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Note On Transliteration 
The system of transliteration used in this thesis is normally that 
used by the Library of Congress. However it should be pointed 
out that most Arabic terms have been transliterated according 
to the Gulf dialect. 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis attempts to unravel the essence of the state in the Gulf Arab 
countries. The study's main argument is that the Gulf Emirates have been able to 
manipulate the oil wealth and create what appear to be modern states. The Gulf 
ruling families were confronted, however, with the dilemma of introducing the kind 
of civil society that accompanies modernity. They have been able to survive and 
legitimate their dominion by exploiting religion as the state ideology. 
Traditional patriarchal norms and cultures have been maintained by the 
ruling tribes in the Gulf The issue of citizenship and citizens' rights has rarely been 
debated in regard to the Gulf However, this is one of the main problems of the 
contemporary situation in the Gulf states. This study concentrates on this issue by 
means of a review of the media. The Gulf media have been utilised to promote the 
modem patriarchal structure of the state. 
The main body of the thesis examines the media in relation to two main 
issues: foreign workers in the Gulf and Gulf women. The final chapter of the 
thesis, however, exposes the fact that Gulf journalists themselves have no rights 
and that at times of crisis the tenuous autonomy they enjoy withers. A major crisis 
occurred very recently to reinforce this argument. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 
2 August 1990 and the deployment of foreign troops in the Gulf created a further 
complication for the Gulf ruling families. They were forced to allow foreign -
mainly American and British journalists- to cover the war, but they compelled 
national reporters to use material which was filtered through the foreign press. 
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Introduction 
The Gulf region has witnessed a drastic transformation during the last two 
decades. Some sort of change has been felt not only by the Gulf nationals, but also by 
many visitors to the region. Sociologists, historians, journalists and other scholars were 
interested in this transition and many have documented it. The relatively poor Gulf 
emirates have emerged as 'modem' states. In a brief period of time they have been able 
to construct their infrastructure. Schools, hospitals, motorways, television networks, 
radio stations, newspapers, luxurious supermarkets and shopping centres were 
estabhshed. These vast and rapid changes can only be compared with the tales in One 
Thousand and One Nights. The newly created states and governments were able to 
transform their countries because of the huge amounts of oil revenues following the 
discovery of oil in large quantities. The dependence on it as the main source of the 
world's energy increased oil prices. New modem cities were built on the mbble of the 
old shanty Gulf towns. In these newly constmcted cities old crafts disappeared to give 
way to new professions and vastly higher standards of living. During the 1970s and 
1980s the standard of living in most of these oil-rich Gulf states was among the highest 
in the world. 
In their msh to constract their modem states, the Gulf govemments needed all 
the expertise and help they could get. Professionals, skilled and unskilled labourers 
were imported from different parts of the world. In the fields of education, health, 
banking, services and constmction expatriate workers were recmited. Thousands of 
white-collar and blue-collar workers mshed to the region to share the abundance of oil 
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wealth. Many Arabs from capital-poor countries were needed especially where mastery 
of the language was crucial such as in the education and media sectors. 
Foreign expertise and labour together with the importation of advanced 
technology - possible due to the huge amounts of oil revenues - transformed the Gulf 
in line with the standards of most of the industrialised countries. This transformation, 
however, did not materialise in the creation of a civil society. The Gulf states are still 
ruled by the same dominant families or tribes. The ruling families have been able to 
maintain most of the traditional norms and have continued to govern by them. 
Traditional patriarchal structures have been combined with modem technologies. The 
Gulf ruling families utilised religion as the ideology or foundation which supported 
the system. 
The Gulf monarchies tried to deliver prosperity and growth as part of their 
plans for development. Some of these leaders have projected themselves as the 
'champions' of modernity and have fought to introduce advanced media outlets - such 
as television - and formal education for women that was condemned by many 
traditionalists. They were confronted, however, with the obstacle of introducing the 
civil society that usually accompanies such transformation. The traditional-patriarchal 
state structure survived all the drastic changes in the region. 
Modernity 'Gulf style' did not bring about any changes in the relation between 
citizens and the newly created states. With a population that has been exposed to 
different cultures - through television or travel - and a large number of highly educated 
citizens, the Gulf rulers were faced with the problem of sporadic popular demands for 
political participation. Nonetheless, they have been able to overcome this difficulty by 
resorting to traditional religious values, together with their oil wealth to underpin their 
authoritarian regimes. Gulf citizens are bribed so as not to challenge the power 
distribution in society. 
The absence of civil society in the Gulf can be clearly observed in the lack of 
citizens rights. Individuals are judged and treated according to their family or tribe in 
relation to the mling elites. Individuals have no rights and there is no space for voicing 
opinions. Unlike most modem societies, the Gulf states have no outlets for popular 
representation. Parliaments do not exist and in the few cases of the short-lived ones -
as in Kuwait and Bahrain - the majority of citizens were not allowed to participate. Gulf 
women, in particular, have no rights either social nor political. Freedom of movement, 
education or choice of husbands or career is denied to women and they are totally 
dependent on their male relatives. 
The Kuwaiti mling family, for example, have been promising to allow women 
to vote and participate in parliamentary elections. In October 1992 a small percentage 
of the Kuwaiti population was allowed to vote in the first elections since the 'liberation' 
of Kuwait. Kuwaiti women felt that they were betrayed by the mling Al-Sabah family 
after all the sacrifices they had made during the invasion. 
Although the media are highly developed, they too are completely confined by 
the state straitjacket. The idea of a fourth estate is a dream that Gulf journalists can not 
afford. Advanced media technology is used in the Gulf to promote the patriarchal 
nature of the state. 
This thesis attempts to examine how the Gulf media behave towards two main 
issues, namely Gulf women and foreign labour. In undertaking this the writer seeks to 
find out how the Gulf media handle these two main issues in relation to the state and, in 
particular, the articulation of their aspirations. In the final chapter, However, Gulf 
journalists themselves become the main object of study in an attempt to discover how 
they fit into the argument about civil society. At this point Gulf joumalists appear to be 
victims themselves of the state's authoritarianism just like the other two examples. 
Although some margin of liberty is tolerated in general, at times of crisis this freedom 
vanishes. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait is used as an illustration of how the state 
manages the media in times of crisis. 
It seems appropriate here to summarise the main argument of the thesis. A few 
scholars have articulated the oppression of the new Gulf states where the ruler has 
complete domination over all aspects of life in his emirate. Others have argued that the 
Gulf states have their own distinctive style of representation and democracy. The 
present vmter puts forward a different argument, namely that the Gulf ruling families 
have been able to adopt most aspects of modem technology and have delivered them to 
their citizens, but they have not departed from their traditional patriarchal norms. 
Hence, they have not created a civil society to complement the modem state structure. 
The thesis is divided into five chapters plus an overall conclusion. The first 
creates the framework for the argument by reviewing the literature on the role of the 
media in modem states, mainly focusing on the issue of the media and citizenship. The 
second chapter attempts to examine the Gulf states in relation to civil rights. The third 
and fourth chapters cover the fieldwork in which the writer monitored the media in four 
Gulf countries. This review of the media concenfrates on two main issues: one social, 
namely the situation of Gulf women, and the other economic, namely the continuous 
dependence on foreign labourers who, like Gulf citizens, have no rights. The f i f th 
chapter looks at the Gulf media, and how Gulf journalists - as a third example - also 
fall under the control of the modem patriarchal state. Although they act as one of the 
state's instruments for expressing its power and filter its ideology to the citizens, they 
too cannot escape its curbs. 
In these three chapters content analysis was used though the writer is aware of 
its disadvantages and that it is an outdated method. However, the complicated Gulf 
societies and the restrictions and curb on the media made it the only useable and 
applicable method. 
The writer is also conscious of the different sociological approaches that are 
used in each chapter. The thesis does not follow a single method, mainly because it 
tackles different interrelated subjects. There is a shift f rom media studies to 
development to gender,etc. One could argue that the study of Gulf media while utilising 
the citizenship theory necessitated this technique. Although the first reading of the 
thesis might suggest that the chapters are not associated, in fact there is a continuity 
throughout the study. To understand and be able to follow the argument one has to 
focus all through the thesis on the idea of the lack of a civil society in the Gulf. The 
Gulf mling elites have never argued that they have a democratic system compared to 
that in many industrialised countries. They have, however, insisted on the argument 
that they have their own peculiar democratic system that is rooted in the culture and 
religion of the region. The writer in this thesis attempts to reveal that this whole 
argument about modemisation is a facade. Since these states have tried to concentrate 
on the media as the main element through which the Gulf ruling families project 
themselves as being modem, the writer tries to provide the opposite through a study of 
the media in general and joumalists in particular. The first chapter, hence, attempts to 
prove that the Gulf media has nothing in common with media in Western countries -
with all its problems - where a civil society exists. The second chapter is an attempt by 
the writer to present a different, and hopefiilly interesting, argument in the study of the 
Gulf, one that is different from the Orientalists or the radical sociologists and scholars. 
The Gulf societies as seen by the writer are very complex and a simplified argument 
such as that they are oppressive is not enough for the main debate in this thesis. 
Given that the thesis is based on empirical study I would like at this point to 
highhght another important factor, namely the obstacles faced by the writer. Firstly: 
being a female from the Gulf made it difficult to get access to many individuals and 
officials. Also travelling around - especially in Saudi Arabia - was almost impossible 
without a male companion. Secondly: being a journalist did not help, because Gulf 
officials never trust local reporters and the public are fearful of revealing any 
information to the media. 
When I started my fieldwork I had plans to interview information ministers in 
the four Gulf countries on which the study concentrates. My plans collapsed after the 
first telephone calls I made to the offices of these ministers to arrange for interviews. I 
sent many letters requesting an interview and explaining what I was doing and the 
specific information needed. I waited for more than six months with no answer. In the 
end the Saudi Information Minister's office replied. I received a phone call from the 
minister's secretary informing me that the interview was scheduled for the next day at 1 
p.m. I had less than twenty four hours to find a 'mahram' (male companion) and 
arrange to fly to Jeddah where the minister was living at the time. In the end, my 
brother agreed to take leave from his job and travel with me. We left by car at five a.m. 
to be able to reach the city of Dhahran in Saudi eastern province where we could catch a 
flight to Jeddah. We spent more than half an hour at the Saudi customs after crossing 
the Bahrain-Saudi causeway. When the customs officials found out that I was a 
journalist they insisted on searching the car and took me to a special room where a 
body search was conducted by a female officer. I was interrogated by the female officer 
who also went through all my papers and read my notes carefully. In accordance with 
the Saudi restrictions on females I had to wear the veil and cover myself up 
completely. 
Throughout our journey I was ignored completely and it was my brother who 
was asked questions such as the purpose of our visit to the Kingdom, etc. Whenever he 
replied that he had no business there except to accompany me the Saudis were 
surprised; at times they made jokes and laughed at him. When we arrived at the 
Ministry of Information in Jeddah we were asked to wait because the minister had not 
yet arrive and the interview was delayed for more than an hour. The minister's 
secretary kept addressing my brother who continually repeated that 'You have to ask 
my sister because she is the one who is going to interview the minister, and not me.' In 
the end I was led to the Saudi minister's office. He gave me a lecture on how they (the 
Saudi government) were encouraging women to join the labour force and take up any 
kind of profession they chose. When I started asking him questions he stopped me and 
said that it would be better i f he could have the opportunity to answer me in writing. 
My efforts to persuade him to go ahead with the interview failed and I left his office 
and took the same hectic journey back home. A few weeks later I received short formal 
answers from the minister which were of no use for my study. Al l this was more than 
two years ago and I am still waiting for answers from the other Gulf information 
ministers. 
C H A P T E R I 
NEWS PRODUCTION: CONTROL OF 
NEWS OR CONTROL OF THOUGHT 
"Print is the best of God's inventions, " 
Martin Luther 
"The endless cycle of idea and action, 
Endless invention, endless experiment. 
Brings knowledge of motion, but not of stillness; 
Knowledge of speech, but not of silence; 
Knowledge of words, and ignorance of the word. 
All our knowledge brings us nearer to death. 
But nearness to death no nearer to God. 
Where is the life we have lost in living? 
Where is the wisdom we have lost in knowledge? 
Where is the knowledge we have lost in 
information?" (ELIOT) 
" But the biggest weapon wielded and actually 
daily unleashed by imperialism against 
collective defiance [for the oppressed and 
exploited is the cultural bomb. The effect of the 
cultural bomb is to annihilate a people's belief 
in their names.in their languages, in their 
environment, in their heritage of struggle, in 
their unity, in their capacities and ultimately in 
themselves " (Kenyan novelist, Ngugi Wa 
Thiong'o, J986: 3). 
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1.1 INTRODUCTION: 
In this chapter I shall try to examine the media with regard to their nature, 
control, relation to the state, etc. In doing so I am attempting to find out why the media 
concentrate on certain specific issues and ignore others; why, for example, the story 
read or watched in London is at the same time read in other parts of the world such as 
Cairo for example. I should make it clear at the outset that I am not trying to find out 
whether the media are biased or not or why they are biased. I am simply trying to 
understand how they function and what elements influence the final news story we 
read or watch on our TV screens. It is important to note that most of the sociological 
studies of news production and the media in general have been conducted with respect 
to the industrialised countries. That is why when one attempts to study news 
production in the Gulf region, for example, one finds it difficult to follow one theory, 
(for more discussion on this subject see Schudson, 1991: 143-4). 
Most of the studies on the mass media have concentrated on myths related 
specifically to news production, such as the myth of objectivity on which most 
journalists pride themselves. Before studying these myths, however, and the different 
schools of thought that have emerged, I shall try to define the relationship between the 
state and mass communications, principally the citizenship theory based on the ideas of 
Jurgen Hebermas. Hebermas argued that the development of capitalism was 
accompanied by the creation of a large space for a public forum. However, since the 
second half of the nineteenth century, this public space has been dominated by the state 
and economic interests. 
"A new corporatistpattern of power relations was 
established in which organized interests bargained 
with each other and with the state, while 
increasingly excluding the public. The media ceased 
to be an agency of empowerment and rationality, 
and became a further means by which the public 
was sidelined. Instead ofproviding a conduit for 
rational-critical debate, the media manipulated 
mass opinion " (Curran, 1991: 83). 
By doing this the media have in fact transformed the public into 'passive 
consumers.' The development of any democratic political process requires 
knowledgeable citizens. Graham Murdock noted that in a democratic society, "it is not 
enough for people simply to possess citizenship rights. They must be able to exercise 
them, and this requires policies designed to guarantee access to the conditions needed 
for effective participation" (1992: 20-1). The concept of citizenship itself assumes that 
the public is informed and provided with channels of communication (McQuail, 1991: 
72). Peter Golding and Graham Murdock have argued that the history of mass 
communication is also a history of how the media helped in infusing 'full citizenship' 
(1991: 22). "Citizenship is about the conditions that allow people to become full 
members of the society at every level." In an ideal situation, they wrote, the media or 
mass communication in general could contribute to this by: 
(i) providing the public with information and advice that 
would alert them to their rights and how to observe them. 
(ii) providing information and debate on areas that involve political choices 
and facilitating the means for the public to suggest changes. 
The public sphere, however, is limited because of two main factors: firs, the 
ownership and control of these media outlets, and second, the nature of the relations 
between state regulations and communications institutions ( ibid. 23). Some have 
argued that the development of the mass media has always been connected with the 
evolution of states. The mass media in all their forms have been used by the state to 
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circulate material and information that are of use to it, while at the same time restricting 
any critical news. As John Thompson put it (1990: 168): 
"..the history of the regulation of mass 
communication can be understood as the history of 
attempts by state officials to construct and 
impose mechanisms for the restricted 
implementation of symbolic forms. By suppressing 
information, monitoring output, controlling access 
to technical media and punishing offenders, state 
officials have devised a variety of institutional 
mechanisms which circumscribe the flow of 
symbolic forms and, in some cases, link the 
restricted implementation of symbolic forms to 
the pursuit of overt political aims." 
The governments of most of the industrialised countries have dominated the 
media, and broadcasting in particular, the excuse given being the limited number of 
wave-lengths and television channels available and that these are public service outlets 
that ought to be protected. The main reasons, however, for such control were state fears 
of the power of these outlets i f they were left unmonitored (ibid.: 204). 
The development of mass communication has witnessed a more sophisticated 
method of state control, especially in the industrialised countries. Media outlets are 
increasingly concentrated in the hands of a few individuals or conglomerates and away 
from the direct control of the state, to the delight of the traditional liberalists who have 
always believed that once the media are removed from the state freedom of expression 
is secured. Recent experience and examples, however, have proved them wrong. 
Limitations on the public sphere have been imposed by the owners of these media 
outlets who have strong ties with the ruling elites. Governments, in most of the 
industrialised countries, have also been the largest advertisers in the media. In this way 
the state is actually able to influence the media's output (Golding and Murdock, 1991: 
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25). In fact, the power of these conglomerates and the pressure they exercise on their 
media channel is enormous. 
"The free market thus compromises rather than 
guarantees the editorial integrity of commercial 
media, and impairs in particular its oversight 
ofprivate corporate power " (Curran, 1991: 87). 
James Curran has cited evidence that these conglomerates ally themselves with 
specific governments or ruling parties, their reasons for doing so being that their 
businesses will benefit in the end. He concludes that the media conglomerates are not 
independent 'watchdogs' serving the public; rather they promote their own interests. 
The role conglomerates play will be discussed later in this chapter. 
In pursuing the argument of state domination over the public sphere, two 
examples might be quoted briefly, one from an industrialised democratic country 
where there is no direct government control over the media, the other from a non-
democratic country ruled by a single family. 
The first example is that of the deterioration of the British Broadcasting 
Corporation's current affairs programme 'Panorama' which has always been thought 
of as being on the side of the public. The Weekend Guardian of 19 September 1992 
published an article entitled 'The taming of Panorama,' in which the writer, Dave Hill , 
argued that the programme had been facing pressures not to be too critical of the 
Conservative Government, and that several Panorama episodes had been dropped, 
delayed or altered on the excuse that they contained controversial information. The 
article, traced the history of 'Panorama' and attempts by different governments to 
'tame' it, the last instance cited being during the Gulf War when the episode 'Project 
Babylon,' in which Panorama produced evidence that the British Government had been 
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helping to arm Saddam Hussein's Government was postponed until the war was over. 
Hill wrote: 
"The most alarming result, it is claimed, is that 
programmes critical ofgovernment policy stand in 
danger of being defused, diluted, or both." 
The second example comes fi-om a completely different structure, especially as 
regards to relations between the state and the media. In Saudi Arabia media outlets 
controlled either directly by the government (television and radio) or indirectly through 
private owners who have close links with the government. In 1991 the first Arab 
satellite television station. The Middle East Broadcasting Centre, was launched ft"om 
London. Part of the reason for its being based in London was to distance it from the 
direct control and influence of any Arab government. The channel is privately owned 
by several Arab businessmen mainly Saudis; a main shareholder is a relative of the 
King Fahd of Saudi Arabia. During the first few months of transmission MBC 
concentrated on news in the style of the American cable network CNN. Later, 
however, news and current affairs editors came under pressure from the owners, 
especially the relative of King Fahd, who imposed the Kingdom's policy on MBC's 
news bulletins. Gradually MBC changed to become a mouthpiece of the Kingdom and 
all critical views were excluded. 
1.2 DIFFERENT SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT: 
It may well be appropriate at this point to give a brief and panoramic view of 
the different schools of thought that have attempted to study and understand the media. 
Throughout history the media have taken different forms. In ancient Greece oral 
communication was dominant since the printing press was not yet invented. Print 
became the main form of communication in pre-industrial Europe, especially in 
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Britain. Communication centres (if we can use this term) shifted from East to West 
with the invention of the printing press and later of more advanced means of 
communication. Yet most of the rest of the world was introduced to the printing press 
during the colonisation period when many Western imperialists such as England and 
France sent their printing machines along with their armies. From this period on these 
countries were to continue to be dependent on the West for communication and 
information technologies. (This will be discussed briefly later in this chapter.) 
To mention just a few, the major schools of thought that have studied the media 
were the following. First, the Frankftirt school composed of a group of social theorists 
who fled Nazi Germany in the late 1930s and settled in the United States, where they 
combined Marxian and Freudian ideas to develop a better understanding of society. 
They emphasised the limited effects of the media, but they criticised not only the media 
but all other aspects of life related to the newly created consumer society. The most 
prominent names in this school were Max Horkheimer, Erich Fromm, Theodor 
Adomo, Leo Lowenthal and Herbert Marcuse. 
Another group of social scienfists emerged in the United States in the post-
Second World War period, led by Daniel Lemer, Wilbur Schramm, Ithiel de Sola Pool, 
Lucien Pye and others, and known as the Development school, because they advocated 
the development of Third World countries by means of advanced media or 
communication technologies. Their ideas spread widely, especially among scholars 
from developing nations. But in order to understand Lemer and his colleagues one 
must look at the emergence of the United States as a world power and the urgent need 
to create a single consumer market dominated by Washington. In saying this one needs 
to mention that the US exported programmes are not spreading American values or 
ways of living, but rather capitalist values which the United States truly depict 
(Srebemy-Mohammadi, 1991: 130). 
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Consumerism was not a new phenomenon, at this time. The first newspaper 
advertisement appeared in 1658 (Hil l , 1988:189). But consumerism as a world 
economy and a base for control developed after the Second World War. Lemer v^TOte: 
'Development as an international ideology began with a communication-the State of the 
Union message delivered to Congress by President Harry S. Truman in January 1949' 
(Schiller, 1989: 138). It was not surprising to f ind Lerner repeating Truman's 
announcement that the age of imperialism had been ended. Lemer and his colleagues 
at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology advocated the idea that communication 
was a powerftil promoter of social change that could be used in African and Asian 
countries as a means for development (ibid.: 137). They carried out a study of several 
Middle Eastern countries including Iran, Turkey and Lebanon, where they concluded 
that the establishment of advanced media had helped in developing the rural regions. 
Lerner has been criticised by several scholars from the region including A l i 
Mohammadi, who argues that modernisation as defined by Lemer, actually meant 
Westernization (Mohammadi, 1990: 273). He noted that the first television station in 
Iran was established by a rich Iranian who was also the agent for Pepsi Cola, and who 
became the sole agent in the country for TV sets. The TV station imported 
programmes and advertisements from the United States, which became common not 
only in Iran but also in most of the countries on the west bank of the Arabian (Persian) 
Gulf Mohammadi regarded the argument that imported programmes were cheaper as 
insufficient in the case of Iran. He wrote that during the government of the Shah, 
National Iranian Radio and Television had a huge budget, but 'it seemed safer for the 
regime to allow lots of Western entertainment to be imported than to allow possibly 
critical homemade programs to appear' (ibid.: 276). 
To return to Lemer's argument, Mohammadi found that Iran developed an 
artificial modemity, that is to say, people dressed in Western styles, their social lives 
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had changed, but no real political or economic changes had taken place. Nor did the 
government improve the health or education sectors. Iran was a police state, where 
freedom of expression, of speech or of the press, was not allowed. Westerners were 
favoured over the local population. 
"In Iran, as in much of the Third World, 
development was replaced by a mimetic 
Westernization, a copying of the superficial 
elements of the modern West without the 
fundamental political and social changes 
required. Economic dependency, as in the spread 
of montage industries that merely assemble 
consumer technologies developed elsewhere 
(thus not helping an independent economic 
sector to grow), was supported by cultural 
dependency, in which mass media broadcast 
news and cultural entertainment programs 
more attuned to the markets of industrial 
nations or regime needs than to the cultural 
habits of the Iranian people " (ibid.: 279). 
This criticism was widely raised by other Third World countries at the United 
Nations which called for a new information order. The main UN agency concerned 
with the issue was UNESCO which came under attack from the United States which 
finally abandoned it altogether. The call for a new information order fell on deaf ears 
among the developed nations and was ultimately dropped. The same developing 
countries who called for the new order found their own cultures being invaded by new 
concepts and ideas not to mention language. They lost the battle when they became 
totally dependent on the United States for technical assistance (Schiller, 1989: 144). 
One example of this dependence is shown by the way most Third World 
countries are reliant on the industrialised nations for information and news about their 
region. One of the most urgent issues is the control over satellites by a handful of 
developed countries ( Demac, 1990: 214). The same could be said of almost all the 
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advanced communication technologies such as computers and computer software, 
telephones, radios, and television. UNESCO's 1989 statistics found that only 4 per 
cent of the world's computer hardware was owned by developing countries. Of the 700 
million telephones in the world, the Third World had less than 10 per cent, while nine 
of the developed countries owned 75 per cent of the total. Among the developing 
nations, 39 had no newspapers and 30 others only one in comparison with the United 
States' has 168 and Japan's 125. Average radio ownership in the Third World was 142 
per 1000 population as compared with 990 in developed nations and 2,100 in the 
United States. As for television, the world average is 137 per 1000, with 447 per 1000 
in the developed countries but only 36 per 1000 in the developing nations. The gap 
between the two as regards TV programmes and films is even greater in most 
developing nations the flow is entirely one way. 
These countries also depend almost totally on the major Western news 
agencies, namely the Associated Press and United Press International (American), 
Reuters (British), and AFP (French). Most news is about these Western countries 
unless events elsewhere affect them, such as the Iran-Iraq war or conflicts in other 
Third World countries. Other news which might attract the attention of the major news 
agencies is news of crashes of aeroplanes (that might have carried citizens of these 
nations), or natural disasters such as floods, hurricanes, famines etc. (Hamelink, 1990 
: 223). The flow of news from Western countries is almost 100 times more than that 
from Third World countries to the West. 
It is important to note here that the idea of 'Global culture' has been thoroughly 
discussed in the West and criticised by many sociologists because in fact it means that 
the less fortunate (mostly developing) nations will be inundated with new styles of 
living, fashions, music and other cultural elements that are alien to them. Studies not 
only in Third World countries, but also in many European states, have found that 
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programmes such as 'Dallas' can have an effect on viewers. Of course this is a subject 
of considerable disagreement among scholars. Believers in the so-called 'active 
audience' (see below) have found that individuals with different backgrounds interpret 
'Dallas' differently; they have based their argument on a study by a graduate student on 
the effect of Dallas on Israeli society with all its differences. 
Anthony Smith, one of the critics of the development theory and how it could 
create a global culture, has noted (1990: 176): 
"a global culture would operate at several levels 
simultaneously: as a cornucopia of standardized 
commodities, as a patchwork of denationalized 
ethnic or folk motifs, as a series ofgeneralised 
'human values and interests', as a uniform 
'scientific' discourse of meaning, andfinally as the 
interdependent system of communications that 
forms the material base for all the other 
components and levels." 
Schiller refers to it as 'cultural annexation,' or 'unrestricted commercial 
intercourse between nations.' He then makes the appeal, "..The technology of modem 
communications must be won away from its current custodians" (Schiller, 1969: 152). 
During recent years we have seen the flourishing of so- called 'active audience' 
believers, who argue that the power of the media is balanced by the power of viewers 
or readers who make sense of the material being fed to them. Others argue that, with 
advanced technologies (i.e., videos, satellite dishes, cable channels), the individual has a 
large spectrum to choose from. Leaders in this approach are Katz, Ang, Liebes and 
others who concentrate on the individual interpretation of what s/he watches or reads. 
Schiller is one of many who disagree with the 'active audience' theorists. He has noted 
that, though audiences are important, they do not play an active role in choosing, ....etc: 
social and economic changes are much more important since they create new attitudes 
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and maybe even needs (Schiller, 1989: 153). John Fiske and John Hartley, however, 
have stressed the point that television programmes always carry the message of the 
dominant class (Fiske and Hartley, 1978). 
A few scholars have also argued that the increase in media outlets has not led to 
more space for the public sphere. James Curran wrote recently that though there are 
now more television stations, these broadcasting centres are not producing different 
material or, for that matter following a new ideological perspective. CNN, he noted, 
does not construct news differently from the other three main American networks 
(Curran, 1991: 94). Fred Inglis has also argued that social theories are not like scientific 
ones. Unlike the clean-cut theories of science, social theories are 'messy' just like 
culture (Inglis, 1990: 173). 
In trying to understand news production I shall try to avoid the argument that 
news is biased either to the left or to the right as many people claim. Instead, I shall try 
to interpret the media (and the news media in particular) as a complex social and 
cultural product that is produced under pressure at all levels. I shall attempt to 
combine the three main approaches to media studies: 
(i) Via the political economy which relates the outcome of the media to the 
economic structure of the media organisation and the state in general; 
(ii) Via the social organisation and occupational ideology; 
(iii) Via the cultural approach which concentrates on the symbols rather than on 
relations between individuals or the organisational structure. For example, in reaction to 
minorities, racial problems, women,etc. the cultural approach concentrates on the 
culture rather than on the journalist who reported the story or the organisation he works 
for (Schudson, 1989: 266). 
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Each of the above approaches has its strengths and weaknesses. For example, 
the political economy approach, or what is also known as the 'conspiracy theory' or 
propaganda model, has been criticised by many scholars on both sides of the Atlantic. 
One of its major exponents, Noam Chomsky, recently replied to many of his critics in 
an important book (Chomsky, 1989). Yet even critics of such an approach cannot 
ignore its logic. Such was the case of Graham Murdock who did not agree completely 
with the idea that news production is influenced by the ruling class, yet admitted that 
'The basic definition of the situation which underpins the news reporting of political 
events very largely coincides with the definition provided by the legitimated power 
holders' (quoted in Schudson, 1989: 268). 
To understand news production, however, as based on organisational structures 
and pressures is not enough to give a clear idea of the reasons for the final product. 
The social organisation approach concentrates on the individual journalist and her/his 
relation to their superiors. It also takes into account such concepts as the reporter's 
objectivity. 
The third approach to news production tends to see the news as part of a whole 
culture or maybe a reflection of this culture since it uses the same cultural symbols. For 
example, two scholars (Johan Galtung and Mari Ruge) found that reporters concentrate 
on individuals rather than on structures because Western culture tends to stress the 
power of the individual,....etc. Marshall Sahlins wrote that 'an event isn't just a 
happening and a given world, it is a relation between a certain happening and a given 
symbolic system' (Sahlins, 1985: 153). 
The media, or to be precise the news, produced under different strains and 
pressures, direct pressures imposed by the profession itself or indirect ones such as the 
ideological considerations involved in the process of collecting, choosing and writing a 
news story. Editors and journalists are under pressure to beat deadlines, they are 
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always running against time. This has been known to many sociologists as a 'stop-
watch culture' in which journalists are taught that to be obsessed about time is to be 
professional. 
"Time is the substance of which I am made. Time 
is a river which weeps me along, but I am the 
river; it is a tiger which mangles me, but I am 
the tiger; it is a fire which consumes me, but I 
am the fire " (Jorge Luis Borges quoted in 
Schlesinger, 1978: 83). 
A few people have been arguing that, because news is produced daily, it is 
impossible to give in-depth analyses and articles. That is why, they argue, news is so 
personalised; it concentrates on the individual rather than on the structure, the system or 
the society. One might ask why news is gathered on a daily base. Why is it (using Fred 
Inglis's term) a 'one-day best-seller'? Is it because of the human daily cycle, or the 
capitaHst way of running business? As Tuchman noted 'News is not a report on a 
factual world; news is a depletable consumer product that must be made fi-esh daily' 
(Tuchman, 1978: 179). In trying to understand news production in general, one might 
perhaps be able to understand the different factors that enforce such restraints as time. 
Journalists, in their msh to meet their deadlines or to get the story ahead of their 
colleagues, tend to turn to the more available information, such as statistics produced 
by the govemment or the official views on issues. They thus end up with a one-sided 
story. They also tend to report the story as it is, without any background; often this 
could do more harm to the story than not getting the facts straight. 
Newcomers to the field will be assigned to beats that are usually govemment 
ministries or agencies connected to the govemment. They try to familiarise themselves 
with their assignments and of course start to build up connections. As I know fi"om my 
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own experience, the most successful reporter is the one who has more prominent 
sources than his colleagues. I personally experienced this in most of the newspapers 
and magazines that I have worked for and even before that at the university. As 
students of journalism we were assigned to beats that were usually different college and 
departments. We start our daily work with a roundup of these departments; checking 
with professors or secretaries about activities that are going to take place. As all 
journalists we competed with each other for stories we get. When we got at the 
professional level we were prepared to be assigned for beats and instead of colleges we 
changed to ministries. Reporters are promoted to editors of specific sections of the 
newspaper or even editors in chief i f they have proved that they were able to get the 
most senior official as their source. One reporter covering state government has been 
quoted as saying, 'The only important tool of the reporter is his news sources and how 
he uses them' (Schudson, 1989: 271). 
Competition also plays a role in the kind of stories that we read or watch on our 
television screens. Journalists, rushing to beat their colleagues, try to get the story as 
fast as possible and this could be one of the reasons why there are so few in-depth 
stories. The economic side of news production plays a role also, since in-depth and 
investigative reporting costs more time and money. That is why we are now presented 
with less and less investigative reporting of the kind that became fashionable for a time, 
especially following Watergate. Journalists turn to official spokespersons, the police 
and so on, in the belief that they are more reliable and therefore the story they provide 
needs no second checking which, as noted above, is money and time-consuming. An 
example of this occurred in 1986 when President Reagan accused the Nicaraguan 
Government of being involved in drug trafficking. The American and British media 
reported it without checking, and when it was found to be wrong did not bother to 
report this (Herman, 1990: 81). Another recent example of the media's trusting the 
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officials was the second Gulf war, when the British and American media waited for 
the official spokespersons to feed them with the news (see Chapter 5). 
As for international news, the barrier of language is of course one of the 
disadvantages facing reporters most of whom cannot speak a foreign language. The 
assumption that English is spoken fluently all over the world does sometimes fail the 
reporter who could be faced with a group of people who do not know a single word of 
English. This issue was raised by many critics of the media coverage of the recent Gulf 
War, who noted that all but a few of the reporters in Riyadh and Baghdad could not 
speak Arabic. 
Language is not the only barrier that correspondents are faced with when 
reporting from foreign countries. The understanding of other cultures could be a much 
more difficult issue facing most Western reporters. Annabelle Srebemy-Mohammadi 
found that the high costs of covering foreign countries has forced many networks to 
close down their local offices and settle for a foreign correspondent or 'stringer' who 
travels from one place to another as required. Such an arrangement makes it even more 
difficult for a foreign correspondent to try to specialise in one country or area. 
According to Srebemy-Mohammadi, however, it is not only financial restraints that 
have affected foreign news reporting, but also organisational pressures. She cites the 
case of the ABC crew in Lebanon during the hijacking of a TWA aircraft in 1985. 
ABC had an office in Beirut before the incident took place and most of its crew spoke 
Arabic and had therefore been able to get a good story. Their editors, however, 
considered that they had got 'too involved' with the people they were covering and 
therefore took the decision to move them to another country. 
It is also worth noting that a reporter for an American network during the 
negotiations for the Camp David agreement lost her job because in her reporting she 
concenfrated on the anger felt by most Arabs towards President Sadat of Egypt and the 
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American Administration. She later wrote a book about the agreement which she called 
'Frogs and Scorpions'. 
1.3 NEUTRALITY THE BIG MYTH: 
News as a product is not at all neutral although most journalists believe that it 
is. Nor are the styles of writing the news or of broadcasting it neutral. News angles, or 
camera shots in the case of television, can sometimes twist the reality of what has 
happened. Even the lighting that is used in news programmes, the lenses (the use of 
close-ups, long shots, etc.) the graphics, the length of a shot, all these are done in a very 
precise way to help the message that the producer or editor wants to get across to the 
viewer. We can still remember the huge portrait of Saddam Hussein that was used by 
BBC television during their continuous coverage of the Gulf War. It gave the 
impression of the Iraqi President being a dictator or a Hitler, as he was described by the 
British media. Since most viewers have become accustomed to the fast pace of 
television commercials, for example, the same fast technique has been adopted by 
news programme producers, in their continuous attempt to hold the audience in a 
highly competitive field. Television commercials usually last no longer than 30 
seconds, and so news items are now composed of shots; each lasting a maximum of 7 
seconds (Gruneau and Hackett, 1990: 290). 
As regards to newspapers, the game is concentrated on where the news story is 
published and where in the story the most important or controversial element is hidden. 
Scholars like Hallin, Herman, Chomsky and Lipstadt, have written that although in 
most Western liberal societies news stories about controversial issues do get published 
in the newspapers, they could never make it to the front pages. Hallin takes the 
argument further by claiming that since Vietnam the style of writing has changed to 
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hide the truth as in a story as much as possible. He argues that there has been a 'reverse 
inverted pyramid' (Schudson, 1989: 272). 
Each day reporters and editors have to choose from among the thousands of 
stories and happenings around the world a handful of news items to be published or 
broadcast. This is well known as the 'news values,' which in itself raises the question 
of which criteria these journalists use in judging stories or events, Stuart Hall has 
written: 
"news values'are one of the most opaque 
structures of meaning in modern society. All 'true 
journalists' are supposed to possess it: few can or 
are willing to identify and define it. Journalists 
speak of'the news' as if events select themselves. 
Further, they speak as if which is the 'most 
significant' news story, and which 'news angles' 
are most salient are divinely inspired. Yet of the 
millions of events which occur every day in the 
world, only a tiny portion ever become visible as 
'potential news stories'; and of this proportion, 
only a small fraction are actually produced as the 
day's news in the news media. We appear to be 
dealing, then, with a 'deep structure' whose 
fiinction as a selective device is un-transparent 
even to those who professionally must know how 
to operate it" (quoted in Schudson, 1989: 277). 
Journalists have created their own vocabulary and terminology, with the use of 
words such as 'claimed' which can give a completely different feeling to the reader 
from the word 'said' which is mostly used when quoting an official, whereas 'claimed' 
is used when referring to unofficial sources. Specific words are used to describe other 
countries, especially Third World nations. The word 'terrorism' is used quite often by 
the media but only to refer to specific groups or nations (mostly Arab) but not to other 
countries which follow the same practices. Terrorism, for example, is used loosely 
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when referring to any Palestinian political group including, at some points, the Palestine 
Liberation Organisation (PLO), while the state of Israel, with all its human rights 
violations and expansionist attitudes, is never referred to as a terrorist state. Srebemy-
Mohammadi lists a few examples with respect to Iran after the revolution and how the 
media changed its language and terminology, referring for instance, to Iranian women 
in black robes or veiled (Srebemy-Mohammadi, 1990: 302). 
Editors and journalists identify events and relate them to other events', for 
instance, 'another terrorist mugging attack,' another case of 'child abuse'. Hall and his 
colleagues in their book 'Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State and Law and Order' 
argued that reported events, as shown above, are thus placed on a cultural map of 
meaning; although these maps may vary somewhat between different organs of the 
mass media they all share a consensual image of society. 
Correspondents will not report events unless they can be fitted into the existing 
framework. So news is not really new; instead it is old. This is also true i f we look at 
what have become known as the 'staged events' such as press conferences, court 
hearings, etc. when editors and reporters prepare for the events. Even major events, 
such as the US bombing of Libya or the first day of the air bombardment of Baghdad 
by the allies, have been found to have been staged to coincide with the main news 
bulletins by the major US networks (on the Libyan attack see Chomsky, 1989: 272). 
1.4 OBJECTIVTY: ANOTHER MYTH: 
Journalists are obsessed with the idea of objectivity. One of the reasons for this 
obsession could be that they like to regard themselves as professionals with 
professional ethics. Yet joumalists are not required to pass specific tests or to obtain a 
licence like other professionals, and this is what makes the idea so dangerous. 
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Objectivity as a basis for news production was first invented in the United 
States and has been taught in most schools of journalism all over the world. The 
objectivity myth was introduced by the Associated Press for commercial reasons in 
order to sell uniform wire service news to a large number of newspapers and television 
networks in different parts of the world. It has been criticised by different scholars for a 
number of reasons. Walter Lippman, for example, argued that '..the effort to state an 
absolute fact is simply an attempt to achieve what is humanly impossible, all I can do is 
to give you my interpretation of the facts' (quoted in Schudson, 1989: 271). 
The argument in favors of the impossibility of objectivity can be seen through 
an understanding of human beings. Objectivity implies that journalists are different 
from all other people, that they can get rid of all their feelings, emotions or 
backgrounds when they sit down in front of a typewriter or a keyboard. This is, of 
course, unthinkable. Claud Cockbum, one of the last survivals of the radical press, 
wrote, 'The humbug and hypocrisy of the press begin only when newspapers pretend 
to be "impartial" or "servants of the public". And this only becomes dangerous as well 
as laughable when the public is fool enough to believe it' (quoted in Elliott, 1978: 191). 
Objectivity, it has been argued, is also one way of legitimising the state since it 
gives officials certain rights and guarantees a positive reaction to what they say. Many 
studies have found that the media are actually biased towards official views, something 
that can be seen particularly clearly in times of war (Vietnam, Panama, Grenada, the 
Falklands and most recently the Gulf War). 
News production, as noted earlier, is a highly selective process. It starts with 
choosing a specific incident to write about out of the hundreds of other things 
happening at the same time. Journalists also decide on the angle they are going to use in 
writing the story, which information to drop and which to concentrate on, etc. The last 
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step is for the editor to decide where to publish it, whether to put it on the front page or 
to hide it inside the paper. 
"The mass media and government can therefore 
make an event newsworthy' merely by giving it 
their sustained attention..By the same token, 
they can make another perfectly newsworthy 
event a nonhappening for the bulk of the 
population " (Herman, 1990: 85). 
Reporters are sometimes forced to cut a story or choose one rather than another 
simply because of the amount of space available in a newspaper or of time in a news 
programme. Imagine the situation where the journalist in charge finds out a few 
seconds before a news programme starts that s/he is 10 seconds short; s/he would 
definitely grab the story that fits this slot without thinking of its content. The same 
could be said about newspapers. In my own experience as a reporter, I have found that 
many stories are dropped at the last moment or added for the simple reason that the 
paper was going to press and the editor had to fill an empty space. 
One of the most interesting and controversial areas in media studies is the 
question of how much joumalists know about their audience. And do they really write 
and broadcast what their readers and viewers are interested in? One argument is that, 
since news is a commodity that is available in the market for sale (this argument will be 
pursued further in this chapter) then those who work in the media should know what 
their consumers want or need. To develop this argument, it could be argued that i f 
people in Britain, for example, do not like page three of the tabloid newspapers then the 
circulation of these papers ought to be very low. But the statistics show that they have 
the highest number of readers among British newspapers. Could it be that the majority 
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of the British public escape from the problems of their daily lives by reading the gossip 
columns and looking at the page three girl? 
Other studies have proved the opposite. For example, Herbert Gans in his study 
of news at four major US networks and magazines, found that journalists know very 
little about their readers. He argued that most of them are not really interested in 
knowing their audience and that they usually write for their superiors and colleagues 
(Gans, 1980: 230). Although readers think that reporters write for them, the evidence 
shows that Gans' finding is more accurate. Even though journalists will argue that their 
readers do not like this type of news or that, they do not actually know anything about 
their readers and do not even care to read reports which could give them more 
information about them, such as their ages, professions and interests or class 
backgrounds. Journalists have their own clubs or bars where they meet other 
colleagues in the business and each one of them passes judgment on the others. They 
have no time to socialise with other people who could be their readers. 
"I began this study with the assumption that 
journalists, as commercial employees, take the 
audience directly into account when selecting and 
producing stories; I therefore paid close attention 
to how the journalists conceived of and related to 
their audience. I was surprised to find, however, 
that they had little knowledge about the actual 
audience and rejected feed back from it. Although 
they had a vague image of the audience, they paid 
little attention to it; instead they filmed and wrote 
for their superiors and for themselves " (Gans, 
1980: 229-30). 
Since joumahsts do not know anything about their audience they use their own 
judgment when it comes to story selection. They sometimes judge a story by its being 
new to them, although it might not be new to their readers. In saying this, one can not 
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overlook the fact that not all reporters and editors are ignorant of their audiences, 
otherwise this would be reflected in their circulations and ratings, which most 
joumalists take seriously as an indication of their success or failure. 
In their book 'Making the News,' Peter Golding and Philip Elliott argued that 
what researchers should concentrate on is the structure of newsmaking rather than the 
bias in the news. They say that even though news has to be comprehensive, it is in fact 
selective since the editor's job is to select a few stories out of hundreds. Or as Chief 
Justice Warren E. Burger has said: 'for better or worse, editing is what editors are for 
and editing is the choice and selection of material'. The term 'gatekeeper' has been 
used to refer to editors in their role of choosing from the daily stories produced or 
gathered by journalists. This term also shows how news is selective and not 
comprehensive. Editors usually choose the stories that wil l sell more, not copies but 
advertisements. Editors, after all, are also under pressure from the proprietors and the 
advertisers. They have to follow the policy that was set by their board of directors. 
It could also be argued that editors, even i f they are free from all the other 
pressures, are not free from their own prejudices, class origins, and sometimes even 
ignorance. The same thing could be said about joumalists, who in most instances create 
the news and not just report it. Since they get their stories from sources such as news 
agencies and official spokespersons, 
''Processes or 'gatekeeping' in mass communication 
may be viewed within a framework of a total 
social system, made up of a series of subsystems 
whose primary concerns include the control of 
information in the interest of gaining other social 
ends " (Donahaue, 1972: 45). 
Editors tend to enforce the ideology of the owner (or owners) of a newspaper 
or television network on all the joumalists who work under their command. Beginners 
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get to know the roles of their papers and how to get their stories published from their 
editors during what is called the training period for new recruits. They also learn their 
paper's policies from reading it, and they know that i f they fail to follow these policies 
they might not get promotion or might even lose their jobs. Edward Jay Epstein, who 
coordinated a seminar on organisational theory, found that individuals in these 
institutions alter their values so as to fit with those of the organisation they work for 
(Schudson 1989: 273). 
When reporters start expressing different views from those their editors want, 
they could face dismissal; recent history has shown many such cases not only in 
Britain, but also in other European countries, and in the United States. Former Federal 
Communications Commissioner, Nicholas Johnson described this process when he 
wrote: 
"The story is told of a reporter who first comes up 
with an investigative story idea, writes it up and 
submits it to the editor and is told the story is not 
going to run. He wonders why, but the next time he 
is cautious enough to check with the editor first. 
He is told by the editor that it would be better not 
to write that story. The third time he thinks of an 
investigative story idea but doesn't bother the 
editor with it because he knows it's silly. The 
fourth time he doesn't even think of the idea 
anymore" (quoted in Schulman, 1990: 117). 
1.5 The Satanic Majesty of the Media: 
The Press and television in most Western countries tend to over-represent the 
royal families, the ruling parties and the rich and famous, while ignoring the news 
about minorities such as blacks or Asians, or even about majorities such as women, the 
working class, and trade unions. This makes the situation appear as a kind of 
conspiracy by the rich and powerful against the poor, whereas it could just be the way 
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the news is produced. In other words, a study of the factors that affect this kind of 
reporting could make it more understandable; for example, the proprietors and their 
class origins or the interests they represent, the pressures from advertisers (for an 
audience with a high purchasing power), the backgrounds of editors and joumalists and 
the media ethics. The cultural approach to media study could be used here to 
understand this concentration on specific classes and groups of people. Paul Hartman 
and Charles Husband wrote as long as 1973: 
"The British cultural tradition contains elements 
derogatory to foreigners, particularly blacks. The 
media operate within the culture and are obliged to 
use cultural symbols " (1973: 274). 
The Media in most industrialised nations tend to be concentrated in the hands of 
a few individuals or conglomerates. Newspapers used to be owned by single families 
but as production costs have gone up many of these families have been forced to sell 
part of their shares; this introduced the era of the conglomerates, but there are still a few 
individuals who hold the largest number of shares. These individuals or groups can 
make their influence felt on the media content. Many have claimed that the new media 
owners are simply shareholders who are interested in profit rather than making a 
political statement. However, it has been found that most media proprietors are 
ideologically committed and not just neutral businessmen ( Curran, 1991: 95). James 
Curran has argued that the best example of this is Rupert Murdoch. Although Murdoch 
has at times accepted the judgment of his newspaper editors, there were many 
inicidents where he imposed his own views against the advice of these editors. 
Lord Beaverbrook, the then proprietor of the Daily Express, told the 1948 
Royal Commission on the Press that he ran the paper 'purely for propaganda and with 
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no other objective', but he added that a paper is not good 'for propaganda unless it has 
a thoroughly good financial position' (Royal Commission on the Press, 1948). Or as 
Ralph Miliband argued: 
"Making money is not at all incompatible with 
indoctrination...the purpose of the entertainment 
industry, in its various forms, may be profit; but 
the content of its output is not by any means free 
from ideological connotations of a more or less 
definite kind" (Miliband 1973: 202). 
Antonio Gramsci noted a long time ago that after 1900, with the advanced 
technologies such as telephones and wire services, the press was faced with increased 
financial pressure and so had turned to local business 'these institutional shareholders 
then exerted pressure on the editors to follow a specific line' (Gramsci, 1985: 386). 
The concentration of power in the media is greater now than at any time in 
history . Daily and Sunday newspapers, paperback books, records and commercial 
television stations are in the hands of a few firms or individuals; women's and 
children's magazines and cinema exhibition, for instance, are concentrated in two 
companies in Britain. Conglomeration in the media sector is very prominent, with the 
ovmers of newspapers or television at the same time holding shares in other companies 
and industries such as oil, gas and military technology. This, as Neal Ascherson has 
argued, leads to 'the increase of potential "no go" areas for critical reporting', due to the 
fact that newspaper proprietors tend to use the media to gain a favourable image for 
their other products (quoted in Gurevitch, et a l , 1982: 140). 
Even though many editors and reporters regard themselves as able to report 
whatever they think they should, it has been proved that they are not as free as they 
think even i f there is no direct censorship or control exercised by the proprietor. 
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"/ believe that the suggestion of editorial 
independence is a romantic myth dreamed up by 
editors. There is no doubt in my mind at all that 
proprietors who, having spent a great deal of money 
on a newspaper, at the very least will not allow it 
to express views consistently with which they 
strongly disagree. Editors would rapidly find that if 
they wanted to do otherwise, they would be looking 
for a new job " ( Lord Marsh of Mannington, 
chairman of the Newspaper Publishers Association 
since 1975 in 'The Press Barons', BBC World 
Service, 23 Dec. 1984). 
The problem gets worse when joumalists feel that they should avoid any kind 
of investigative reporting about a company i f their newspaper proprietor has shares in 
it. In this case as Gurevitch, Bennett, Curran and Woollacott argue that reporters 
exercise self-censorship by not investigating areas that might be of problem for their 
employing organization. This practice of newspaper proprietors holding shares in 
other businesses has been criticised by proprietors themselves. For instance, Rupert 
Murdoch stated, in an interview conducted in November 1977, ' I don't think that a 
newspaper should owoi outside interests. By owning something outside joumalism you 
lay yourself open to attack. And newspapers should be above that.' Nevertheless, two 
years later Murdoch, who owns four British national papers with a circulation of 11.2 
million, bought 50 per cent of the shares of Ansett Transport Industries, and now has 
interests in offshore oil and gas, cable and satellite television, ranching, warehousing 
and the cinema industry (in Hollingsworth, 1986: 7-8). 
Like most British newspapers except perhaps The Guardian Murdoch not only 
sets the policy of his papers and has control over their contents, but also has the power 
to appoint and dismiss their editors. This was clearly shown when Barry Askew, 
appointed by Murdoch in April 1981 as editor of The News of the World differed with 
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the proprietor over the De Lorean story and was dismissed by Murdoch. Askew later 
commented; 
"/ don't think Fleet street gives a damn about 
ethics, morality or anything else. It gives a damn 
about attracting a readership that will attract an 
advertising situation which will make a profit 
which will make the press barons powerful 
politically" (Hollingsworth. 1986:20). 
Another example of such pressures by proprietors on the content of their 
newspapers was cited by James Curran in the case of The Observer and the influence 
brought to bear on the editor by the proprietor who had large investments in Zimbabwe 
not to publish the story of the atrocities committed by the Zimbabwean army, for fear 
of offending the government of Zimbabwe and jeopardizing his business interest 
(Curran, 1991: 88-9). 
The same thing could be said about other proprietors of British newspapers. 
Even in the case of Lord Rothermere, who lives in Paris, the situation is the same: ' I 
see myself as the king..mapping out the overall strategy my papers wil l take. My 
editors are the generals who carry them out' (Hollingsworth, 1986: 17-8). 
Opponents have argued that this situation no longer obtains with big 
corporations and large numbers of shareholders. Big corporations can not be run by a 
single manager and each departmental manager has adequate freedom. But in most 
newspapers there are a few substantial shareholders who are able to dominate the 
meetings of the board of directors. Small shareholders have very little individual voting 
power and are unlikely to organise themselves to overthrow the large shareholders. The 
other important factor against this argument is that the board of directors decides on the 
company goals, policies and profits. 
35 
It could therefore be concluded that all the evidence has proved that newspaper 
proprietors have been using their power to influence the content of their papers in 
favour of their political views or to protect and promote their commercial activities. The 
Guardian stated on September 1984, 'One of the traditions of British joumalism is that 
editorial content of a newspaper is independent of the activities of the groups which 
own them...now it has been shattered' (cited in Hollingsworth, 1986: 8). 
Moreover, we have entered the age of conglomerates which are transnational. 
More and more newspapers, t.v. stations, satellite broadcasting, cable networks, book 
publishing, movie producing are concentrated in the hands of a handful of individuals 
all over the world. Murdoch and Maxwell - before his death - have been not only the 
owners of the largest numbers of newspapers and t.v. commercial channels in Britain, 
but extended their conglomerates all over the U.S. and Western Europe (after 
perestroika in Eastem Europe, the two moved fast to buy newspapers and even start 
commercial t.v. channels there). In Britain, France, Italy and West Germany, few men 
have been able to control as large a number of media outlets as Rupert Murdoch, Leo 
Kirch and Silvio Beriusconi. 
"....world broadcasting is more than ever before 
passing out of the hands ofpeoples and their 
governments, and into the hands of a quite new kind 
of tyrant, the Satanic Majesty of media, and 
alongside the star which he creates, the most 
potent character in this whole narrative " (Inglis 
1990:131). 
To take Murdoch again as an example the 'Magellan' of the information age, as 
he has been named, has recently purchased 20th Century-Fox's film stocks to be used 
by his Sky Movie channel as cheap films. Apart from the Sky channel, Murdoch 
controls two-thirds of newspaper circulation in Australia (his native country), half the 
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press in New Zealand, a third of the British press including The Times and The Sun 
(with the largest circulation) as well as his American empire. Murdoch was quoted by 
The Guardian as saying 'We are seeing the dawn of an age of freedom in viewing and 
advertising' (quoted in Schiller, 1989: 124). 
In the United States with its enormous media market takeover bids have been 
going on for some time. Media outlets have become more and more concentrated in the 
hands of a few families, big businesses, banks and armaments manufacturers. To state 
but a few: CBS network is owned by one man, NBC is owned by General Electric 
(which has nuclear and electronic defence confracts and links with Citibank, Morgan 
Guaranty Trust, Toshiba and owns RCA). ABC is owned by the conglomerate Capital 
Cities (Inglis, 1990: 130). One of the largest publishing houses in the world. Gulf and 
Western, also owns Paramount Studios, Simon and Schuster, and Prentice Hall among 
other companies. The New Yorker was bought by the Newhouse Publishing chain 
which owns Random House, Alfred A. Knopf, Pantheon, Villard, Times Books and 
Vintage Books. The Gannett Company chain owns 90 newspapers among them USA 
TODAY. 
As for Britain the same activity has been taking place, for example, the Pearson 
Longman conglomerate owns Penguin and Longman group aside from the Financial 
Times newspaper and Goldcrest films (Inglis 1990: 127). 
Concentration also extends to the movie business. The main Hollywood 
studios have been purchased by many conglomerates which also own TV stations in 
various US cities and also cable networks. A Hollywood reporter wrote, 
"the buzzword in Hollywood is vertical integration. 
The major studios and even some of the minor 
ones, intend to make and distribute movies, 
manufacture and sell video cassettes six months 
later, then syndicate their films to their own 
television stations, by passing the networks and in 
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the case of Disney, play them on a studio-owned 
pay-cable channel" (quoted in Schiller 1989:39). 
Most of these movies will be distributed all over the world. One can begin to 
see the case for the argument of the global culture being mostly concentrated in four 
capitals. Ben Bagdikian, author of a book titled 'The Media Monopoly,' noted in 1987: 
"In 1982, when I completed research for my 
book. The Media Monopoly, 50 corporations 
controlled half or more of the media business.By 
December 1986, when I finished a revision for 
the second edition, the 50 had shrunk to 29. The 
last time I counted, it was down to 26" 
(quoted in Schiller, 1989: 35). 
Most of these US programmes and movies will not only be dumped into Third 
World countries markets, but also in most of the European capitals which are desperate 
for cheaper programmes. A British government paper on the development of cable 
networks reported that an hour of old US programme could cost £2,000 while the 
same thing produced at home cost ten times more (Inglis 1990: 129). It is worth 
mentioning here that Japanese corporations have been moving into the US market with 
purchases of many media outlets. 
Transnational corporations could also enforce their own rules in far-away 
countries and oblige governments to relax regulations on the media and 
communications in general. With their large investments (which are needed in many 
capitals) they could threaten to pull out from one country and move to another with less 
restrictions (Schiller 1989: 122). 
Governments could also impose their wil l on others, as was the case (noted 
earlier) of the United States with UNESCO. The US Administration fought against 
UNESCO because it was protecting countries from the onslaught of transnational 
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corporations. A former US representative at UNESCO noted that Washington 
disagreed with the UN organisation because it was against the weakening of the public 
broadcasting which exists in many countries. The Business Roundtable in the United 
States, which is an organisation comprising the biggest corporations in America, has 
been encouraging the free flow of information because it helps business both nationally 
and internationally. In a statement it asserted: 
"In the past fifteen years, the flow of inft}rmation 
across national borders has increased dramatically. 
This international information flow (Ilf) includes 
everything from internal corporate information 
transfers to trade information-based products and 
services. IIFhas expanded international markets 
and made possible the provision of new products 
and services to those markets. IIFhas allowed 
multinational enterprises to improve their services 
to their customers, consolidate their resources, 
control their costs, and reduce theirflnancial 
risks. IIP has transformed the way in which all 
companies, manufacturing or service, do business 
internationally" (Schiller, 1989:119). 
Communication, as has been illustrated here, is becoming more and more 
business-oriented and is departing from its main responsibilities to the public. 
Chomsky noted in his 1989 book, that the main purpose of the media owned and 
controlled by the big corporations, was now to sell audiences to the businesses 
(Chomsky 1989: 8). 
1.6 NEWS AS A M A R K E T COMMODITY: 
As communication in general has become concentrated in the hands of a group 
of businessmen who are trying to make as much profit as possible the news too has 
had to change to fit the new outlook. The same people who sell Pepsi Cola, diapers, 
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cereals, and arms also sell the news not only to the local market but to the whole world. 
News programmes on television have changed their rhythms to keep up with the 
commercials they are sandwiched between. In fact, most of the news programmes, in 
recent years, have been shifted to the entertainment departments of networks. 
"the creation of news is seen as the social 
production of "reality" on the other hand it is taken 
to be the social manufacture of an organizational 
product, one that can be studied like the 
manufactured goods " (Schudson 1989: 273). 
News programmes are today mostly sponsored by products. In the United 
States most of the main news slots are sponsored, and the sponsoring company is 
usually announced at the beginning of the programme. In Britain, this is done in a more 
discreet way; the newscasters usually refer to the advertisement slot as a break so that 
the average viewer is tied to his seat waiting for the programme to continue and at the 
same time is fed with information about a new product in the market without really 
being aware of it. 
Each and every news programme usually targets specific audiences. The 
morning ones are full of commercials for cereals, pet food, detergents, etc. since it is 
mostly housewives who watch them. The evening ones target a different category. 
Children too are not safe from the consumerist brain-washing technique. The Wall 
Street Journal (the bible of most businessmen) reported that today's child is 'highly 
brand-conscious'. It also quoted the publisher of Marketing to Kids Report, as saying 
that: 'even two-years-olds are concemed about their brand of clothes, and by the age of 
six are fiill-out consumers' ( quoted in Schiller, 1989: 34). 
The Media have proved to be more profitable than most other consumer 
products. The largest capitalist countries depend on them to bring home large sums of 
money through overseas sales. Britain, for example, in 1984 earned £4 billion from 
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information exports, whereas its profits from cars, during the same year, was only £3.8 
billion (Collins, 1989: 352). Britain is the second largest exporter of television 
programmes after the United States. In the US the chairman of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee's Subcommittee on Technology and the Law stated that, in 1987, 'while 
other economic sectors show steady deficits, the makers of American books, computer 
software, recordings, movies and other copyrighted materials generated a 1.5 billion 
dollars trade surplus' (quoted in Schiller, 1989: 127). 
While most sociological studies have concentrated on television programmes 
exports such as 'Dallas', very few have investigated the export of news programmes 
by both the US and Britain to other industrial countries. American television networks 
with their million-dollar newscasters have been broadcasting their version of the news 
to capitals such as Paris. Programmes such as 'CBS Evening News', with Dan Rather 
are seen by a French audience the next morning, while 'ABC World News Tonight' is 
exported to Japan which has invaded the American market with its high technology. 
ITV in Britain exports its news programmes to Australia, among other countries. 
Daniel Hallin has argued that news is business that sells both ideologies and 
commodities. He wrote, 'this gives television news a rather unique character: a key 
political institurion as well as a seller of detergent and breakfast cereal' (quoted in 
Gruneau and Hackett, 1990: 284). 
Edward Herman noted that the media during the 1980s have been mostly 
profit-oriented and their stocks have become 'market favorites'. Media proprietors have 
made large profits from enlarging their audiences beyond the national boundaries 
(Herman, 1990: 79). 
"The bourgeoisie knew how to make the people 
work, but it also narrowly escaped destruction in 
1929 because it did not know how to make them 
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consume. It was content, until then, to socialize 
people by force and exploit them through labour, 
but the crisis of1929 marked the point of 
asphyxiation: the problem was no longer one of 
production but one of circulation...mobilised as 
consumers, their 'needs' became as essential as 
their labour power" (Hill, 1988:189). 
The advanced communications technology age, as this one is called, has shifted 
most journalists, writers, artists, film producers and others concemed with culture into 
professional salespeople. Newscasters do not qualify for their jobs simply on the basis 
of their ability as joumalists but also on the way they look and dress. Even authors of 
books have been asked by publishers to write in a specific way that will make their 
book more attractive to the largest spectrum of audiences. They have been told that it is 
not enough to write a book but that they have to sell it too. 
These joumalists and writers are not only selling a way of life and commodities 
but are also feeding their readers and viewers with specific images and ideologies. The 
1990s have brought a concentration of power in the hands of a very few countries, i f 
not of a single country. The US and other Western media are advocating the image of 
democracy for other countries while labelling some as communist, terrorist, non-
democratic. Democracy itself has been defined as being Western or more precisely 
American. 
Countries in the South are now under continuous pressure to prove themselves to 
the Northern states and to show that they are practising democracy Western-style. Most of 
the eastem bloc countries that were labelled by the Western media as communists are now 
undergoing changes which take them of f the media agenda. The media labels can be 
changed overnight, just as the Western governments change them. A country like Syria, 
which was dubbed a refuge for terrorist groups, became one of the allies during the Gulf 
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War. Libya, on the other hand, continued to carry the label even though nothing has been 
proved against it. 
1.7 ADVERTISERS: T H E MEDIA GURUS: 
Advertisers put more pressure on newspapers and television networks today 
than previously, since newspapers and TV networks depend increasingly on them to 
cover production costs. While a few people have argued that advertisers care about the 
readers and so in the last resort newspapers should cater for the readers in order to 
attract advertisers, it has been proved that advertisers are not really interested in all 
readers but only in the small group who have the money to buy their goods. The 
editors of most quality papers in Britain compete among themselves to create the best 
atmosphere for advertisers. Since the editorial content of the paper is important for 
advertisers, even the placement of the advertisement makes a big difference for them. 
Editors, for instance, will never publish a computer advertisement next to a story about 
a malfunction in computers or any other story that might discourage the reader from 
buying a computer. For example, James Curran has shown how advertisements for 
personal investment have been put alongside editorials focusing on share advice and 
stock exchange dealings which could give a misleading picture (Curran, 1978: 229-
67). 
"Both newspaper and television stations carry 
'must stories,' items that the business office, 
advertising staff, or front office say 'must be 
carried' to satisfy either advertisers or friends of 
well-placed executives in the news organization " 
(Tuchman, 1978: 175). 
Adverrising also force editors to publish as many stories as they can on 
Saturdays and Sundays when their papers are crowded with advertisements. Editors 
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will also feel the power of the advertisers i f they publish a story that is critical of the 
advertiser's company or an affiliate. For instance, in 1978 The Times and The Sunday 
Times published articles criticising cruises on luxury liners owned by the Cunard 
Shipping Company. The company sent letters to both editors complaining that the 
papers had offended 'the special relationship' between newspapers and advertisers, and 
even though both newspapers stopped their critical articles, Cunard withdrew £18,000 
worth of advertising from them. 
For newspapers such as The Guardian, where there is no pressure from the 
proprietors, the pressure from advertisers is even worse. The Guardian can not 
manage to survive without advertisers, and at some points it has had to change its 
political line to attract them. An article by The Guardian in Campaign, the advertising 
industry magazine, on 10 August 1979 stated that it was read by 'The thinking rich...85 
percent of them are ABC (social class) which is a better percentage than The Financial 
Times or The Daily Telegraph can offer,' and that The Guardian readers were not 
'down-at-heel extremists without a penny to bless themselves with. They have bank 
accounts full of lovely money.' The Guardian's editors and managing directors went 
out of their way to stress the same points on other occasions, as for instance, the article 
by the managing director, Gerry Taylor, in the same publication which stated: 'To 
assume that The Guardian is only for leftwing trendies and dropouts is as outdated a 
view as the dinosaur.' 
For all these reasons the power of the advertisers gets stronger and stronger. 
But, as was found by the Royal Commissions on the Press, not many editors and 
journalists will admit that they were pressured by advertisers to write in one way or 
another since this is against the ethics of journalism on which many of them pride 
themselves. 
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Most newspapers, magazines and networks depend on advertising. In the 
United States, for example, 75 per cent of newspaper revenues comes from 
advertising, while it is 50 per cent in the case of magazines and 100 per cent in the case 
of the television networks. Any independent newspaper or TV station that attempts to 
break this dependence wi l l be forced to close down under severe pressure from 
advertisers (Herman, 1990: 80). 
''These advertisers will rarely sponsor programs 
that seriously criticize sensitive corporate 
activities, such as ecological degradation, the 
workings of the military - industrial complex or 
corporate support of and benefits from Third World 
tyrannies" (Herman, 1990: 81). 
The monopoly in advertising is even worse than in the media; most small 
advertising companies are unable to survive the pressures from the multinationals and 
the big advertising agencies are swallowing smaller ones all over the world. 
Advertisers in the United States and Britain are no longer catering for their own 
national markets but are producing commercials that can be shown and printed in many 
different capitals. Business Week, in an article on deregulation in Europe, stated, 'As 
deregulation sweeps Western Europe makers of consumer goods are rethinking their 
marketing plans to reach mass audiences as never before. This could mean a heyday 
for international advertising' (quoted in Schiller, 1989: 123). 
In Britain advertising expenditure as a proportion of Gross National Product 
has shown only a very slight shift over the past three decades. It was 1.43 per cent in 
1960 and dropped only to 1.34 per cent in 1985 (Inglis, 1990:118). By the the end of 
the 1980s advertising expenditure in the United States had reached $100 billion. Kellner 
noted that it was far more than the amount spent on education (Kellner, 1990: 254). 
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Like the joumalists, advertising commercials are not only selling products but a 
whole way of life and set of values. Advertisers spread consumerism as a way of 
living freely. They also create ways through which the individual can become socially 
acceptable such as the advertisements for types of soap that could clear face spots and 
so make the young man attractive to women. Commercials for specific kinds of mouth 
washes, deodorants, perfumes and others all create the idea that for the young man or 
woman using these products is one way of drawing the attention of the other sex. 
"Advertising is persuasive, relying on emotional 
appeals, dramatic or comic images, and 
manipulation of basic fears and desire " (Kellner, 
1990: 245). 
Many television programmes and articles in the newspapers and magazines 
indirectly advertise for specific products and even for social, economic and political 
values. In times of war many of them advertise tanks, warplanes, guns, etc. Television 
programmes (even news programmes) are used to promote styles and fashions, 'in 
fact consumers pay for the programming through higher prices for the goods they 
purchase. Many television series, like Dallas, Dynasty, and other prime-time soaps, are 
themselves advertisements for wealth, luxury, fashion, and a high-consumption life-
style'(ibid.: 251). 
The situation is even worse when such programmes are broadcast in Third 
World countries where standards of living are so low, and food shortages and children 
dying of malnutrition are part of daily life. 
High-profile events such as major sports contests, political meetings, etc. are 
sought by advertisers in search of sponsorship. During the last few years even political 
organisations such as the United Nations have offered their major conferences and 
events for sponsorship. Terese P. Sevigny, UN Under-Secretary General for Public 
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Information, told the Eleventh Public Relations World Congress in Melbourne in 1988 
that the UN's new approach was to 'explore corporate and institutional sponsorship.' 
He cited the 40th anniversary of the UN Declaration of Human Rights as a great 
opportunity for advertisers (Schiller, 1989: 133). 
Television programmes in Britain have not in the past been available for 
sponsorship as they are in the US, but recently the independent network relaxed its 
regulations and offered programmes for advertising sponsorship. The first such 
programme was 'Rumpole of the Bailey,' scheduled for broadcasting in the Autumn of 
1992. The sponsors, who paid £300,000 for the six-part series were to get a front 
credit of 15 seconds to 'convey an image,' and state that the programme was 'made in 
association wi th ' or 'supported by' but not (as in the United States) that the 
'programme has been brought to you by.' A spokesman for Thames television, 
announcing the deal, dismissed fears of advertisers influencing programmes by saying 
that the money was to be shared by all companies affiliated with ITV and that he was 
confident that the viewers would not 'object to the association with Croft port...it is a 
perfect mix' (The Guardian, 8 June 1991). 
Advertisers are not the only ones who can influence the content of the media. 
Officials tend to use the media (directly or indirectly) to express the views of the 
government or of the ruling parties or families. Officials, with a clear understanding of 
the financial and time pressures on journalists, tend to spoon-feed reporters with 
information. They hold press conferences knowing that they are making the job easier 
for the journalists while at the same time getting their side of the story published. They 
also circulate press releases and written copies of statements to newspapers, and 
television and radio stations. 
Government spokesmen usually held press conferences, and to make the job 
easier for the journalist who is usually running against time they will sometime offer a 
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written copy of what they want to announce. For example. Sir Gordon Reece who 
since 1975 held the job of personal media advisor for Mrs. Thatcher, has regular 
meetings with the editors and senior executives of The Sun, The Daily Mail and The 
Daily Express. His meetings had proven to be very useful for Mrs. Thatcher who got 
all the support she needed from these editors and their papers. 
"Because of the close and complex relationship 
between media organizations and other dominant 
social and political institutions, it is arguable 
that the mass media will essentially tend to 
reinforce - even though they may ostensibly, or in 
passing, challenge or question - prevailing social 
and political hierarchies. Examples of such 
reinforcement can be found in Britain, for instance, 
as far back as the general strike in 1926 and in 
current coverage, or lack of coverage, of events in 
Northern Ireland" (Gallagher, 1988:161). 
Even though most Bri t ish newspapers tend to favour Conservative 
Governments and will avoid any reporting that embarrasses them, a few cmsaders can 
be found, who are prepared to publish stories that cause them to be faced with threats 
from govemment and to be excluded from government functions. Such was the case 
with The Observer whose editor Donald Trelford stated in his Kenneth Alsop 
Memorial Lecture at Edinburgh University on 14 November 1985: 
"We have a government that rewards the 
journalists it favours as never before - arise Sir 
Larry, Sir John, Sir David, SirAlastair (Burnett) -
but takes its hostility towards papers that oppose 
its policies, or leak embarrassing information, to 
spiteful and vindictive lengths. When The Observer 
wrote about Mark Thatcher's business connections, 
for example, the Prime Minister's press secretary, 
Bernard Ingham, went so far as to threaten 'dirty 
tricks' against us. Mrs Thatcher clearly sees the 
press's task as to reflectfaithjully her own vision 
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of the world. Anyone who doesn't do that is seen as 
ill-intentioned and irresponsible." 
Open censorship is not always needed in the so-called democratic states 
because joumalists work in such close proximity to officials that they identify with the 
state. Editors and reporters mix with their official sources, dine and travel with them, 
join their sporting clubs and hang around in the same places. Mark Hertsgard, author of 
'On Bended Knee: The Press and the Reagan Presidency,' commented that the media 
in the United States (and the same could be said for all Western democracies) were a 
'palace court press' and that journalists adopt the same values and opinions as the 
people they write about {The Guardian, 4 February 1991). A reporter for The 
Washington Post trying to explain why joumalists at the paper did not support the 
printers' strike of the 1970s, explained: 
"we eat lunch at the same restaurant as Henry 
Kissinger, and thus identify with those kind of 
people. We may work in the same building but the 
journalists work in offices; the printers work in a 
factory "(Schulman, 1990:118). 
Media organisations faced with the high costs of advanced technologies and 
continuous competition to get the news to viewers and readers ahead of the others; have 
to cut their other costs and depend on cheaper means of news gathering. This forces 
joumalists to depend heavily on what Boorstin has called 'pseudoevents' staged events 
such as press conferences and political conventions, etc. (Gruneau and Hackett, 1990: 
285). 
The use of the media by ruling parties or groups is not confined to capitalist 
systems. Non-capitalist states also use the media to legitimise the system, though the 
means whereby this is done may differ from one state to another. In the capitalist 
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system, however, the media, like all other aspects of culture, have been highly 
industrialised. Adomo and Horkheimer wrote that capitalism today: 
" has moved to appropriate and industrialize all 
those domestic, leisure and cultural areas of life 
which earlier capitalist production left alone " 
(quoted in Inglis, 1990: 114). 
One way in which governments manipulate the media is by creating media 
experts simply by financing research institutions such as the Heritage Foundation, the 
American Enterprise Institute, the Georgetown Center for Sfrategic and Intemational 
Studies in the United States, and their equivalents in Britain. Even universities and 
academics are used by the state as one way of providing the media with specific 
information and expertise. In a crisis the media can draw on a handfiil of experts from 
these institutions to help explain events and situations. Other organisations have also 
been created by the state, to pressure the media to keep to the mainstream of thought 
and ideology (Herman, 1990: 83). 
In times of war direct censorship is always practised in the Western 
democracies and is accepted as a 'necessary evil in the national interest' (Schlesinger, 
1989: 286). Throughout history the British media have always succumbed completely 
to the state in wartime. Philip Knightley documented this situation in his book on war 
coverage from the Crimea to the Falklands. Media coverage of British involvement in 
the recent Gulf War certainly confirmed his argument (Knightley, 1989), as does this 
short poem by Humbert Wolfe: 
You Cannot Hope 
To bribe or twist. 
Thank God! The British journalist. 
But seeing what 
That man will do 
50 
Unbribed, there's no occasion to 
(Humbert Wolfe in Index on Censorship April-May 1991) 
Dissent in wartime is reported by the media only when it occurs among 
officials or different political parties. The Vietnam war set a clear example of such a 
situation. When a few congressmen or senators perceived that the US might lose the 
war and began arguing against it; the American media reflected this line cleariy. During 
the recent Gulf War, on the other hand, the Labour Party in Britain joined the 
Conservatives in support of what it called a 'just' war against aggression, and the 
British media conformed to the official stand. 
1.8 T H E MEDIA L E G I T I M A T E THE STATE: 
With technological development and control over the press by big business, the 
news process has become like any other commodity. It starts from the putting together 
of small pieces to make a final product which ought to be attractive enough for the 
consumer to purchase. And with all this power being in the hands of a small section of 
society, it is no surprise that the media in most of the industrialised countries represent 
the elite. 
Media study, of the press in particular, has always raised controversial 
questions among sociologists because of the power that the media hold. 
"Power which the media derive from their reality-
defining capability is attributable largely to the 
service they perform in making us the indirect 
witnesses to events of which we have no first-
hand knowledge or experience " (Bennett, 1982: 
296). 
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Bennett and many others have argued in favour of the power of the media, and 
the press in particular, as the means by which most people learn about the outside 
world or even their own society. Others have concentrated on the control over the 
press, or the press as an element of social control. In other words, how the press 
legitimises the political system and the mling class and hence spreads this class's ideas. 
As Curran, Gurevitch and Woollacott put it 'the role of the media here is that of 
legitimation through the production of false consciousness, in the interests of a class 
which owns and controls the media' (Curran et al. 1977: 152). 
Thus the media become a political element under the control of the class which 
possesses the means of material production. Or the media are, as seen by Connell, a 
megaphone through which the ideas of the dominant class are 'amplified and 
generalized across society' (quoted in Gurevitch, Bennett, Curran and Woolacott, 1982: 
22). 
Newspapers were the creation of the middle class to serve that class's needs. 
During the nineteenth century newspapers were used to report news of delays in the 
arrival of shipments or disasters that could affect the transportation of goods. This role 
of the press has changed with the changes in society and its class stmcture. Gerbner 
wrote that today's mass media 'are the cultural arm of the industrial order from which 
they spring,' while Enzensberger described the media as 'the consciousness industry' 
whose role is to sell the 'existing social hierarchy' to consumers (Tuchman, 1978: 
156). Both proponents and opponents of state control of the media were concerned to 
ensure that they provided institutional support for the social order (Boyce et al., 1978: 
61). 
"Essentially a comparative study of the mass 
media in any society is a study of power, and the 
means whereby it is held and legitimised without 
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recourse to coercion. While concentrating on the 
growth of institutions I have attempted to 
emphasise that their key function was to present 
texts to an audience which constructed the known 
world with its structure of domination and 
control" (Ward, 1989: 201). 
As seen here, the media's role is to reinforce the status quo and so to reinforce 
capitalism not only in the centre of production but also in other countries so as to sell 
this ideology to audiences and consumers everywhere. Individuals everywhere thus 
become slaves to one ideology, one culture, because they depend on the media to tell 
them how to think of themselves and of others, what to eat and drink and, most 
dangerous of all, how to interpret their own history and culture. Audiences lose the 
capacity to recognise the truth because their only way of knowing it is through 
communication channels which are all but instmments of the state. Audiences in distant 
countries have become totally dependent on news and views broadcast and published in 
Western centres of communication. Individuals in the Third World depend on the 
Westem media to interpret the news from their own countries and region and to help 
them understand their own history and culture. The Westem media, therefore, not only 
legitimate the state at home, but also throughout the worid they create the basis for total 
hegemony by a single country. 
Advanced communication technologies have facilitated this cultural invasion. 
Television programmes with the help of satellite dishes do not need visas or passports 
to cross borders and enter different countries. Individual human beings everywhere 
become targets for specific ideological messages, mere viewers not participants in any 
kind of decision-making. They are subjects for manipulation just like the characters in 
Orwell's novel 1984. 
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Newspapers, books, television and radio programmes are channels of 
entertainment for the ordinary individual, used by many people as a means of escapism 
from daily problems. At the same time, they are dangerous channels of entertainment 
for the simple reason that they are regarded by many simply as a way of passing the 
time. The most straightforward programme or article contains a message expressed 
directly or indirectly, which passes through different filters. Edward Herman has 
defined these under the following five heads: 
(i) Size, ownership and concentration of the media, also profit orientation. 
(ii) Advertising as the main source of income for the media. 
(iii) Dependence of the media on the information and news provided by officials 
and government spokesperson. 
(iv) What he calls 'flak' as a way of disciplining the media. 
(v) Anti-communism as an ideological control. It should be noted here that this 
last is no longer the case and the main ideology that is being carried by most 
Western countries (specially the United States) is the defence of 
democracy. 
Noam Chomsky summed them up in his book 'Necessary Illusions' as: 
"The intimate relations between private and state 
power, the institutionally determined need to 
accommodate to the interests of those who control 
basic social decisions, and the success of 
established power in steadily disintegrating any 
independent culture that fosters values other than 
greed, personal gain, and subordination to 
authority, and any popular structures that sustain 
independent thought and action " (Chomsky, 1989: 
131). 
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While this chapter has concentrated on the study of the media specifically in 
relation to the state, the next one wil l try and set the grounds for the analysis of the 
media in the Gulf. To try and do that, however, one has to attempt to examine the 
nature of the newly created states in the Gulf region. The chapter specifically deals with 
the transformation of the Gulf countries and the absence of a civil society. 
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CHAPTER II 
G U L F SOCIETIES: TRIBALISM OR CLASS ? 
"Our grandfathers were riding camels, our fathers 
were riding cars and we learned to ride airplanes. 
But if the situation continues as it islam afraid 
that our grandchildren will go back to riding camels 
again "(King Faisal of Saudi Arabia in Haikal, 1992: 93). 
2.1 Introduction: 
The societies, state structures and development of the Gulf have been a focus 
of interest for many sociologists, historians and political analysts. Most of these 
studies, however, have concentrated on the rapid changes that these societies have 
witnessed as a result of the oil surplus, and have emphasised their material 
transformation the foundation of an advanced infrastructure, the formation of state 
structures (ministries and specialised agencies), the adoption of advanced 
technologies in most fields,etc. 
"Mostpublished work on the subject tends to consist 
either of theoretical generalizations based on statistical 
criteria such as educational and other infrastructure 
advances or else on pragmatic but narrowly focused 
fieldwork on such themes as, let us say, modifications 
in attitudes to exogamy among the bedowin of Ras al 
Kheima" (Balfour-Paul, 1984: 186). 
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A few scholars, however, have been interested in the development of the state 
in relation to citizens' rights. The question of whether Gulf citizens have gained any 
rights in the process of this state formation has been put by many scholars. Three 
main discourses have dominated work on this issue. The first was the orientalists' 
approach which noted that these societies are completely dominated by the rulers 
who control all aspects of their states. These studies were the main theme of Edward 
Said's book 'Orientalism.' The Orientalists argued that the emir in the Gulf states 
controlled all aspects of life in his emirate, whether political, economic or social. 
Such an argument can be clearly seen in J.B. Kelly's book 'Arabia, the Gulf and the 
West.' 
The second - mostly by Gulf scholars - argued that these states have their own 
particular type of democracy in which the 'majlis' plays an important role in citizens' 
representation. Civil rights, according to this argument, have been preserved and the 
ruling families are in no better position than their people. This argument recurs in 
most Arab writings on the Gulf, for instance in Sayf Marzouq Al-Shamlan's study of 
Kuwait and the relation between the ruling Al-Sabah family and their citizens. In his 
book 'Min Tarikh Al-Kuwayt' (From Kuwait's History), Al-Shamlan wrote that the 
Al-Sabah: 
"..were not privileged from most of the Kuwaiti 
population in any way. They were similar to the shaikh of 
a tribe. There was no distinction between the shaikh and 
members of his tribe. The power of the ruler was 
limited, and there were some Kuwaiti leaders who had 
more authority than the ruler himself" (quoted in Tim 
Niblock, unpublished paper). 
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This belief that the ruling families are not more privileged than the rest of the 
Gulf population is widespread in most of these studies, and is commonly raised -
especially by Kuwaitis - in discussions and conferences. 
The third category of writings on the Gulf in relation to civil rights is that of 
the radical sociologists. Fred Halliday's 'Arabia Without Sultans' is one example. 
These scholars have asserted that the Gulf regimes are extremely oppressive and that 
their citizens have no rights whatsoever. They in fact do not differ from the 
orientalists' perspective on the Gulf, but argue that the Gulf rulers have a tight grip on 
their states and that there is no room for the expression of discontent. 
However, I shall argue that the Gulf states can not be analysed satisfactorily 
by any of these approaches. They have their own particular kind of political system 
which I prefer to call 'a modernised patriarchal' structure. The Gulf ruling families 
and tribes have been able to combine traditional elements with some features of a 
modem state structure. Patriarchal and kinship organisations have managed to survive 
the transformation from tribal to state frameworks. In this process religion and the oil 
wealth were utilised to camouflage the absence of civil rights. This assertion will be 
analysed in the rest of this chapter. Part of the argument I am pursuing can be found 
in some interesting writings on the Gulf and the Arab worid in general. For instance, 
Michael Hudson has noted that in most of the Arab world, 'monarchies, religion and 
kinship have been exploited to legitimize the ruling families. Many of the Arab 
leaders stress the point that they are the descendants of Prophet Mohammed' 
(Hudson, 1977: 25). 
The Gulf monarchies are uniquely peculiars. They have been able to preserve 
most of their traditional patriarchal structures while adapting to modem technological 
developments. They have accomplished this through a process of legitimation 
whereby the king or emir becomes the father of his country. It is common in the Gulf 
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for leaders to use the word 'family' in reference to their states. Gulf children sing of 
the emir as their father; Baba Isa, Baba Fahd and Baba Jabber is how Gulf children 
have been taught to refer to their leaders. 
"The monarchical legitimacy strategy may be designated 
as patriarch in order to convey the character of the 
king's authority; in a fatherly way he govern each tribe 
and sect" (Hudson: 1977: 25). 
The modernised patriarchal structure of the Gulf required an ideology to 
support and legitimise it, and Gulf leaders founded this legitimising ideology in 
religion. Islam was manipulated in the process of the formation of modem states. 
Political, social and economic aspects were defined through the holy book, the 
'Quran.' This is clearly seen in Ghasan Salame's study of Saudi society and its 
political system. In Saudi Arabia royal decrees forbid Saudis from embracing any 
ideology other than Islam; the punishment for infiingement, according to the decree 
of 1961, for example, is imprisonment. Salame' also noted that the same decree calls 
for the execution of anyone who engages in violent action against the state or the 
royal family. Here, too, the accused has no right to see a lawyer or to undergo a trial 
(Salame', 1989: 86). 
Religion is continuously exploited as the state ideology. Even in development 
plans the maintenance of religious values is mentioned. Such as, for instance, in the 
case of the Saudi second development plan of 1975-80. Glen Balfour-Paul noted that: 
"The fundamental goals for social development in the 
Second Development Plan were to maintain the religious 
and moral values of Islam, to increase the well-being of 
all groups within the society, and to foster social 
stability under circumstances of rapid economic 
change" (Balfour-Paul, 1984:186). 
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A further peculiarity of this modernised patriarchal structure of the Gulf is the 
absence of civil society. Social, civil and political rights have no basis in any of these 
modem Gulf states. Kevin Dwyer, in his study of the lack of civil rights in the Arab 
world, noted that: 
"on the level of love, on the level of sexuality, there is a 
modernist discourse but it only serves to camouflage 
a very traditional social psychological reality " (Dwver, 
1991: 94). 
Dwyer quoted most of the people he talked to as thinking that individuals had 
more freedom in the West than in the Arab countries. The most noticeable example of 
the lack of civil rights is the case of the Gulf women, which wil l be discussed in 
chapter 4 of this thesis. Michael Hudson remarked that apathy and alienation among 
Arabs, which are the result of this process of modernisation together with the 
maintenance of traditional patriarchal stmctures, 'facilitate the manipulation of the 
individual by the state' (Hudson, 1977: 13). 
Kamel Abu Jaber has argued that, although most of the Arab states have 
expanded at the level of administration and socio-economic development, in the 
political sphere they have not. 
"Politically, however, that has not been the case, 
especially since popular, participatory political 
institutions have either been effectively harnessed or in 
many instances sterilized, emasculated, repressed, or 
banned and replaced by docile institutions with lofty 
sounding names" (Abu Jaber, 1987: 6). 
With the exploitation of their oil wealth the Gulf states have been able to 
develop their countries and to import the technology needed for such transformation. 
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A few people in the West thought that with the importation of technology these 
countries would be forced to shift and to create a civil society to replace the 
traditional norms. This idea did not materialise, however, and in many cases Gulf 
officials challenged it . In a British television programme on the transfer of 
technology, a Gulf official was asked, 'But do you not see that i f you accept Western 
technology, you have to accept the culture that goes with it?' to which the official 
replied; ' i f I buy your electric cooker, do I have to use your recipe for souffles?' 
(Balfour-Paul, 1984: 195). 
The official's answer reflects the attitude of the leaders of these states who are 
ready to develop a modem state, but are not prepared to tolerate a civil society. In the 
modernised patriarchal structures of the Gulf states social, political and economic 
rights are missing 
Ahmed Al-Rub'ai, a prominent member of the Kuwaiti opposition and an 
academic himself, has noted that economic and social developments in the region 
have not transferred citizens' loyalties from the tribe to the newly created state (Al -
Rub'ai, 1989: 135). While interviewing different Arab intellectuals concerned with the 
lack of citizens' rights in most of the region, Kevin Dwyer discovered that individuals 
count for nothing; consequently their ft-eedom vanishes in the midst of the group. 
"...the individual has no meaning. It is like in the 
traditional society, where you are always seen as a 
member of one group or another, where you always have 
to be attached to some collective identity. In effect, the 
individual has no right or possibility to express his own 
personal opinions, without being accused of being in the 
service of a group " (Dwyer, 1991: 87). 
Citizens' rights in the Gulf could also be extended to include occupations. 
Since most of these states have been able to provide free education up to university 
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degrees, individuals expect to find jobs appropriate to these qualifications. On the 
contrary, however, education in these countries bears no relation to the kind of 
occupation one obtains. Many individuals know the position they are going to fill 
even before they start their education; it is in fact a mere enhancement of the 
individual's stratum in society or his class structure (Schemeil, 1992: 47-8). Members 
of the mling families or their supporting tribes are promised higher positions in the 
govemment ministries or even, in a few cases, in the private sector. Educated men and 
women have no voice in politics or even in business. Women are faced with even 
harsher measures in terms of any kind of participation. In Saudi Arabia and Qatar, for 
example, educated women are not allowed to choose their husbands, or to travel 
without a close relative. In the few short-lived incidents of parliamentary experience 
- as in Kuwait and Bahrain - women were not allowed to vote. In October, 1992 the 
Kuwaiti Govemment held the first parliamentary elections since the country's 
'liberation.' Yet again, only 14 per cent of the population were allowed to vote -
Kuwaiti males who had been living in the country since 1921. Women were not 
allowed to vote which led to their raid on the Al-Shouikh polling station in an effort 
to force the authorities to permit them to vote. They were forced, however, to leave by 
the Kuwaiti security men. Kuwaitis who are known as 'bedouin' meaning without 
nationality, were also prevented from participating in this election. Votes were bought 
for the price of 5,000 dinars (US $15,000) (AlSharq Al-Awsat 6 October 92). 
The rest of this chapter will attempt to highlight the modemised patriarchal 
structure of the Gulf states, and also to show the nature of the state stmcture in times 
of crisis. It will concentrate on the six member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
formed in 1981, since they share many common factors. Five of the six countries 
Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Oman, apart from Saudi 
Arabia, have been colonised at one point or another by the Iranians, the Portuguese, 
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the Turks during the Ottoman Empire or the British. Although the Ottoman Empire 
was able to control parts of Saudi Arabia (what was then known as the Arabian 
Peninsula), it was never in ful l control of the whole country. These countries also 
shared the same dependence on commerce as the mainstay of their economies before 
the discovery of oil and the socio-political changes that accompanied it. 
The core of the argument here will be derived from the study by the Kuwaiti 
sociologist Khaldoun Hassan Al-Naqeeb. Although his analysis of the Gulf societies 
does not entirely correspond with the argument presented here, it is on the whole the 
closest to it. Al-Naqeeb has criticised most of the writings on the Gulf, especially 
those that he described as the 'scissors and paste,' historians and journalists. 
"Most of this type of writing is impressionistic and 
superficial, lacking intimate knowledge of the area. For 
non-Arabs, the lack of mastery of the Arabic language 
detracts greatly from the significance of these writings, 
added to the fact that generally they lack historical 
perspective and vision " (Al-Naqeeb, 1990:2). 
He also commented on economists with only one perspective on the region, 
namely the pre-oil and the post-oil periods, mentioning specifically studies by 
Muhammad Sadiq and William Snavely, Naiem Sherbiny and Mark Tessler, George 
Lenczowski, Benjamin Shwadran, Ragaei al-Mallakh and many others (ibid.). It 
should be mentioned here that the same perspective has been adopted by many 
scholars from the region, who either lacked the theoretical background or depended 
entirely on the documents and archival material available through the official 
institutions of the Gulf countries. It should also be noted that much of the history of 
the region has been tailored to suit the ruling elites in the Gulf. For example, the 
Bahraini Government held a conference in the mid-1980s to celebrate the 200 years of 
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Al-Khalifah mle under the title 'Bahrain Through the Ages,' at which historians from 
different parts of the world were invited to present papers related to Bahrain or the 
history of the region in general. The conference was organised and chaired by two 
members of the ruling Al-Khalifah family who obviously influenced not only its 
nature but also the contents of many of these papers presented. Many of the historians 
invited, did not dare to criticise the Al-Khalifah family or even to mention that they 
were not Bahrainis by origin and had conquered the island by force. 
Al-Naqeeb has also argued against many writers who saw the collapse of the 
tribal role and the disappearance of the tribal mentality after the discovery of oil and 
its large amounts of revenue. In fact, tribal power has not yet been buried in the sands 
of the Gulf deserts, but that does not mean that new forces of power have not 
emerged. The Gulf today (as this chapter will try to demonstrate) is a combination of 
both tribal patriarchal (centralised) states and free capitalist economies. It is going 
through a complicated and difficult procedure which is unique to the region. 
In saying this, one should not dispute that some of the information in these 
books could be used or at least referred to when necessary, but the reader will notice a 
great dependence here on the argument presented by Al-Naqeeb since he represents a 
different approach to the study of the Gulf states. This does not mean that there is 
complete agreement with his argument, especially when he refers to the current 
economic system in the Gulf as state-capitalism. This could be a correct description of 
a few Arab countries such as Algeria, Egypt (during Nasser's time) and Iraq but not of 
the Gulf 
The history of the Gulf region according to al-Naqeeb can be divided into four 
periods, namely: 
(i) The Portuguese hegemony (1509-1622). 
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(ii) The European stmggle in the region - mainly between the British and the 
Portuguese - over the control of the area (1630-11839) 
(iii) The British hegemony over the whole region ( 1839-1920) 
(iv) The transformation from the rentier state to the authoritarian state- what 
the present writer prefers to call patriarchal (1920 to the present). 
It is important to note that the fourth period, the contemporary history, 
witnessed the stmggle between the British and the Americans over control of the Gulf 
which has ended in the Americans' favour. This period has been referred to by many 
writers as 'reflagging the Gulf,' when the Union Jack was replaced by the stars and 
stripes. 
2.2 FROM TRIBES TO STATES: 
The main attraction of the Gulf for Western powers (historically speaking) 
was its location in the middle of the trade routes to the East. From 1515 the 
Portuguese had a few trading posts along the coastal towns of the Gulf. They 
conquered the region after long battles with the Safarid Persians and the Ottoman 
Turks. From this time on, the region faced tribal battles and the migration of many of 
these tribes either fi-om the heart of the Arabian Peninsula to the coastal areas or from 
one trade centre to another (Graz, 1990: 4-5). Many tribes appeared and others 
disappeared or were scattered, all depending, according to Al-Naqeeb, on the fighting 
over trade routes or one tribe raiding another and forcing it to pay the 'khuwa,' which 
could be described as a protection tax. 
The strongest of these tribes had always derived their power from either tribal 
affiliations or tribal militias known as 'Fadawiyah.' Al-Naqeeb noted that the tribes 
used these two elements to protect their trade, which meant that the same tribes would 
have complete control over trade and would enforce their authority over the coastal 
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towns (Al-Naqeeb, 1990:15). This could be seen in the emergence of the Al-Saud 
family in 1745 after the union of two tribes; Muhammed ibn Abdul Wahab (the father 
of the puritanical Wahabi sect of Islam) united with the emir of Al-Diriyya (a small 
tovm close to the present-day capital, Riyadh) (Graz, 1990: 112). 
Unti l recent times trade in the region depended on 'al-Mudarabah,' a 
complicated process which can be translated simply as speculation, but involving 
much more than this. The trader who engaged in this, who was known as the 
'Mudarib,' carried out many different transactions and travelled long distances that 
ended in large amounts of profit. One aspect of 'al-Mudarabah' in the Gulf was the 
commission charged to merchants for the protection of their trade. The mlers of the 
small Gulf emirates used 'organized violence to sell a certain kind of services,' such 
as this protection. They also received gifts and sums of money from the big merchants 
in the region. Bribery was a common source of income, especially during the 
Portuguese occupation of the Gulf ports (Al-Naqeeb, 1990: 11). 
"To die between my saddle bags as I travel through the 
land [i.e., as a trader] seeking God's bounty is preferable 
to me than to be killed fighting for the faith, because God 
has ranked those who travel over the land seeking his 
bounty above warriors for the faith, in accordance with 
His word: "And others travel [as traders] through the 
land" (ibid.: 146). 
The west coast of the Gulf has always been dependent on commerce as a vital 
sector of the economy. Historically speaking the inhabitants of this region relied on 
pearl diving, fishing and farming (in a few spots where soil and weather permitted) 
rather than on commerce. Pearl diving played a significant economic and political role 
until the discovery of cultured pearis by Mr Mikimato of Japan (Graz, 1990: 14). The 
peari diving industry was organised under the 'Zaba'nah' or patronage stmcture, as 
explained in many studies by Muhammed Al-Rumihi and others. The 'Zaba'nah' 
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meant that the workers (who were ranked in a kind of class stmcture) depended on 
the loans they obtained from their employees, the shipowners, during the winter 
season. Pearl diving was a seasonal occupation, from June to October. The divers 
spent their whole lives trying to repay their loans and if they died, then their sons had 
to take on the repayments. In other words the shipowners known as 'Al-Nokhadh' 
actually controlled the lives of hundreds of families, and not just their employees, as 
was depicted in the movie 'Bass ya Bahr,' (The Cmel Sea) by the Kuwaiti director 
Khalid al-Saddiq. The 'Al-Nokhadh' is still used by many playwrights to symbol the 
cmelty and greed of the mling elites to the extent that members of the mling families 
are annoyed about it. The Bahraini Crovm Prince, for example, at a meeting with local 
novelists and playAvrights in the eariy 1990s called on them to stop depicting the 'Al -
Nokhadh' in this way. Sheikh Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifah told the gathering at his 
private 'majlis' that the 'Al-Nokhadh' was a distinctive feature of the region's history. 
As noted earlier, the strategic location of the area in the centre of important 
trade routes was always the main attraction for most of the major empires. The British 
perceived control over the Gulf region -at the heart of their shipping lanes to India - as 
vital. In 1798 they secured their position in Muscat, (Oman) and thus controlled the 
main entrance to the warm waters of the Gulf, namely the strait of Hormuz. From 
there they penetrated the whole region under the pretext of fighting piracy and the 
slave and arms trade after they stopped taking part in this trade (Al-Naqeeb, 1990: 
47). The concentration by Western -especially British - historians on piracy in the 
Indian Ocean and the Gulf gave this aspect the faked illusion of tmth, to the extent 
that the Gulf was nicknamed the Pirate coast. The British adviser to the Sheikh of 
Bahrain, Sir Charles Belgrave, devoted a whole book to this subject 'The Pirate 
Coast' (Belgrave, 1960). 
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While no one can deny that piracy took place, but it was not on the same large 
scale as that by Western pirates. It was also carried out at times against the British 
presence in the region and their absolute control over trade and commerce. The mler 
of Sharjah (one of the seven member states of the United Arab Emirates) devoted his 
Ph.D thesis to rebutting this argument (Al-Qasimi, 1986). Later, in the nineteenth 
century many ships owned by these small emirates would be forced to fly a flag 
designed by the British. A few kept the British-designed flag even after independence 
or adapted it as their national flag, as did Bahrain. 
In succession following the first major treaty of 1820, Britain signed 
protection treaties with the sheikhs of the Gulf emirates, in 1861 and 1892 with 
Bahrain, in 1891 with Muscat (Oman) and in 1899 with Kuwait. By this time Britain 
had control over almost all the Gulf apart from Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia has never 
been under direct British control, but this is not to say that Britain had no influence 
over the country. Initially the British were interested in the Arabian Peninsula only to 
secure their protectorates on its borders. Afterwards they wanted to curb the Turks 
who were controlling part of the Western province. To achieve this objective, Britain 
signed an agreement in 1915 with Abdel Aziz Al-Sau'd, in which the Saudi ruler 
pledged not to have relations with any foreign power and not to isolate any of his 
territory or to grant any concessions without consulting Britain first. He also 
guaranteed to keep open the pilgrimage routes to the holy places of Mecca and 
Medina (Lackner, 1978: 17). 
Pilgrimage revenues were the main source of revenue for the Saudi monarchy 
prior to the discovery of oil . In 1941-42 the British government had to cover the 
deficit in the Saudi budget as a result of World War I I and its consequences in the 
dismption of the pilgrimage to Mecca (Al-Naqeeb, 1990: 152). During the period of 
British control over the region they invented a new economic system in which each 
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emirate specialised in producing one product or dependent on one that is of use to the 
British empire. While Saudi Arabia depended on the pilgrimage revenues the other 
Gulf countries concentrated their efforts on pearl diving. Later in the century the 
mling Al-Sau'd family would use the shrines in Mecca to legitimise its dynasty and 
create its powerful position, not only in the Arab world but also in all Moslem 
countries, as the protector of Islam and its most holy shrines (Graz, 1990: 8). 
British hegemony over the Gulf region changed the whole political and 
economic atmosphere. For the British supported a few tribes or families against the 
others even to the extent of fratricidal conflicts. Often, i f a sheikh was no longer of 
use to them, the British would remove him from power and replace him with his 
brother or son. An example of this was Britain's removal of Sheikh Isa Bin Al i , the 
mler of Bahrain in 1922, and his replacement by his son Hamad who, as Muhammed 
Al-Rumaihi has noted, was more prepared to listen to British advice (Al-Rumaihi, 
1984: 25). 
This thesis w i l l refer to the emirates in their relations with Britain as 
protectorates, although this is not the most precise description of them. Rosemary 
Zahlan noted that they were not protectorates, mandates or colonies and that they 
were referred to by Britain as being in treaty relations with it (Zahlan, 1989: 13). 
The economy of these protectorates faced a great setback as a result of 
Britain's control over their trade. The local traders could not compete and were forced 
to become local agents or distributors for European commodities. By this time local 
handicrafts had begun to fade and the economy of many of the emirates depended 
almost exclusively on pearl diving. This does not mean that the whole inhabitants of 
these lands were in the pearl diving industry, there was also fishing and trade as 
referred to before. The essence of the income, however, was from pearl diving and the 
rest were only marginal as Table 2.1 show. 
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Country Population Ships People+ % of popul Income * 
Bahrain 99075 917 17633 18 1260300 
Oman 72000 1215 22045 31 8000000 
Qatar 27000 817 12890 48 
Kuwait 37000 461 *9200 20 134700 
Source: AI-Naqeeb, 1990: 56. 
* Income is in Rubees which was the local currency at the time. 
+Refering to people involved in the Pearl industry. 
There was, however, some farming and fishing. Many people in Bahrain, for 
example, were farmers who worked on the date-palm plantations which were mostly 
owned by members of the ruling Al-Khalifah family. As Niblock noted in his paper 
'Oil Economy and its impact on Social and Political Structures in the Gulf Area,' 
control over the main economic resources was divided as follows: 
"...Pearl production was left in the hands of tribal 
majalis; much of the cultivation and exploitation of date 
palms was administered directly by the Al-Khalifa ruling 
family; nomadic agricultural production and fishing was 
mostly organised at a very local level" (Nibblock, 
Unpublished paper). 
In other parts of the Gulf cattle-raising was popular especially in Saudi Arabia 
which up to the 1940s was one of the biggest Arab exporters of livestock. Following 
the discovery of oil, however, it became one of the biggest importers, since most 
sheep-raisers abandoned their jobs for better paid employment in the oil industry. The 
Saudi Government itself, like many others in the region, abandoned all other 
resources and concentrated on oil. 
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In general, the economies of these countries prior to the discovery of oil 
depended mainly on pearl diving and other small businesses which were all controlled 
by the ruling tribes or families. The amount of direct or indirect control varied from 
one emirate to another; the Al-Khalifah in Bahrain had much more control than the 
Al-Sabah of Kuwait or the Al-Thani of Qatar. As for the political system, it 
continued to be a tribal patriarchal system in which the emir or sheikh would sit in his 
'majlis' and listen to the opinions of other members of the tribe or of traders. The 
'majlis,' however, was never the place for other groups in the population to raise 
complaints or seek to influence the sheikh or ruler. As Niblock put it in relation to 
Saudi Arabia: 
"..The ability to express views to the decision-maker is 
not equivalent to having a share in determining what 
decisions are made. The attitude ofAbd Al-aziz bin Abd 
Al-Rahman Al-Saud towards advice offered to him is 
neatly summarized in a Koranic text which he frequently 
quoted to Philby : 'Take counsel among yourselves, and if 
they agree with you, well and good: but if otherwise, 
then, put your trust in God and do that which you deem 
best" (Niblock, 1982: 89). 
In most of the Gulf states the tradition of the 'majlis' still exists; for example, 
in Bahrain Sheikh Isa Bin Salman Al-Khalifah still open his 'majlis' to the public, but 
only members of his own family, ministers and big businessmen go to see him. 
Occasionally, though, one might see a member of the public presenting a letter in 
which he asks the Sheikh for a house or a piece of land, since land, even after the 
discovery of oil and the change in the political and economic structure, is still 
considered part of the ruler's property. Ghasan Salame' noted in his book 'Saudi 
Foreign Policy since 1945' that Abdul Aziz Bin Saud in 1925 converted the tribal 
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lands (which constituted 80 per cent of the Peninsula) into the monarch's property. 
He also announced that all resources under the land of the whole country belonged to 
the state (quoted in Shararah, 1981: 132). 
The absolute control of Al-Saud and most other ruling families in the Gulf had 
been achieved by means of the sword and British support, combined with oil wealth 
and religion. The use of force and the dependence on foreign powers (first the 
British, then the Americans) are still the main pillars supporting the Gulf dynasties 
today. The British intervened several times to save the Gulf monarchies, as was the 
case with the Al-Khalifah of Bahrain in 1871, 1895 and 1905 (Al-Naqeeb, 1990: 59). 
The support of foreign powers for the Gulf dynasties was clearly visible during the 
1990-1 Gulf War; subsequent to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the six members of the 
Gulf Co-operation Council called on their American and European 'allies' to come to 
their help (this will be discussed later in this chapter). In 1924 King Abdul Aziz bin 
Abdulrahman (Known as Abn Saud) addressed the 'Akhwan' ,different from the 
Muslim brotherhood, by saying: 
"..don't forget that each one of you has lost either a 
father, a brother or a son by us....you have not obeyed us 
by well but by force and God help me I will use my sword 
(kill you) if you did not obey God" (in Shararah, 1981: 
121). 
Wadah Shararah also noted that the British Government used to reward 
supportive Arab tribes and this in the end helped specific tribes to bribe others,etc. 
(Shararah, 1981: 119). While these tribal rulers tried their best to please the British 
many locals had their suspicion of these white men. Sheikh Ahmed of Kuwait once 
built a tennis court for his British guests in the gardens of his palace; where he sat to 
watch the game from a "carpeted mud hut" (The Observer, 1990). The same article 
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"End of a desert dream," noted that small boys in Kuwait would sing " Englishman 
with a hat on your head we hope you die in bed tonight," when they see a western 
man in the streets of Kuwait. 
Most of these mini states had no borders between them and many in fact did 
not exist as independent entities until the first World War when the borders were 
drawn. Nevertheless these borders would still be changed several times by the British 
to please one ruler as against another. The borders, nonetheless, were not important 
until the discovery of oil. 
"..it was not an easy task in a world where the territory 
of one or the other tribe was defined more by loyalty to a 
sheikh than by lines on a map" (Graz, 1990: 6-7). 
The whole picture of the region changed at the beginning of the present 
century following the discovery of oil, and the increased interest on the part of the 
Western powers, especially the British. Oil was first discovered in Iran in 1905 and 
from this time on it looked as i f the region was sitting on a gold-mine which was oil. 
By this time oil had became an important source of energy and the oil companies, 
mainly those known as the Seven Sisters, proceeded to fight bitter battles to win 
concessions in the region (Sampson, 1975). The Gulf, however, apart from Kuwait 
under the 1927 Red Line agreement among the Seven Sisters, was reserved for British 
companies. This was why when Standard Oil of California gained a concession in 
Bahrain it had itself registered in Canada as the Bahrain Petroleum Company 
(BAPCO). In Saudi Arabia the situation was different. Abdul Aziz Al-Saud had made 
a special agreement with Britain in 1927 and so Standard Oil of California got the 
concession there too (Lackner, 1978: 32). Oil was discovered commercially in many 
of the small Gulf emirates prior to the Second World War. It is ironical that Bahrain, 
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which is the poorest Gulf state today (compared with the others) was the first in which 
oil was discovered in 1932. In 1938 oil was found in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and in 
1939 in Qatar. As for the United Arab Emirates, it was discovered much later, in 
1966, in both Abu Dhabi and Dubai. 
These dates are considered stepping-stones in the history of the Gulf The 
discovery of oil added to the significance of the region. Thereafter the emirates were 
to suffer another coloniser in the form of the oil companies. Although the 
governments of the Gulf were to control half of these oil companies in accordance 
with agreements signed in the 1950's and 1960s, many companies would keep actual 
operations in their own hands. For example, Aramco still runs the oil fields in Saudi 
Arabia, although the Kingdom has acquired half its shares (Graz, 1990: 141). 
In accordance with the concession agreements signed by the oil companies 
with the sheikhs, the former had to pay the rulers a percentage of the revenues, but a 
very small one. Since the Gulf countries were very poor and the pearl-diving industry 
was facing a serious setback due to Japanese competition from cultured pearis; the 
rulers were satisfied with the small amounts of money they obtained from the 
companies. 
"..the company was given the exclusive right to explore, 
prospect drill for, extract, manufacture, transport and 
export oil produced. ..The company agreed to build a 
refinery; supply the government (Saudi); and advance 
loans deductible from future royalties, which were fixed 
at four gold shillings per ton of crude oil" (Lackner, 
1978: 34). 
Following the discovery of oil, the issue was raised of who should get the oil 
revenues, the ruler or the nation. Kuwait was the only one to settle it from the outset. 
The Government decided that the revenue was a nadonal one; and that the emir 
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should get a fixed salary of 12 million Kuwaiti Dinars. The other Gulf ruling families, 
however, did not agree to share the profits with the population until the British 
intervened to persuade them that the people ought to have a share of the wealth. Only 
then did the rulers of Bahrain, Qatar and the smaller emirates agree on condition that 
they received no less than one-third of the oil revenues as a personal salary. As for 
Saudi Arabia and Oman the matter is not yet clear (Al-Naqeeb, 1990: 103). 
Oil will continue to be the main source of income for these countries. Almost 
90 per cent of their national income during the last half century has come from oil 
profits. It was obvious that the oil companies were indirectly ruling the emirates 
because of the increased amount of power they retained. They imported foreign 
expertise from Europe and America and labourers from India and other Asian 
countries. Many Gulf nationals were also attracted to work for the companies. 
Locally recruited workers, however, obtained lower salaries than the expatriates and 
lived in appalling conditions in the companies' camps. The famous Saudi novelist 
Abdelrahman Munif described the social and political changes that accompanied the 
discovery of oil in an unnamed Gulf country (undoubtedly Saudi Arabia). In his 
intriguing novel 'Cities of Salt' he captures the disruption of the bedouins' life when a 
group of foreigners arrive and start drilling for oil. In a discussion between the ruler 
and a prominent member of the tribe who was saddened by the drastic changes, 
Miteb Al-Hathal asks the emir about the foreigners; 
The emir: 'We invited them, and they have come to help us.' 
'What kind of help, your excellency?' he asked innocently 
'Under our feet, Ibn Rushed (how they call Miteb), there are 
oceans of oil, oceans ofgold.' replied the emir. 'Our friends 
have come to extract the oil and the gold.' 
'...by the end of the new year, God willing, you'll have money up 
to your ears.' 
'by God, your excellency, we were as happy as we could be 
before those devils came along.' said Miteb. 'But from the first 
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day they came to our village life has been camel piss. Every day 
it gets worse.' 
The conversation continues until the emir loses patience with Miteb and 
threatens to use his sword against any 'troublemaker.' Miteb's only comment is to tell 
the emir that he (the emir) will get stronger after the foreigners extract the oil from the 
ground, but that he ought to recognise that 'the Americans aren't doing it for God' 
(Cities of Salt, 1988: 87). 
The great rush by local inhabitants, whether farmers, beduins, craftsmen or 
pearl-divers, led to the decay of many old crafts and economic sectors. As for the few 
merchants in the Gulf who survived the competition with foreign - mostly Western -
companies, they shifted to work with the oil companies as suppliers of goods and 
materials or as agents supplying the local manpower needed. 
The population concentrated in the newly created oil cities and towns set up to 
accommodate the numbers of people moving in. Many local people working for the 
oil companies began to move towards consuming the different kinds of products 
imported from Europe which were available in the markets for the expatriates. They 
saw the comfortable cars driven by the oil company's senior employees and tried to 
imitate them. Furthermore, with Aramco's installation of the first television station in 
Saudi Arabia, many purchased television sets, and Individuals in neighbouring 
countries such as Bahrain followed suit. The introduction of radio and TV stations in 
Saudi Arabia met with outrage from the religious institutions to the extent that the 
first television transmitter in Riyadh was bumed down by them. Bahrain was to be the 
first of the emirates to be introduced to other modem technologies. The first printing 
press was established in 1937 and the first cinema opened its doors in 1939. 
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Even though the oil revenues multiplied with the increased dependence on oil 
as a source of energy, the Gulf countries did not utilize the oil wealth to initiate other 
sources of income for their economies. On the contrary, they diverted towards the 
services sector and failed to develop their industry or agriculture. For example, the 
only other economic activities that developed from the 1950s on were the banking 
sector and marginal workshops or factories producing inadequate quantities of 
foodstuffs that were not enough to satisfy the local market (Al-Rumaihi, 1984). As for 
the banking sector, from the one bank in 1920, the Eastern Bank in Bahrain, the 
number climbed to 10 by 1971 and thereafter snowballed. 
In short, the period up to the Second World War witnessed the delineation of 
the Gulf emirates into small states by the Western imperialists. The first borders were 
drawn by the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916 which divided the whole Arab World 
into French and British areas of influence. Thereafter more borders were created by 
the British. In fact, only one border was drawn by Arabs - that between Saudi Arabia 
and Yemen - the rest were defined by foreign powers. Al-Naqeeb argues that this 
delineation of borders had a destructive effect on the Gulf because of: 
"..thefutile dispute about boundaries which had no 
historical basis; and the insoluble debate about the 
question of citizenship and its conditions among entities 
which were not separated by national, racial or cultural 
boundaries....the physical foundations were laid down for 
the fragmentation of the Gulf and Arab Peninsula society, 
not by means offoreign armies of occupation but by the 
weapon of national independence " (Al-Naqeeb, 1990: 63). 
Borders conflicts among the Gulf states have remained as one of the sources 
of instability in the region up to the present. One might usefully list the border 
disputes and the countries involved: 
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1- Saudi Arabia and Kuwait over the maritime boundary. 
2- Saudi Arabia and Yemen over boundaries specifically in the 
al-Wai'a area. 
3- Saudi Arabia and Oman over the Waterhole of Umm Zamol and 
the Buraimi oasis. 
4- Saudi Arabia and Egypt - and later Israel - over the island of 
Sanafir and the Straits of Tiran. 
5- Saudi Arabia and Qatar which might lead to the collapse of 
the GCC. 
6- Kuwait and Iraq which led to two invasions by Iraq in the 
last thirty years. 
7- Bahrain and Qatar over the Hawar islands group. 
8- The UAE and Iran over the Greater and Lesser Tumbs islands 
and the island of Abu Musa. 
9- Sharjah, Ajman, Umm Al-Qawain and Iran over offshore 
waters. 
10- Sharjah and Fujairah over boundaries. 
11- Dubai and Sharjah over territory. 
12- Ras Al-Khaimah and Sharjah over an area rich with deposits 
of phosphate. 
13- Ras Al-Khaimah and Oman over the Musandum Peninsula. 
2.3 EXCHANGING PALM TREES FOR OIL WELLS: (The emergence of the 
rentier state). 
The early 1960s encountered a new diversion in the oil industry that affected 
the world in general and the Gulf in particular. During 1959-60 the oil companies 
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reduced the price of oil twice without consulting the producing countries. This 
conduct alarmed the latter, to the ultimate danger of the companies. A Few of the 
producing countries met in Baghdad in the same year which witnessed the 
establishment of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (Opec). Soon 
afterwards some Arab countries, mainly Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Libya, formed the 
Arab version of Opec which was later joined by the other Arab countries. Countries 
such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and later Abu Dhabi established their own national oil 
companies that were to take the place or at least to join the foreign ones. 
In general this period, from the discovery of oil to the price war of the early 
1970s, was characterised by the lack of heavy industry, the tremendous dependence 
on oil revenues, and the phenomenal expenditure on imported goods. 
"One study of oil revenues and expenditure in the Gulf 
states between 1950 and 1970 noted that in Bahrain as 
much as 92 percent of oil revenues went to cover 
current expenditure, while the figure was 90 percent in 
Kuwait. Another study showed that 99 percent of oil 
revenues was set aside for the ruling family in Bahrain 
and 82 percent in Kuwait. The study commented that 
similarly high ratios were found in the other oil 
emirates (Qatar and Abu Dhabi). It concluded that the 
factors determining the division of oil revenue are 
traditional and political rather than specifically 
economic" (Al-Rumaihi, 1986: 34). 
Owing to the spread of nationalist movements in the Arab world during the 
1950s and 60s, and the great problems Britain was facing independence agreements 
were signed with the Gulf states. Kuwait was the first to gain its independence in 
1961 and the rest, Bahrain, Qatar and the smaller emirates, followed ten years later. 
As for Saudi Arabia and Oman, as mentioned earlier they have never been colonised 
directly by Britain but had been partner to many agreements. None of these countries. 
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however, including Saudi Arabia and Oman, was fully autonomous even after gaining 
their political independence; they were wholly dependent on British, American, or 
European products. Although British soldiers left, American soldiers soon moved in 
with land and sea bases such as the Juffair base in Bahrain. The American empire, 
however, was not interested in protectorates or colonies. In fact President Wilson was 
one of the first world leaders to call for the end of colonisation. The US 
adminisfration preferred independent states that were in reality totally dependent on 
Washington. 
One way of distributing the oil revenues among the nationals was the land 
acquisition policy adopted by many of the Gulf states. Between 1957 and 1962 the 
Kuwaiti Government spent $840 million on such a project (Zahlan, 1989: 37). Many 
Kuwaitis benefited from the land compensation which resulted in the emergence of a 
new class. 
This period (1950s and 1960s) could be expressed as the rise of the rentier 
state in the Gulf. Ruth First argued that oil-producing countries that receive regular 
rents in the form of petroleum revenues could be described as rentier states. She 
described the characteristics of the rentier state as follows: 
"The oil revenues received by the governments of the oil-
producing and exporting countries have very little to do 
with the production processes of their domestic 
economies. The inputs from the local economies other 
than raw materials - are insignificant" (First, 1980: 
119). 
In most of the oil-producing countries -and the Gulf states are the outstanding 
example - the economy shifts towards the services' sector to serve oil production, 
while most of the other aspects of the economy collapse. In the Gulf, individuals 
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gradually abandoned their jobs and shifted to work in the oil industry. Although most 
of these countries did not have a large agricultural sector, after the oil rush it faced a 
huge setback and most of the foodstuff needed were imported. Dependence on foreign 
goods increased as did the need for imported manpower since most of these tiny 
emirates had only a small indigenous population, (see Table 2.2) 
Table 2.2: The Gulf States, area and population in 1987. 
Country Surface area (sq.km) Population (millions) 
Bahrain 369 0.5 
Kuwait 18,000 1.9 
Oman 300,000 1.3 
Qatar 10,360 0.4 
Saudi Arabia 2,150,000 12.5 
U.A.E 84,000 1.9 
Source: McLachlan, 1989: 3. 
Table 2.3: Percentage of population participating in different sectors of the economy in selected years. 
Country year agriculture industry services 
Bahrain 1971 34 59 
Kuwait 1970 33 65 
Qatar 1970 32 64 
Saudi Arabia 1970 40 20 40 
Oman 1971 83 13 
UAE 1968 18 34 48 
Source: I.L.O Yearbook of Labour Statistics, 1974. 
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An important characteristic of the rentier state is the creation of a mammoth 
public sector. A portion of the oil wealth was distributed by offering jobs to a large 
number of nationals, a policy which compensates for the lack of development projects 
which might absorb a large proportion of the workforce. It also camouflages 
unemployment and creates a large unproductive section of the population. 
Government offices in the Gulf are crammed with such examples. It is common to 
enter any of these premises only to find that many employees spend most of their 
working hours reading newspapers and sipping tea and coffee. Local newspapers in 
Bahrain, for example, have published arficles in which the editors criticised the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs for employing nationals when there was no 
work for them. These articles revealed incidents of female employees spending their 
working hours doing aerobic exercises, watching video films or exchanging recipes. 
The inflated public sector policy helps the establishment by reducing the chances of 
any kind of public revolt or a call for democratic changes in the political system, (see 
Table 2.4) 
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Table 2.4: The increasing number of employees in the public sector in the Gulf states from 1971-81 
Country UAE Bahrain Saudi Arabi Oman Qatar Kuwait 
1971 134,082 
(82.4% 
Saudis) 
3,112(91.8% 
Omanis) 
87,032 
(40.3% 
Kuwaiti 
1975 184,741 19,000 10,820 (64% 113,274 
(77% (78.9% Qataris) (40.1% 
Saudis) Omanis) Kuwaiti) 
1981 197,935 37,758 252,898 38,840 37,587 167,616 
(36% (72.6% (60.4% (48.5% (34.6% 
citizens) Saudis) Omanis) Qataris) Kuwaiti) 
Source: Al-Naqeeb, 1990: 85. 
The governments of these countries, while providing jobs for a large 
proportion of the population, failed to impose any kind of taxation. Gradually the 
governments took over complete control of the economy and indulged in lavish 
expenditure on the country's infrastructure, some of it ending up as white elephants. 
Most of these schemes were to serve the oil industry, such as large sea-port facilities, 
airports to receive the large number of foreign workers, etc. People in the region who 
suddenly shifted from rags to riches also adopted the same pattern of extravagant 
expenditure. Luxury items such as designer clothes from Paris and Rome, high-speed 
cars, expensive hi-f i systems, and the summer exodus to Europe became part of the 
Gulf nationals' way of life. This economic model and the way of life adopted by the 
governments of the Gulf states and their populations were properly defined as 'slave 
economies,' a term used by many economists. It simply refers to the idea of importing 
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goods and people to serve the locals who live like 'masters' without being involved in 
any kind of hard productive work (McLachlan and McLachlan, 1989: 6). Flora 
Sullivan noted in her study of Kuwait how nationals belittled hard work and gradually 
shifted to white-collar jobs only. 
"The resulting wholesale move of Kuwaitis out of skilled 
work signaled the beginning of a caste status for 
nationals. Thereafter a Kuwaiti's identity became tied up 
with white collar employment as even skilled labor soon 
held the taint of being associated with cheaper foreign 
workers" (Sullivan, 1987: 12-5). 
Another scholar remarked that in the advertisements in most of the Gulf media 
(or those targeting Gulf nationals) the theme was that Gulf nationals could possess 
what had been produced in the West without hard work. Yves Schemeil wrote that the 
visual images in most of these advertisements carried a European (Western) person 
with a machinery, ranging from car or motorcycle to a food mixer or television set, 
which the Gulf man or woman was pictured as utilising without any trouble. He 
argued that the message in these advertisements was that the Gulf nationals did not 
have to work to obtain these luxuries. In this way the producers have captured the 
essence of the Gulf society's perception of work (Schemeil, 1992: 54-6). 
Per capita income in most of these countries (especially in Kuwait and the 
UAE) rocketed within a period of twenty years without going through the normal 
process of gradual economic and social changes. Until very recently, these countries 
were not obliged to improve their educational or training programmes in order to be 
able to replace foreign labourers and expertise with locals. This is a recipe for disaster 
in the long term. The education system in the Gulf states is tailored to producing 
government employees not skilled workers. 
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While most of the traditional crafts and professions vanished, new ones 
emerged after the exploitation of oil. The roles of the 'guarantors' surfaced after the 
arrival of foreign labourers (especially from the Indian subcontinent) to work in the 
oil production sector. Many locals accumulated wealth by simply working as agents 
for expatriate workers. Baqir Al-Najjar presented a list of famous guarantors in Qatar 
and Kuwait in an unpublished paper in Arabic entitled "Al-Hijrah ila al-Khalij al -
'Arabi: dirasah fi al-tarikh al-ijtima'i li-al-hijrah wa dawr al-sharikat al-naftiyah fi al -
nisf al-awwil min al-qam al-ishrin (Immigration to the Arabian Gulf: a study of the 
social history of immigration and the role of the oil companies during the first half of 
the twentieth century) (quoted in Al-Naqeeb, 1990: 85). A famous guarantor in 
Bahrain during the early days of oil production was Hussein Yateem. 
In all the Gulf states the law requires foreigners to have a national sponsor or 
partner. Gulf nationals exploited this privilege by manipulating foreign workers, 
desperate for jobs, in order to attain wealth without making any effort. Flora Sullivan, 
in her study of the Kuwaiti society, noted that this system 'gave nationals a vested 
interest in the inferior legal status of foreigners' (Sullivan, 1987: 3). 
Gulf governments have provided free health, education and social insurance. 
They also subsidised a few food items, electricity, water and other important public 
services. In many of these countries, people did not have to pay for their electricity or 
telephone. Recently, however, a number of Gulf states have enforced taxation because 
of the depletion of oil resources. Members of the ruling families are exempt from 
paying their utility bills. A large section of them primarily benefited from the 
construction and other projects that followed the discovery of oil. 
"Broad classes of the inhabitants have profitedfrom this 
kind of transfer, but it is a benefit more like 'crumbs 
from the table'; for those who profit most are the 
members of the ruling family and the great merchant 
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families who possess extensive real estate holdings, 
enabling them to gain possession of the lion's share of 
public subsidy" (Al-Naqeeb, 1990: 83). 
The rentier states of the Gulf that emerged between the 1950s and the early 
1970s were able to dominate the political, economic and social aspects of life. Their 
governments had a firm grip on all facets of the economy and were able to exploit it. 
Construction projects -under government control - were distributed among local 
agents for international construction companies. Individuals were encouraged to 
launch new projects such as food processing, shipping agencies, etc. with the support 
of the government. The power of the ruling and merchant families in the Gulf, which 
had been lost after the signing of treaties with the British, was reinstated with the 
emergence of the rentier state. This, of course, did not mean that these classes were 
acting free from any influence. On the contrary, they continued to act as agents for the 
international capitalists serving their interests in the region. Whilst the Gulf ruling 
families strove to accommodate to the new changes; they aimed to preserve the 
traditional relationships (Al-Naqeeb, 1990: 84). 
Contrasts between the extremely rich and the relatively poor in the Gulf have 
been enhanced while the disparity between the wealthy Arab countries and the rest of 
the impoverished Third World has also widened. Many Arabs were attracted to the 
Gulf region. The same period witnessed a large influx of Arab professionals who 
were needed mostly in the education and other public sectors. Many less fortunate 
Arab countries benefited from the Gulf oil revenues through the remittances of their 
nationals who were working in the Gulf, though this by no means implies that the oil 
revenues were distributed equally among the Gulf population or the Arab world at 
large. 
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Around this same period nationalist feelings were spreading throughout the 
Arab world especially after the success of the Free Officers Movement in Egypt in 
overthrowing the monarchy. Many Egyptians and Arabs (Palestinians, Lebanese, 
Syrians,etc.) who arrived in the Gulf as teachers and professors at the few newly 
opened universities, promoted the Nasserite ideas of pan-Arabism. President Jamal 
Abdul Nasser of Egypt - himself a member of the Free Officers Movement -
championed the notion of one Arab economy through which the oil revenues of the 
Gulf region could be used for the development of powerless Arab countries. 
Many in the Gulf were influenced by the Nasserite movement and attempted 
to bring pressure to bear on their governments to abandon their strong affiliations with 
the West and establish powerful alliances with their Arab brothers (Shararah,1981: 
154). Nationalist movements were established in most of the Gulf countries. The 
strongest among them were in Bahrain and Kuwait. The Higher Executive 
Committee in Bahrain, for example, achieved a strong footing among a large section 
of the population. It managed to propagate its nationalist ideas through sports and 
cultural clubs. The committee had successfully called for strikes and demonstrations 
in the late 1950s against British control of the country and its economy. It also used 
the Arabic-language newspaper of the time 'Savrt al Bahrain' (The Voice of Bahrain), 
to promote its ideas. The Bahraini Government reacted by sentencing many members 
of the committee either to imprisonment or to forced exile. One of the exiled leaders 
of the committee, Abd Al-Rahman Al-Bakir, documented the events of the 1950s in 
Bahrain in his book, 'Min al-Bahrain ila al-Manfa: Sant Hilanah' (From Bahrain to 
Exile in 'Saint Helena'). 
Similar movements were inaugurated in other Gulf states where the same 
measures were deployed to spread Arab nationalist ideas. In Kuwait many sports and 
cultural clubs were the headquarters of the different factions of the movement, 
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whether Nasserite, Ba'thist or socialist. These movements gained strength after the 
attack on Egypt in 1956 by Britain, France and Israel following President Nasser 
nationalisation of the Suez Canal. People in the Gulf (as in many other Arab capitals) 
took to the streets setting fire to British establishments and calling for the unity of all 
Arabs against the Westem imperialists' domination of the region. 
According to Al-Naqeeb, the primary achievements of the Gulf nationalist 
movements of the 1950s and 60s were the splintering of 'tribal sectarian forces' and 
the embracing of nationalist ideas. 
Egypt's defeat in the six-day war of 1967, nevertheless, transferred the 
leadership of the Arab world in favour of the tribal patriarchal regimes of the Gulf. 
This, combined with the tremendous increase in oil revenues after the 1973 oil price 
war, despatched the nationalist movement to its grave. The Gulf regimes managed to 
'corrupt' most members of the opposition by the attractions of the luxury life that was 
extended among Gulf nationals. These regimes created the impression that anyone 
could make it to the top and enjoy all the bounty of life i f s/he understood the system 
and worked with it. Members of the opposition, like all the others, rushed to grab their 
share of paradise and comfortable living. 
It is also crucial to note that the Gulf rulers were never completely dominated 
by the foreign powers, whether British or American. Up to the early 1970s many Gulf 
leaders safeguarded their independence and dignity. One of these leaders was King 
Faisal of Saudi Arabia (brother of the current king Fahd) who in 1973 imposed an oil 
embargo on the United States and Holland in response to their unconditional support 
for Israel in the Middle East war. All the other Arab oil-producing countries followed 
suit and refrained from supplying oil to the two nations. The Arab oil embargo, which 
lasted for five months, revealed the concept of using oil as a powerful political 
weapon. Oil prices were to move sharply upwards from this time on which was to put 
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the foreign powers (especially the United States) in an uneasy position and hence 
obliged to increase their presence in the region to protect their interests, namely cheap 
oil. In the same year OPEC raised the price of oil by 67 per cent from 3 to 5 dollars 
per barrel and then by a ftirther 133 per cent to $ 11.65. Oil prices were to continue to 
move upwards so that by 1980 they had reached $37 per barrel (The Middle East 
Magazine, May 1986). 
"The Economist (27 June 1987) estimated that after the 
1973-4 price rises, Saudi Arabia and some of its OPEC 
allies were accumulating foreign-exchange surpluses at 
around $115,000 a second; and that they could have 
bought the equivalent of the four British clearing banks 
every eleven days, or all the equities on the London Stock 
Exchange after nine months; and that in under thirteen 
years, they could have supplied every adult Arab with an 
annuity of $115per week" (Zahlan, 1989: 129). 
2.4 T H E O I L BONANZA (The emergence of the patriarchal authoritarian 
state): 
"Within twenty years or less people have movedfrom 
desert tents with bushes as lavatories to villas with 
gold plated bath taps. The ideological confusion that 
arose from this contradiction is enormous. Western 
producers and local importers encourage the development 
of materialism and even King Faisal the religious ascetic 
favoured material modernisation " (Lackner, 1978: 17). 
The importance of the region, though, does not depend on the amount of oil it 
produces but also on its oil reserves. These jumped from 18 per cent of world proven 
reserves in the early 1970s to 42 per cent in 1980. Similarly oil revenues climbed 
drastically during the 1970s and 1980s until the drop in 1985 that will be discussed 
later. Tables 2.5 and 2.6 show the oil reserves in the 1980s and revenues during 
89 
selected years from the early years of the discovery of oil to the massive revenues of 
1983. 
Country 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 %change 
U.A.E. 30.4 32.2 32.4 32.3 32.5 0.6 
SA 167.5 164.8 168.3 168.9 171.7 1.7 
Oman 2.3 2.6 2.7 2.8 3.5 25.0 
Qatar 3.6 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.4 3.0 
Kuwait 67.9 67.7 67.2 66.8 92.7 38.8 
Bahrain 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Source: OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin (1984). 
Table 2.6: Increase in oil revenues in the Arab Gulf countries in selected years. (In $m.) (-) Shows that 
information is not available 
Country U.A.E Bahrain SA Qatar Kuwait 
1940 1.0 2.5 
1950 3.3 57 1.0 11 
1960 3 15.0 355 54,0 465 
1965 33 22,0 655 69,0 671 
1970 233 35,0 1200 122 895 
1974 6306 170 31163 1970 4765 
1977 9237 226,5 41114 1975 8819 
1980 19456 254 102372 5387 17246 
1983 12800 46100 3000 9900 
Source: OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin (1982). 
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In 1986 Kuwait's oil revenues were $ 9,200m. while its population in the same 
year was 600,000 which meant that the average oil income per head was about 
$15,333 (McLachlan and McLachlan, 1989: 6). The largest oil field in the world, the 
Ghawar field in Saudi Arabia, lies in the Gulf region. The Gulf has four fimes as 
much oil as the United States and the former Soviet Union combined. In 1986, it was 
reported that 40 per cent of the world oil trade originated from the Gulf. Although not 
all the Gulf countries were blessed with such vast oil reserves as Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait, others had benefited from it. Bahrain, for example, which is the poorest 
compared with its neighbours has benefited from its oil refinery which is utilised by 
Saudi Arabia as one way of helping the small island. The government of Bahrain and 
its ruling Al-Khalifah family profited from the Abu Sa'fa oil field in the eastern 
province of Saudi Arabia. Qatar also does not have large amounts of crude oil 
compared with the other Gulf states, but it has the second largest reserves of natural 
gas in the world (ibid.: 14). 
The Gulf economy has enabled large number of nationals to shift towards the 
commercial sector. Many merchants created empires of their own on the same scale 
as those of the Rockfellers and other business tycoons in the industrialised nations. 
Others were employed in the government sector; by the late 1970s and early 1980s 
there were more people working in the government ministries and offices than these 
could absorb. By 1981 the numbers of government employees in the six Gulf 
countries were 197,935 in the UAE, 37,758 in Bahrain, 252,898 in Saudi Arabia, 
38,840 in Oman, 37,587 in Qatar and 167,616 in Kuwait. 
Also new types of jobs or sectors continued to surface such as the middle men 
or local agents not only for merchandise but also for expatriates seeking a job in the 
Gulf as construction workers or as maids and nannies. The number of recruiting 
offices mushroomed. In general there was a shift towards the services sector and most 
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of the population switched from satisfying their own needs to living off the oil 
revenues. Fuad Khuri described the situation in Bahrain and the drift towards the 
services sector (which could be true of other Gulf countries). 
"....15% of the wage or salary earners (totaling 1,950) 
changed their profession -the tendency was for 
teachers, college graduates and engineers to become 
civil servants, free enterprisers, and merchants; 
technicians became taxi drivers and salesmen; craftsmen 
and tradesmen became shopkeepers, peddlers, or 
messengers. The high frequency of foreign labor in blue-
collar jobs has pushed the Bahrainis to the more 
profitable "services" sector of the economy " (Khuri, 
1980:140). 
These enormous changes in the economic activities of both governments and 
people in the region created one of the biggest markets in the world. The Gulf 
countries, with their major dependence on oil revenues; imported all kinds of goods 
and foodstuffs from the United States, Western Europe, Japan and other Asian 
countries. 
"Oil income has made it possible for the country to live 
off imports of everything from wheat to private 
aeroplanes. This is happening partly through the creation 
of consumers: the state employs people at increasingly 
large salaries to work in the administration and 
services, imitating a consumer society. The other 
ways in which the regime has supported the development 
of a merchant class have been its own extravagant 
consumption and the tacitly acknowledged 'commission' 
system of agencies that has allowed a number of 
fortunes to be made with surprising speed" (Lackner, 
1978: 214). 
This consumerist attitude produced new conceptions, ideas and expectations. 
The concept of fast money replaced the need and respect for hard work. A large 
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number of Gulf young people became unproductive and looked for easy short-cuts to 
becoming millionaires. They depended excessively on foreign workers and servants. 
Even children were left to be cared for by nannies from India, Sri Lanka or the 
Philippines. As a result, children knew English better than their native Arabic and 
learned traditions and habits that were foreign to them. Men and women alike spent 
more and more money on status symbols such as expensive cars, clothes and 
jewellery. 
Holiday travelling during the summer became a necessity and a goal for those 
who could not afford it. The new bourgeois class that has been created since the oil 
boom spent more and more time on finding new ways to spend their millions of dinars 
and riyals. 
"Consumer spending became almost like a contagious 
disease spreading from home to home. To the point that 
even those who could not afford it, borrowed to keep up 
appearances., the boom years created a supposed elite, 
who had the wealth without education, work or even 
cultural values. They rose to positions of influence, 
because their names were recognised both inside and 
outside their own country " (Azzam, 1988:18 ). 
Even at the government level, officials were interested only in building 
artificial constructions that were alien to the local inhabitants such as the largest golf 
course in the world which has just been opened in the emirate of Dubai. Officials 
enjoyed reading in the foreign press that they had the biggest university or club or 
whatever, without being interested to know how useful it was to the future of the 
country or region and whether the amount of money spent on it was justifiable. The 
whole region, with the fast development of high-rise buildings, hotels, parks, 
shopping malls,etc., appeared like a huge Disney Land where everything is artificial. 
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Muhammed Rumaihi has compared these countries with the new towns built in the 
United States during the gold rush period and which have now become ghost towns. 
To some extent this could be true of the future of the Gulf region or this is the way 
many locals see the fiiture. Table 2.7 demonstrates the percentage of household items 
consumed in the Gulf and how it has jumped in many of these countries over a period 
of 15 years. 
Table 2.7: An estimate of ownership of consumer items in the Gulf countries between the years 1970-85 
% of household items 1970 1985 
Car 60 65 
Deep Freezer 30 50 
Washing machine 75 80 
Refrigerator 90 95 
Color television 30 65 
Video 6 45 
Food Processor 40 60 
Source: Bahrain Chamber of Commerce. 
According to their company reports, many of the famous brand names such as 
Nescafe', Tide, Mercedes, Lux, Pepsi Cola, Brylcreem, Lipton, Sony, etc. have a 
bigger share in Gulf markets than in any other market in the world. There are a few 
products, such as perfumes and soft drinks, where the per capita consumption is the 
highest in the world. It has been claimed that Gulf nationals are highly vulnerable to 
advertising, especially since the largest number of inhabitants, about 40 to 50 per 
cent, are below the age of 15. In Qatar, for example, over 44 per cent of its 60,300 
population are less than 15 years old. In Saudi Arabia the figure is 48 per cent. In 
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1984 alone an estimated $175 million was spent on advertising, most of it through 
television which is more effective in the Gulf because of the high rate of illiteracy. 
Gulf nationals not only consumed material goods but also human beings in 
terms of the labour force. These countries with their small populations were unable to 
meet the needs of the huge construction and other projects. Combined with the 
elements already mentioned such as the locals lust for collecting money without hard 
work that has surfaced since the oil boom and the circulation of oil revenues this led 
to an increased dependence on foreign labour. The Gulf inhabitants had lost their 
respect for hard work and the younger generation looked for easy outlets or easy jobs 
with high salaries. Even those from poor village families left school early with no 
other ambition than to find easy employment in the public sector. 
"Work is not considered a sacred value as in other 
societies. The oil states are tending to become leisure 
societies handing out wages and allowances to the 
general public without demanding any work in return. 
This reduces the need to work and leads to large-scale 
absenteeism, evasion of responsibilities and duties, and 
abandonment ofprojects for no particular reason " (Al-
Kawwari, 1981: 54). 
The number of foreign workers gradually increased to the extent that the 
nationals became a minority. According to the International Labour Organisation 
there were 6 million foreigners living in the Gulf in 1982, representing 46 per cent of 
the population. Table 2.8 and 2.9 gives the percentages of expatriates in the labour 
force in the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council, excluding Saudi Arabia, 
and the ratios of their participation in the economy. 
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Table 2.8: Percentage of expatriates in the Gulf countries during three different years 
1970 1975 1980 
Country Total popul % expatriat Total popul % expatriat Total popul %expatriat 
U.A.E 220,000 54 656,000 70 1,043,225 75 
Bahrain 216,078 17.5 282,000 24.2 358,857 32.4 
Oman 600,000 7 811,000 20 900,000 30 
Qatar 111,000 58.8 180,000 63.9 260,000 67.3 
Kuwait 738,662 53 994,837 52.5 1,355,827 58.6 
Source: Al-Naqeeb, 1990: 87. 
Table 2.9: Expatriates participation in the economy in relation to the indigenous population ",n the year 
1980 (percentage economicaly active). 
Country % Total population % Nationals % Expatriates 
U.A.E. 52.8 29.3 67* 
Bahrain 36.8 19.3 59 
Saudi Arabia 22.3 
Oman 28.1 18.4 
Qatar 45.7 23.7 61* 
Kuwait 36 19.3 40.7 
Source: Al-Naqeeb, 1990: 88. 
(*) Not reliable. 
The conditions in which these foreign labourers live are not too far from the 
conditions of slaves during the Roman Empire, especially for the unskilled labourers. 
They are confined to isolated camps, crowded in rooms without any proper sanitary 
facilities. Often these rooms have no electricity or water and when there is not enough 
space workers have to sleep in shifts. In some Gulf countries there are labour laws 
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stipulating the amount of space and facilities that should be available, but 
unfortunately these laws are not always implemented and the inspection procedures 
are inefficient. 
"Anyone who travelled through the region in the heyday 
of oil will have seen the disparities between the rich and 
poor, the contemptuous treatment of the Palestinians, 
Pakistani, Egyptian, and other 'guest workers,' and the 
arrogance of rulers for whom oil was a family windfall 
rather than an opportunity and a responsibility for their 
people" (The Observer, 19 August 1990). 
With the increased dependence on foreign workers a labour market has been 
created in which many nationals act as agents for hundreds of foreign workers. They 
provide them with visas on condition that they supply the local agent with a stated 
amount of dinars or riyals monthly. The Gulf is also packed with recruiting agencies 
adverfising for workers in the daily newspapers. Advertisements such as 'A great 
opportunity...we now offer maids from Sri Lanka for the small amount of 30 Dinars, 
the Filipinas for 60....' are very common and are accepted. These agencies have 
started using modem technology in their offices. One can visit their premises and 
watch videos of maids being interviewed, in which they answer questions about their 
credentials and then walk around to show their physical appearance to the Gulf 
clients. 
Among the foreign workers who flooded the Gulf during the oil boom years 
were many Arabs, from poor Arab countries (Egypt, Yemen, Syria) and from the 
diaspora such as Palestinians and Lebanese. These labourers, especially the unskilled 
ones have created massive changes back in their home countries, where like many 
other unskilled workers from Asia, have transferred consumerist habits to their 
villages and towns. For example, many Egyptians have been able to buy a flat or a 
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house in their village such as many professional Egyptians could not afford, and many 
Pakistanis took television sets and videos back to villages with no electricity. (Birks 
and Sinclair, 1980: 342). 
The major dependence on foreign labourers could perhaps be attributed to the 
absence of women's participation in their countrie's development projects because of 
social, polifical and religious restrictions on women. In many of these countries, 
women are not allowed to work with men. The strict Islamic laws are not practised to 
the same degree all over the Gulf. For example, in Saudi Arabia there is strict 
segregation of the sexes. The country with the most relaxed segregated society is 
Bahrain (Niblock, 1982: 177). 
The exclusion of women from the work force increased the need for imported 
labour. The Gulf countries failed to adopt any policies by which they could integrate 
women into the labor force and try to reduce the dependence on expatriates. On the' 
contrary, many of these countries provided social security benefits for women who 
were divorced or widowed, etc. (Hijab, 1988: 20). 
Al l the above mentioned elements indicate the shift in the Gulf economic and 
political systems from the rentier state to a patriarchal authoritarian structure. The 
latter is characterised by the centralisation of economic and political systems in the 
hand of the elite, which in the Gulf is the ruling tribes or families. The economies of 
these states depend totally on oil revenues, a small portion of which is distributed 
among the nationals. Al l other aspects of economic activity tend to cater to the main 
one, namely oil production and oil-related industries such as petrochemicals. 
The patriarchal state structures of the Gulf are also characterised by 
dependence on foreign workers, and limited participation of women in the 
development projects and the economy in general, plus huge expenditures by the state 
or the public on luxury goods and projects. The superficial appearance of the Gulf 
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societies might convey the impression that the political systems are very liberal, that 
the economy is free and that the people are enjoying all the benefits of the good life. 
But this first impression could disappear the moment one takes an in-depth look and 
observes the real hidden situation. The facts that would strike one are that none of 
these countries has any kind of political representation. In fact the families that are 
ruling them are the same as those which signed treaties with Britain many years ago. 
Apart from Kuwait and Bahrain (for a short period) none of the other states has ever 
experienced any kind of an elected parliament. Freedom of speech, of expression and 
of the press is prohibited. Citizens of these countries could be imprisoned without trial 
for varying numbers of years for the simple 'crime' of holding views, beliefs or 
convictions that differ from those of the establishment. International human rights 
organisations have long been publishing reports of violation of human rights in these 
countries. Amnesty International representatives have frequently been prevented from 
attending trials of political prisoners. The (London) Guardian of 13 November 1990 
published an article about the Medical Foundation for the Care of Victims of Torture, 
a London centre which specialises in the treatment of tortured political prisoners, 
which reported that many Saudi political prisoners had been treated at the centre. 
Al-Naqeeb defines the nature of the patriarchal (what he called the 
authoritarian) state by its complete control of the political, economic and social 
systems: 
"In its idealform, the state extends the tentacles of its 
domination to the economic system, monopolizing the 
ownership of the means ofproduction; to the political 
system, monopolizing the means of organization; and to 
the social system, offering itself as an alternative to its 
institutions, substituting for competing ideologies the 
ideology of domination and terror, for its original values 
the values of hedonistic consumption, and for its culture 
the culture of fear and intimidation " (Al-Naqeeb, 1990: 
117). 
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Although the Gulf govemments advocated free market policies, they actually 
maintained their f i rm grip on the economies of their countries. Most traders, 
merchants and contractors depended on the state or its agents -indirectly- for their 
livelihoods. A large number of the big projects during the oil-boom period were 
distributed by the state among a few individuals, mostly merchants or members of the 
ruling family or their front men. Many members of the ruling families conduct their 
business activities through agents who work as a cover for them. For example, the 
Prime Minister of Bahrain - who is also the brother of the sheikh and the real ruler of 
the country - controls most of the business transactions in the island and owns many 
of the big companies, through a few individuals one of whom is the head of his office. 
Although some kind of development has taken place in most of these countries 
during the last twenty years or so, but this was done under ful l state control. The 
desert emirates of the Arab Gulf are not the same as those travellers wrote about years 
ago. They have been dressed in a new modem uniform. Most of the Gulf capitals 
could easily be mistaken for cities in the West. The ruling families, however, have 
maintained their traditional role through the use of terror and intimidation on some 
occasions and bribery on others. The newly created states are without doubt highly 
artificial and internally fragile. They have therefore depended on outside Westem 
powers, and specifically the United States, for protection. A recent example of this 
fragility and reliance on outside powers came in August 1990 when Iraq invaded 
neighbouring Kuwait. Saudi Arabia and the other five members of the Gulf Co -
operation Council immediately called on their Westem 'friends' to come to their aid 
(the invasion will be discussed in more detail later). 
A Few of these states are still mn by the emir himself and not his government 
or ministers. Qatar is a vivid example of this situation. The emir of Qatar, Sheikh 
Khalifah bin Hamad Al-Thani, manages the state administration - its budget, foreign 
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and internal policies, etc. - by himself to the extent that when he leaves the country on 
vacation the whole government comes to a standstill until his return (Graz, 1990: 155 -
6). Sheikh Khalifah treats his country in the same way as his ancestors controlled the 
affairs of their tribe. Qatar is the Al-Thani tribe, since one out of every 15 Qataris is a 
member of the ruling family. 
Though an extreme case, the example of Sheikh Khalifah and the Al-Thani is 
not unique. Most of the ruling families still believe that they own the land, what is on 
top of it and beneath it. Recent history has demonstrated that the tribes have been 
converted into corporate structures. These corporations derive their strength and 
power from: the tribal establishment, the merchant class, the religious establishment 
(al-Mutawa'h), the newly created middle class, the army and police and their 
powerful foreign 'friends,' though the army and police could also be identified with 
the tribal establishment since they are controlled by the tribes. 
The national guards in many of these countries, in particular Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait, all come from the tribes. Rules and regulations for joining the army and 
police have been relaxed in most countries during the last few years. Yet members of 
minority sects such as the Shi'its in Bahrain (minorities not in numbers or percentage 
of population but in power) have been forbidden to join. Most of the armies, navies 
and national guards of the Gulf states have been established with direct help from 
either Britain or the United States. A large chunk of the national budget is devoted to 
purchasing arms. In 1985 Saudi Arabia's defence budget was 64.09 billion Riyals 
($17.3 bilhon). Following the budget deficit due to the collapse of oil prices in 1986, 
the defence allocation was decreased to 60.8 bilHon Riyals and in 1988 to 50.8 billion 
Riyals (Graz, 1990:140). Saudi Arabia has the highest arms spending per capita in the 
worid, exceeding even that of the United States (Salame', 1989: 75). 
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The recent conflict in the Gulf region has proved that these highly-equipped 
armies are solely for decorative purposes. The Americans, however, have used many 
of them for their own benefit, as was the case when the Saudi Government assigned 
$330 mi l l i on for the reinforcement o f its national guard using American advice. 
Holden and Johns in their book 'The House o f Saud,' revealed that this was used by 
the Americans to enable CIA agents to infiltrate the kingdom (quoted in Graz, 1990: 
277). 
Many ministers in the Gul f governments are actually members o f the ruling 
families. Sometimes members of one family rather than the extended tribe hold three 
or four o f the major posts in the govemment. Such is the case of King Fahd of Saudi 
Arabia and his brothers and sons. Three o f his brothers (with the same mother, known 
as ' Al-Sudairian') control the ministries of defence, interior and the govemment of 
the capital Riyadh. Fahd's son Faisal is Undersecretary for the Ministry of Youth and 
Sports. His other son Mohammed runs a consultancy company that is the agent for 
multinational corporations such as Bechtel, Brown and Roots, Continental and others 
(Shararah, 19881: 155). O f the 18 members o f the Bahraini Cabinet, eight are f rom 
the Al-Khal i fah ruling family. To some extent the description used once by Tahsin 
Al-Bashir, an Egyptian diplomat, could still be correct: 'Outside Egypt, there is no 
nation in the Middle East; the others are only tribes with a flag' (Graz, 1990: 111). 
The Egyptian diplomat could have made this statement in revenge for the role 
his country use to play in the Arab world being overtaken by the Gul f states, and 
Saudi Arabia in particular. The defeat of the Nasserite govemment o f Egypt in the 
Arab-Israeli war o f 1967 marked the end o f the Arab nationalist movement that had 
swept the Arab World f rom the Gul f to the Maghreb. Thereafter power was to shift 
f rom Egypt to the oil-rich states o f the Gulf. The Gulf Co-operation Council was to 
replace the Free Officer Movement o f Egypt. Whereas Egypt managed to control the 
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Arab world through the spread o f pan-Arab ideas; the Gulf leaders dominated the 
region with the ideologies of money, consumerism and greed. 
Within twenty years, the Gulf leaders managed to manipulate the people and 
governments o f most o f the Arab countries, i f not of the Third World. Saudi Arabia 
utilised its oil revenues to bribe and suppress nationalist and progressive movements 
in isolated areas. Intellectuals and others in most o f the destitute Arab countries 
waited in line to obtain visas and jobs in the Gulf . Many Egyptians, Lebanese, 
Palestinians and others made fortunes from their jobs in the Gulf region. Countries 
like Jordan came to depend entirely on the remittances of Jordanians working in the 
Gulf. 
By the end o f the 1980s the whole imperialist plan for the region had been 
completed, thanks to K ing Fahd and his five-member clique. The Americans and 
other Western allies had eliminated the nationalist ideas and groups that had 
attempted to disrupt their 'g rand ' plan fo r the region. They had managed to 
accomplish all this without applying any kind of direct force or coercion. This was, of 
course, before 2 August 1990 when the Iraqi army moved into Kuwait and interrupted 
their plan by rekindling nationalist feelings that had faded with the temptation of the 
oil wealth. 
This does not, o f course, mean that during the past twenty years there were no 
attempts by ind iv idua l s or movements to raise the issue o f democracy and 
participation in the Gulf. But many of these attempts, failed and the Gulf regimes 
have rejected any idea o f sharing power with their people. In Kuwait, for example, 
efforts to establish an elected parliament ended with its dismissal by the emir in 1986. 
In that same year a strict censorship was enforced on the media and many Arab 
journalists were deported f rom the country, the most prominent of them being Naji 
A l - A l i , a Palestinian cartoonist who was deported to England and assassinated a year 
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later in front o f his London newspaper premises. The ruling Al-Sabah family were 
unable to tolerate any criticism even at the academic level. Khaldoun Al-Naqeeb, a 
professor o f sociology at the University o f Kuwait, was detained and interrogated 
after the publication in Arabic of his book 'Society and State in the Gulf And Arab 
Peninsula.' 
Although these countries were united in the Gulf Co-operation Council pact, 
each tried to preserve a separate identity. The policies of Kuwaitisation, Saudisation, 
Bahrainisation, etc. were widely disseminated. Each government oudined its goals for 
replacing expatriate employees wi th nationals. They have also tried to force this 
policy on the private sector but without success. 
Saudi Arabia 's Five-Year Plan o f 1985-90 targeted the substitution o f 
foreigners by Saudi men and women whenever possible and proper (Graz, 1990: 131). 
In most o f these tiny states wi th low populations, such a goal seemed unrealistic 
partly because of the lack o f a f i i l l development plan and the lack of sincerity on the 
part o f officials. At the same time, newspaper headlines were drumming up support 
for the plans, while businessmen were buying their way round the regulations by 
bribery and members of the ruling families were trading in visas for foreign workers. 
Prior to the invasion o f Kuwait three major events introduced the region to its 
first shock waves since the relative calm of the oil-boom years. The first was the 
outbreak o f the Iraq-Iran war and the Gulf leaders' fear of its spreading. During the 
first few years the war was confined to inland regions far fi-om the Gulf waters. Later, 
however, the fighting extended out through what became known as the 'tanker war.' 
Gulf shipping lines were continually under threat of attack from both sides. Many oil 
tankers were struck by missiles and this affected oil supplies worldwide. 
Warships belonging to the United States, Britain, France, Italy, the Soviet 
Union, Japan and many other countries moved into the region to protect the shipping 
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lanes and clear the mines f rom the Gulf waters. Kuwaiti oil tankers were the target of 
most o f these assaults. Kuwait's govemment requested aid first from the Soviet Union 
and then f rom the Americans. Later the Kuwaitis agreed with the Americans to re -
flag their ships for protection. Nevertheless, ships and tankers flying the American 
flag were still raided. 
In the initial stages of the war the Gulf states played the role -at least publicly 
- o f neutral neighbours. Later they supported Iraq and supplied the Baghdad regime 
wi th money, o i l , and arms. Clearly that the Iraqi army could not have survived 
without G u l f money especially f rom Saudi Arabia, Kuwai t and the United Arab 
Emirates, plus o f course support from Westem powers like the United States. 
The second shock wave that coincided with the war was the Kuwaiti stock -
exchange crash o f 1982. The collapse o f the Souq Al-Manakh affected the whole 
region and reminded many of the Wall Street crash of the 1929 in the United States. 
The crisis resulted in $92 bill ion worth of unpaid cheques and created a tremendous 
dilemma for the Kuwai t i Govemment which was obliged to intervene (Darwiche, 
1986: 94). 
Many studies that have dealt with the Al-Manakh crash attributed the failure 
to the absence of any economic logic. They suggested that the oil wealth had created 
a new remarkably rich class. Many Kuwaitis who did not know what to do with the 
mi l l ions o f dinars in their bank accounts thought o f investing their money by 
establishing off-shore companies and banks, most of which were set up in Bahrain 
and Dubai both o f which enjoy relaxed financial legislation. 
It all started like a game or a fairy tale with individuals buying and selling 
stocks in companies that existed only on paper. The madness continued and spread 
f rom Kuwait to Bahrain and the other Gulf states, but, with a lesser intensity. Gulf 
nationals borrowed millions and billions of dinars fi-om local and intemational banks 
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with no other guarantee than their well-known names. Others who could not afford to 
borrow pawned their houses, yachts and other property to buy stocks. Blank cheques 
were transferred f r o m hand to hand as individuals bought and sold their shares 
without paying anything for them in real money. 
Public employees, taxi drivers and others shifted their activities to buying 
passports f rom the poor to sell to stock buyers. Many made huge amounts of money 
through these transactions. At one point it was found that police and army officers 
were using the passports of political prisoners to buy and sell shares. Crowds queuing 
f rom dawn in front o f the doors of the local brokers and banks were a common sight 
in many Gul f capitals especially in Manama. Sometimes fighting would break out 
over who was to get in first and police assistance was needed. 
The madness extended beyond stocks and shares to cover the buying and 
selling o f small shops in the newly-built marble premises of the Souq Al-Manakh. 
These shops were sold for a thousand times more than their real price. At one point 
brokers -bored with the same transactions every day - suggested betting on the water 
fountain in the middle of the Al-Manakh. Even fishermen who used to pass by the 
Souq on their way to the central market of Kuwait city, found themselves selling their 
day's catch for thousands of dinars after brokers started betting on it too. Graz noted 
that 'a visit to the Suq al-Manakh in fu l l action was like stepping into a Fellini film' 
(Graz, 1990: 92-3). 
Neither the Kuwaiti Government nor those of neighbouring states intervened 
to end the madness because many members of the government and the royal families 
were actually involved. The Kuwait i Parliament questioned the Minister of Justice 
(who is a member of the Al-Sabah family) on his involvement in the Al-Manakh. A 
Kuwai t i businessman later told The Financial Times ('Charity begins at Home', 30 
October, 1986), 
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"This is a family affair. It is not a financial package 
but a political social package " (Zahlan, 1989: 76). 
The whole economic atmosphere in these Gulf states was highly artificial or, 
as John Maynard Keynes put it , 'a Casino Economy' (Keynes, 1970: 158-9). The 
Iraq-Iran war, the collapse of the Souq Al-Manakh and the drop in oil prices after 
1985 (Kuwaiti petroleum fell to $5 per barrel) changed the atmosphere in the region. 
The prices o f crude o i l took a sharp dive at the beginning o f 1986. Oi l revenues 
dropped to half those o f previous years. The combined oil revenues of Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwai t and the United Arab Emirates dropped f rom $186 bi l l ion in 1982 to $57 
billion in 1985 and $36.9 billion in 1986. 
This was fe l t both at the o f f i c i a l and the ind iv idua l level . Almost al l 
construcfion projects were frozen, government schemes were abandoned and many 
local companies went bankmpt. Foreign banks also experienced difficulties and a few 
closed down their offices, others left small operation ouflets either in Bahrain or 
Dubai. Banks that had lent large sums of money to companies and individuals were 
confronted with the reality that these would never be recovered. British companies 
such as John Laing and George Wimpey had to pack up and leave Saudi Arabia which 
had been one o f their biggest markets (Hirst, 1986). 
As most o f the major construction companies pulled out, many foreign 
workers, especially the skilled ones, were also forced to leave the region. Property 
rents plummeted as a result of the departure o f many expatriates. In Saudi Arabia it 
was estimated that 150,000 houses and flats were vacant, and 30,000 apartments in 
Kuwai t . A Kuwai t i economist commented, 'We send the foreigners home to save 
money, but we need them to make i t ' (Hirst, 1986). Shopping centres (the shrines of 
consumerism) that were built f rom marble during the boom years were now deserted. 
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The newly created wealthy class in the Gulf was faced with no other solution 
but to adjust to the changed circumstances, by not changing cars every year and 
cutting down on the number of trips to Europe and the amount of jewellery and other 
luxury items they used to purchase. A famous Riyadh jeweller recalled that in 1981 he 
had bought the famous $5.1 mi l l ion Polar Star diamond at a Geneva auction for a 
businessman's wife: '...now there is less buying o f very very expansive items' (Roy, 
1986). The very rich still bought private jets but they switched to fuel-efficient ones. 
Prince Fahd bin Khaled bin Abdullah said in an interview with a British newspaper 
'Our people must realise that what happened is a dream which happens but rarely in 
history. That dream is over and we have to adjust to reality' (ibid). 
Taxes were introduced for the first time in the recent history of the oil-rich 
Gu l f countries. A Few states are considering reductions in subsidies on foodstuffs. 
Saudi Arabia, for example, has raised custom tariffs from 4 to 7 per cent on imported 
goods and has ceased to treat such goods as cars, jewellery, perfumes and electrical 
appliances as necessities. 
In Bahrain, the government issued a memorandum to its ministries asking 
them to reduce expenditure by 13 per cent f r o m 1985 to 1987. Many of these 
ministries announced to their employees the end of overtime, private telephone lines 
for high-ranking officials, and business trips abroad. Other countries were forced to 
devalue their currencies against the US dollar since most foreign revenue is received 
in dollars. 
A Kuwai t i businessman was quoted as saying, 'We are like a child that has 
been bom into a nice prosperous family and is trained to do nothing but spend. At the 
age o f 30 i t is d i f f icul t to change your habits' (A special survey by The Economist, 
1986). Although the local press tried to comfort the people by reporting that the 
recession would not last long and that oil prices would rise again, events in the last 
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few years have shown that the situation may not change for years to come, i f not for 
ever. 
Al-Naqeeb argued that the problem with the Gulf was not only economic but 
also sociological and cultural, and has been seen only recently with the economic 
recession. He noted that the political system was dominated by the mling families, but 
he argued that the growing number of educated citizens would exacerbate the problem 
o f the pol i t ical , economic, and social changes that are essential. Educated Gul f 
nationals who are not members of prominent families have less chance now of finding 
suitable jobs. In the fiature this might widen the gap between the mlers and the mled. 
He also argued that the Gulf regimes had been aware of the oncoming crisis 
and that they had exploited religion to annihilate change. During recent years 
fiindamentalist Islamic movements have been mobilising public opinion around them. 
2.5 TIMES OF CRISIS: The EstabUshment of the GCC and the Gulf War. 
In 1981 the G u l f Co-operation Council was established for the declared 
purpose o f economic and social co-ordination. Security, however, was its real 
objective. The leaders decided to set up the headquarters in Riyadh and appointed a 
K u w a i t i ex-diplomat as the secretary-general. Abdullah Bishara was actually 
proposed and supported by the Saudis rather than the Kuwaitis since he had the ability 
to advocate the Saudi policies. 
The first reaction by world leaders to the foundation of the GCC came f rom 
the United States. The American administrafion praised the Council and commented 
that part o f the US interest in the region was to see the Gul f states united in one 
federation to act as a defence against foreign aggression (Al -Ni f i s i , 1982: 14). The 
Br i t i sh Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, also welcomed the step by the Gul f 
leaders. 
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A few neighbouring countries such as Yemen and Iraq viewed the Council 
with scepticism. Newspapers in both countries raised the question of why the Council 
did not include all the Arab states in the Gulf. Iraq, which was excluded, argued that 
the new organisation would undermine the Arab League. In interviews with Gulf 
newspapers Iraqi officials remarked that their country had always supported unity 
among Arab countries so long as it did not introduce foreign dominance into the 
region (ibid.: 16). 
The first step taken by the GGC leaders was the adoption of the 'Fahd Plan,' 
dealing with the problem of the Israeli occupation of Palestine. Without going into the 
details o f the plan, it marked the first time the Gulf leaders had recognised Israel as a 
state. Almost a year later the GCC General Secretary was to announce in an interview 
wi th the Sharjah-based Al-Khaleej nQwsipapev that people in the Gul f should see 
themselves f rom now on not as Arabs but as 'Khaleejeen' meaning people from the 
Gulf, and that people from the Gulf were much better than their brothers and sisters in 
the Arab world. He also declared that the problem of Palestine was an issue for the 
Palestinians alone, etc. Abdullah Busharah denied that the whole interview had taken 
place after it was published and created an embarrassment for the Gulf leaders. 
Initially the GCC was faced with obstacles such as the duplication of projects 
by every one of its members; every emir wanted to have an international airport, a dry 
dock, etc. in his country. Other problems surfaced gradually such as the border 
disputes between different members of the GCC. Saudi Arabia tried to dominate the 
Council and submitted different security proposals at different times. Kuwait and 
Oman were the only ones to disagree with the Saudis. When the Saudis proposed a 
security agreement, the Kuwaitis were the only ones who kept refusing to sign i t . 
This, did not mean, of course, that the Kuwaitis did not have separate secret security 
agreements with their neighbours. For example in the mid-1970s, the Kuwaiti security 
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police channelled informat ion about the activities o f Bahraini students at the 
Univers i ty o f Kuwai t . Later, under orders f r o m the Bahraini Government, the 
security police embarked on a wide search for different members o f the National 
Union o f Bahraini Students and deported many of them. 
Each o f the GCC states had a dispute with its neighbours over its British -
drawn borders. For example, the Saudis swallowed the Buraimi Oasis which angered 
both the emir of Abu Dhabi and the Sultan of Oman. Most of these disputes are over 
regions that are rich in oil reserves. Yet the biggest dispute that was likely to develop 
into an all-out war i f Saudi Arabia had not interfered was the controversy between 
Bahrain and Qatar over the Hawar islands. 
On 26 Apri l 1986 Qatar sent in its troops to arrest a group of foreign workers 
who were building a coastguard post on a 10 sq.km. reef island known as Fisht al -
dibal. Qatar perceived this action by the Bahraini Govemment as a violation of the 
agreement to freeze their dispute over the Hawar islands and the surrounding reefs. 
Later, both countries embarked on a war o f words through the local papers (even 
though the newspapers were privately owned they were indirectly controlled by the 
govemments). Saudi Arabia and other members of the GCC intervened to contain the 
situation. Although nothing has happened since that date, the Qatari Govemment has 
been raising the issue at every GGC conference. 
The dispute between Bahrain and Qatar dates to the 1930s when the British 
Political Resident asked the two countries to submit their case. Both countries vwote 
lengthy letters but the Bahrain document was much more sophisticated because of the 
help of the British adviser to the emir. Sir Charles Belgrave. In 1939 the Political 
Resident gave the island of Hawar (only two miles f rom Qatar) to Bahrain (Zahlan, 
1989: 140). 
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Saudi Arabia 's border dispute wi th Kuwai t would later be solved by the 
British through the establishment o f the neutral zone in 1965. Before drawing the 
neutral zone region, the British had awarded chunks of Kuwaiti land to the Saudis, 
which had angered the Kuwaitis. 
During September 1992 relations between Saudi Arabia and Qatar deteriorated 
owing to a border dispute. Qatar decided to pull its troops out of the GCC 'Peninsula 
Shield' forces. Immediately, though, efforts were made to control the rift between the 
two neighbouring states. 
More than ten years after the establishment of the GCC, it is clear that most of 
the promises of change and imity in the social and economic fields have not yet been 
fulf i l led. On the contrary, the only achievement of the Council has been the setting up 
o f the G u l f defence force known as 'Peninsula Shield' (the Americans and their 
Westem allies were later to call their forces in their war against Iraq 'Desert Shield'. 
M a j i d A l - M a j i d concluded that the Council had proved to be a security pact to 
maintain the power o f the mling families and to present a base for American forces to 
be used in the case of conflict in the region, etc. (Al-Majid, 1986: 35). 
While the GCC govemments were still trying to cope with the effects of the 
oil-price crash of 1985 and the deficit in their budgets, the Iraqi army invaded Kuwait 
on the moming o f 2 August 1990. The first reaction by the Al-Sabah family was to 
pack their bags and leave only hours after the invasion and before Iraqi tanks reached 
the capital and the emir's palace. The Kuwaiti army put up no kind of resistance to 
the Iraqi soldiers; in fact many high-ranking officers fled the country the same day. 
While a Kuwai t i newscaster was calling on all Arabs and world leaders to 
come to their help, the Gul f leaders did not even announce the news on their local 
radio and television stafions. A few countries denounced the invasion and called on 
the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to pull his troops out of Kuwait. A few days later 
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the Gul f emirs, kings and sultans decided to break the news to their citizens and to 
invite the US Army into Saudi Arabia. Only six days after the invasion American 
soldiers were arriving in the desert kingdom and their warships were heading towards 
Gul f waters. Later the British were to jo in them and a coalition of more than thirty 
countries was formed under the leadership of the United States. 
Many Arab and Third World countries were to be bribed or promised some 
benefits on condition that they joined the allied forces. A Few did, but the Arab world 
was divided over the invitation of foreigners to solve an Arab issue. The American 
President wasted no time in setting a deadline for the Iraqis to pull out o f Kuwait 
under threat of an allied attack on their country i f they failed to do so. A number of 
peaceful initiatives were made by world leaders such as the French and the Soviet 
Presidents, but they were not given the time to produce a peaceful settlement to the 
conflict. 
By mid-January 1991 the allies began bombing Iraqi cities and towns. The air 
war was to continue for a while, before the Americans decided to start the land battle. 
Thousands of Iraqis -civilians and soldiers- were killed or injured, the infrastructures 
o f Iraq and Kuwait were destroyed and civil war erupted in parts o f Iraq. 
G u l f nadonals lost the li t t le freedom they used to enjoy before this crisis 
erupted. There was a curb on freedom of expression and thus the media in the Gulf 
itself were forced to take a back seat. Gulf journalists were not allowed access to the 
battle-field and had to depend solely on news mostly filtered through Western media 
outlets. 
Saddam Hussein's action completely disrupted the Western plan for the 
region. For the f i r s t t ime in many years the house o f Saud's leadership was 
challenged. For the first time also the G u l f countries and their leaderships were 
perceived as paper tigers and their dynasties as mere castles of sand. The complete 
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dependence of the industrialised nations on cheap oil from the Gulf -rather than on oil 
as a source of energy- was disrupted. Arab nationalist feelings -which had been buried 
by the petro-doUars- were revived. Many Arab capitals were stormed by thousands of 
demonstrators in support of the Iraqis. 
The seven months period o f the Iraqi invasion o f neighbouring Kuwai t 
revealed the true nature o f this state. The members o f the ruling family and later 
thousands of Kuwaitis left their country instead of staying on and fighting for it. As 
one Arab consular affairs officer told The (London) Independent, 
"....But only a few Kuwaitis were prepared to die for their 
country. Of course they faced overwhelming odds but they 
could have done more. They could have fought much more 
in the streets. The air force fired a few shots then fled 
with its planes to Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. If the army 
could have held out in the city for even three or four days 
there would have been enormous pressure ...etc " (The 
Independent, 7 August 1990). 
A major in the Kuwaiti airforce reported that on 2 August he waited for orders 
to come from his superiors, and when that order failed to materialise he decided to 
leave the country with his wife and children ( The Observer, 12 August, 1990). Many 
Kuwaitis who decided to stay (because they could not afford to leave) used to avoid 
the Iraqi soldiers by sending their foreign maids to buy the food they needed. 
Large numbers o f foreign workers -Arabs and others- also fled the country 
during the occupation. Of the 2 mill ion inhabitants of Kuwait, 1.5 mill ion were non -
Kuwait is mostly Palestinians, Jordanians, Lebanese and Asians. The Independent 
listed the number o f foreigners in both Kuwait and Iraq after the invasion as follows: 
Palestinians, 300,000, Indians 167,000, Sri Lankans 90,900, Bangladeshis 59,800, 
Iranians 40,000, Filipinos 43,000 and Moroccans 6,000. 
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Most o f the foreigners who escaped from Kuwait and Iraq went to Jordan. By 
the end of August 1990 there were around 100,000 refugees in Jordan, most of them 
Asians and Egyptians who had been working in the constmction and service sectors 
or as domestic servants. It was these Asian and Arab countries that felt the pinch of 
the crisis more than the others, since most of them depended heavily on remittances 
f rom the Gulf. 
Arabs who were working in the Gulf states were faced with interrogation and 
deportation because their countries were supporting the Iraqi regime. The Saudi 
police, for example, launched an arrest and deportation campaign against Yemeni 
citizens (the largest community in the Kingdom). Amnesty Intemational reported that 
hundreds o f Yemenis were detained and tortured before they were dumped on the 
borders. 
''One Yemeni said that he was arrested while arguing 
over a cab fare and the taxi driver told the police that he 
had criticised the Saudi government. He was arrested and 
taken to a detention centre where he was beaten and 
almost suffocated before being dumped on the Yemeni 
border" (The Guardian, 2nd of November, 1990). 
Saudi Arabia denied this report by Amnesty Intemational and said that it was 
' to ta l ly fabricated and based on planted in fo rma t ion ' (The Guardian, 2nd o f 
November, 1990). Saudi officials told the world media that the Yemenis were leaving 
the country 'voluntarily. ' This was not the first time that the Saudi authorities had 
denied reports o f human rights violafions; in fact the Saudi News Agency (the 
govemment's mouthpiece) is well known among joumalists as the News Agency of 
Denial. And as usual the Saudis tumed to their fatalism attitude and dependence on 
Allah (God) to save them, that is, of course, after they had invited in the Americans. 
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During the actual fighting and the scares of chemical attacks, the local press started 
publishing advice to citizens in case of such attacks by chemical warhead missiles. 
Robert Fisk o f The Independent responded to this attitude by reporting, 
"Those who remember how King Fahd this year laid the 
responsibility for the death of more than 1,400 Muslim 
pilgrims in Mecca upon 'God's will' will find the initial 
advice faintly familiar. 'Ifyou are outside your home and 
in the open, you cannot do anything except to accept your 
'destiny', the article announced. 'The chances are little 
for survival in the absence of an enclosed protective 
area.' 'Look out your windows,' the paper exhorts its 
worried readers, for birds dropping from the trees, cats, 
dogs and people dropping and choking, cars crashing and 
general panic which are all signs of a gas attack. When 
you see such things happen, barricade doors and windows 
and let nobody in or out of the house " (The Independent, 
15 August, 1990). 
The Crown Prince and some other members of the Al-Sabah family retumed 
to the country a week after the Iraqi army was forced out. Nevertheless, life in Kuwait 
did not retum to normal. Members o f the ml ing family organised gangs to arrest, 
torture and k i l l Palestinians and other Arabs who were accused of collaboration with 
the Iraqi army. Later the Kuwaiti Govemment set up special courts to deal with such 
crimes and many Arabs and Kuwait i who are without nationality known as 'bedoon' 
were sentenced to l i fe imprisonment or execution. These trials were criticised by 
many human right organisations as conducted without proper representation for the 
accused. 
The war left many unsolved issues, principally the issue o f democracy which 
the Americans and their allies were arguing as their reasons for fighting the Iraqis. 
The Iraqi Bath'ist regime survived and when the fighting stopped it tumed against its 
own people. Kuwait retumed to the same situation as that prior to the invasion. The 
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Al-Sabah are back in power and no democratic reforms are on the agenda. The 
Americans have established themselves in the region with no indications o f their 
leaving in the near future. The other Gulf regimes have also returned to their previous 
treatment o f their citizens. Practices o f interrogation, torture and imprisonment 
without trial have been restored. 
The future o f the Gulf, or for these six members o f the GCC, appears to be 
very gloomy. Although the superficial picture gives an impression of prosperity and 
peace, the truth o f the matter is that this is all art if icial . This prosperity does not 
reflect any kind o f development of the economy or of society in general. Although 
many studies written about the Gulf have tackled issues such as, the small number of 
nationals, the influx o f foreign workers, the segregation between men and women, the 
state's different treatment o f Sunnis and the Shi'ites, an in-depth study o f these 
societies could present a more controversial picture. 
This chapter has tried to present a different perspective on the Gulf, though by 
no means presenting a new way of understanding these enigmatic sociefies. They 
represent a combination o f many contradictory elements. Though they have free 
markets, they have kept their tribal alliances and practices. While many Gulf scholars 
consider the foreign workers as intruders, they actually could represent the working 
class. Not all foreigners, though, have taken blue-collar jobs; a few have made it to 
the top and become big businessmen which has allowed them to become citizens of 
their adoptive countries. 
Wad'ah Shararah described Saudi society by noting that the Kingdom 
combines the strict Wahabi sect with American consumerism, tribal relations with 
those o f classic capitalism, '...the ruling tribe with the state, the narrow enclosure on 
oneself with the international role; the execution by the sword with sensitive radars, 
the veiled women with thousands o f imported laborers' (Shararah, 1981: 11). 
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Throughout the last twenty years or so the Gulf countries have been trying to 
play the role of leadership among the other Arab states, while at the same time trying 
to keep other Arabs away from their citizens. They have accepted the boundaries and 
borders which were drawn by the ex-British colonisers. The Gulf leaders were of the 
strong belief that they could develop their countries without the help of other Arabs. 
They invested most of their petro-dollars in foreign capitals and did not help in the 
development of other poor Arab countries. 
These aspects combined -the small number of the indigenous population, the 
great dependence on oil as the fundamental source of income, the lack of one 
development plan for the whole region, the large expenditure sums which exceed 
income, the isolation of women from participating in any development plans, the use 
of terror against the local population, the dependence on foreign forces for protection, 
the lack of democracy - these are all signs of a gloomy future. 
While many studies have portrayed Gulf women as being oppressed by the 
male population, they do not all represent a single case and a distinction should be 
made between women from the upper classes and those from the lower ones. Wealthy 
Gulf women can afford to practise some of their rights. They are also not as oppressed 
as their maids, for example, but they do not share the same rights as the men. Kuwaiti 
women have not been allowed to vote during the various parliamentary experiences. 
Saudi women, even those from the royal family, are not allowed to drive cars, though 
they can travel and study abroad, etc. 
Gulf women just like foreign laborers and journalists will be used in the next 
three chapters as examples of the absence of a civil society in the region. Although 
foreign workers in the Gulf constitute a large percentage of the population, they are 
almost invisible. They only exist as numbers in the official books. Gulf officials try to 
ignore the fact that many of these laborers have been living in the region for years. 
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The contradiction is mostly noticeable when it comes to the Gulf media. On the 
commercial level, local television stations and newspapers cater for these foreign 
laborers. Government-owned television networks broadcast Indian and Pakistani films 
and soap operas. Likewise, a number of local newspapers have a whole section in 
Urdu the language that is spoken by the majority of workers coming from the Indian 
sub-continent. On the other hand, there are un-written (verbal) orders for local 
journalists to avoid raising the issue of foreign laborers in any of its forms as 
discussed in the following chapter. 
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C H A P T E R I I I 
FOREIGN LABOUR: THE INVISIBLE MAJORITY 
IN A G U L F WITHOUT IDENTITY 
3.1 Introduction: 
A Kuwaiti writer produced a play in the mid-1970s that was a hit not only in 
the emirate but throughout the Arabian Gulf region. The play, 'One, Two Three 
Boom,' was a black comedy that projected a family suddenly faced with three 
relatives, who had died before the oil-boom era, and who returned from the grave and 
were shocked to see the changes not only in the structure of their country, but also in 
society itself 
The changes that have occurred in the Gulf in the last twenty years or so might 
well shock even those with the wildest imaginations. Enormous oil revenues has 
meant that these low-populated newly created states have had to start up their 
development plans. Huge cities have been created in the middle of the desert. 
International airports, industrial cities, highways, and commercial shopping centres 
have been built. To the people of the Gulf it was like a fairy tale come true. All of a 
sudden their camels were exchanged for flashy Mercedes, Rolls Royces, etc., their 
small mud houses for huge villas with swimming pools, and their tiny shops for large 
department stores. Most of the residents of the Gulf countries had never even dreamt 
of such changes. 
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The first problem that faced both the governments of these oil-rich states and 
the people themselves was the lack of the necessary work force since almost all of 
them had very small population. Unlike the case of Immigrant workers in Europe or 
the United States; the Gulf emirates invited huge numbers of expatriates be them from 
capital-poor Arab countries (i.e. Egypt, the Sudan, Yemen) or from the Asian 
subcontinent. The expertise needed was also recruited from Europe and the United 
States. From the late 1960s to the early 1970s -with the huge jump in oil prices - the 
foreign insurge began. 
"Immigrant labour usually came in wave 
elsewhere as permanent immigration, and 
displaced labour already there or pushed it 
into other categories, by virtue of accepting 
lower wages. In the Gulf, labour is directly 
hiredfrom the world market as needed for 
specific purposes and sent out again, or 
replaced by others from the same source " 
(Hill, 1983: 131). 
With the increased amounts of oil revenues, the ruling Gulf tribes could afford 
to distribute a small part of them among the indigenous population. The Gulf 
governments offered free education, health and social insurance. People did not have 
to pay taxes; in fact, in some parts of the Gulf -Qatar is a striking example - only 
foreigners had to pay their telephone, electricity and water bills. In those countries -
such as Bahrain - where these services were not free, members of the ruling families 
were still exempted. 
Individual nationals were offered jobs not according to their qualifications but 
as their right as citizens of the country. They were able to rise in the employment 
scale without much effort. Personal relations played a big part and affiliation to a tribe 
or an influential family made an enormous difference in obtaining a job. 
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"..Indeed, a logical extension to the role of emirs 
and sheikhs was that of formal employer so 
capital-rich governments provided employment, 
often sinecures, in ministries. Wages were often 
paid as of right rather than in return for particular 
services. This type of employment with growing oil 
wealth meant that transformation from traditional 
to modern economy occurred on a superficial level, 
remarkably quickly " (Birks and Sinclair, 1980: 23). 
In one way or another this situation increased the problem of the shortage of 
labour. As already noted in chapter 2, the indigenous population lost its appetite for 
hard work. The Gulf regimes were ready to offer jobs in the bureaucracy to a large 
number of their citizens as one way of redistributing the oil revenues. 
"Under this arrangement, paid salaries can be 
thought of as a 'rent' to the nationality 
certificate" (Ferjani, 1984:162). 
Most of the workforce needed to build the infrastructure and industrial cities 
of the Gulf states were imported to the extent that the population of the six members 
of the Gulf Co-operation Council jumped in a short period of time see (Table 3.1). 
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Table 3.1: Estimate of population during the period 1962-1981 
Country Year population 
U.A.E 1967 180,184 
1980 1,043,000 
Bahrain 1965 182,203 
1981 350,798 
Saudi Arabia 1962 3,300,000 
1980 9,454,000 
Oman 1969 750,000 
1980 900,000 
Qatar 1970 130,000 
1981 265,000 
Kuwait 1970 733,196 
1980 1,357,952 
Source: Al-Naqeeb, 1990. 
Although most of the imported labour in the early days came from the capital -
poor Arab countries, they were soon outnumbered by workers from the Indian 
subcontinent and then the Far East. Most of the Gulf states preferred to exchange 
Asians for Arabs for a number of reasons, partly economic but mainly political. Asian 
labour was cheaper than that of many Arabs and was prepared to accept poorer 
conditions, but Asians were also favoured because of their lack of interaction with 
and influence on the indigenous Gulf population. 
Workers from the Arab countries were always seen by the ruling Gulf elite as 
a source of trouble- one element in spreading Arab nationalism in the region. Arab 
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workers have many common features that facilitate their integration into the Gulf 
societies; they share the same language, culture, history and background. The Gulf 
sheikhs were not the only ones who saw the large number of Arab workers as a 
troublesome element; this feeling was also shared by the Western capitalist powers. 
Sir Charles Belgrave, the British adviser to the sheikh of Bahrain, noted in his 
personal memoirs that the Egyptian teachers were spreading the 'dangerous' gospel of 
Nasserism among their Bahraini pupils (Belgrave, 1960: 145). He also wrote that it 
was Bahraini students who introduced strikes into the island. It was not therefore 
surprising that the then head of the educational sector, Ahmed Al-'Umran, changed 
government policy from providing scholarships to the University of Cairo to the 
American University in Beirut (Al-Rumihi,1984: 151). Even though the majority of 
Arabs were repatriated from the early 1970s onwards, a few were still needed to carry 
out jobs that required a mastery of the Arabic language, such as those in the teaching 
and media sectors. 
Many have argued that the influx of foreign workers into the Gulf was part of 
the new international division of labour. It started at a time when the markets of the 
industrialised countries had reached saturation point and when Third World countries 
with few resources were reaching the point of explosion. The numbers of unemployed 
in most of the capital-poor Third World countries were increasing daily and some 
kind of a solution was needed. Others have argued that the importation of a large 
amount of labour was of help to both sides. It helped the Gulf states in their 
development plans by providing the workforce needed, while at the same time solving 
the problem of lack of capital in the countries of origin. 
It was a case of substituting human beings for goods. Egypt's Prime Minister 
in the mid-1970s noted that his country's goals in exporting labour ought to be as 
clear as its goals in exporting cotton and rice. He commented by saying 'Talk about 
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regulating emigration and not exporting human beings should be stopped' (Ferjani, 
1983: 52). Like many other Third World countries, Egypt, which was desperate for 
income, used its only resource that was available at the time, and like the others had 
to pay for it. Most of these capital-poor countries depended heavily on remittances 
from their workers in the Gulf region and used these in place of real development 
plans. As Karl Marx wrote: 
"One of the prerequisites of wage labour and one of 
the historic conditions for capital is free labor and 
the exchange of free labour against money, in order 
to reproduce money and convert it into values in 
order to be consumed by money, not as value for 
enjoyment, but as the use value for money " (Marx, 
1964: 67). 
As the Arab Gulf countries became huge markets for goods and human beings 
where everything could be bought and sold, the immigrant labourers were influenced 
by the consumption habits and soon themselves became a market force. Their needs 
and aspirations changed from those they had had at home. The Gulf region, with the 
largest oil reserves in the world, became a safe zone for the industrialised nations that 
depended on oil as a source of energy. With the importation of a large number of 
Asian workers, the Arab identity of the Gulf started to fade, and nationalist feelings 
and aspirations withered. The region was transformed into a vast supermarket for 
Western goods and ideologies. 
Ferjani noted that the large importation of labour from non-Arab Third World 
nations had created a peculiar situation of extreme dependence on expatriate, largely 
non-Arab labour, an unhealthy relation between the expatriates and the indigenous 
population and lack of plans for the development of national human resources. He 
v^ote, '...a financially rich country with a weak human resource base is in fact, poor 
no matter how high its per capita GNP' (Ferjani, 1984: 156). He argued that this 
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situation could hinder the development of these countries. 
Most of the studies of the phenomenon of the Gulfs total dependence on 
foreign labour have tied it to the economic situation in the Western industrialised 
nations and how it could help world capitalism. Scholars from the region itself, 
however, viewed the importation of foreign labourers - especially non-Arabs - as a 
new type of colonisation. They wrote that most of these foreign workers could be 
used, in the event of political upheaval, as a reserve army or a fifth column, a situation 
that created more hafred towards them on the part of the indigenous population. The 
idea was supported by a number of political underground movements in the region 
especially after Korean construction companies started to build their labour camps 
isolated from the big cities. 
Recent events in the region, however, have proved that foreign workers could 
be the real losers in such an eventuality. What happened in Kuwait after the Iraqi 
invasion of the 2 August 1990 to the large number of expatriates who found 
themselves in the midst of such a disaster with no help whatsoever proved the 
argument wrong. (This will be discussed in a different section of this thesis) This is 
not to say, however, that these events did not reveal the implications of the problem 
for the first time and revealed how vulnerable these countries are. This specific 
incident demonstrated that the huge number of non-Arab workers had changed the 
identity of the region and isolated it from its neighbours. 
"..Labour is a tool used by capital to generate 
profit and at the same time to underdevelop 
or distort the subjective socio-political and 
cultural realities of the societies with 
which it operates" (Glavanis, 1991:23). 
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During this period, it was evident that the Arab Gulf countries were becoming 
more dependent on the outside world, whether West or East. Food, consumer and 
capital goods, soft technology, armaments and labour were all imported. In their 
eagerness for rapid development, these oil-rich states introduced the most advanced 
technologies that were not available to their capital-poor Arab neighbours. This in 
itself meant an increased dependence on non-Arab expertise. The nationals 
meanwhile dodged into new easy jobs and occupations. A new system was introduced 
known as the 'Kaf i l system,' which in simple terms meant nationals working as 
middlemen for the importation of foreign labourers (Al-Najjar, 1985: 108). 
The implications of this migration from capital-poor to capital-rich countries 
had their drastic effects on both sides. Problems started to emerge and dependence on 
the industrialised world increased both in the Gulf and in the labour-exporting Third 
World countries. Peasants in Upper Egypt, Sudan, Yemen, India and elsewhere 
abandoned their lands for the pot of gold that was waiting for them at the end of the 
rainbow in the warm Gulf waters. But the gold did not materialise for many of them 
and the land was lost for ever. They returned home with videos, refrigerators and 
color television sets and started up small businesses, since now they were no longer 
peasants, they were urban dwellers. An Arab writer noted that when he visited 
villages in Yemen, he found that all kinds of consumer goods were available for sale 
from 'Seven-Up bottles to fancy French neckties' (Houidi, 1979: 113). 
In many Arab countries shortages of labour in specific jobs and occupations 
created another problem. There is evidence of such cases in Egypt, Jordan and even 
Yemen which is the poorest of them all. In some parts of Yemen children were used 
to carry out the jobs of the male adults who had left for the Gulf. Yemeni children 
between the ages of 11 and 15 were hired to perform intensive-labour jobs such as 
road works, etc. (Ferjani, 1983: 72-3). 
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The Gulf societies have never accepted foreign labourers even the Arabs were 
rejected by the nationals because they compete with them. Arabs working in the Gulf 
do not identify with their indigenous colleagues, which widens the gap between the 
two groups. There have been many such incidents, such as, for instance, the case of a 
group of nafionals at the University of Kuwait who came into some kind of conflict 
with the University administration. Their Arab colleagues failed to take a stand and 
accusations were made by members of both groups (Sa'd Al-Din and 'Abd al-Fadil, 
1983: 160). 
Arab workers themselves compete with each other and jealousy divides them. 
As a group of scholars noted, in societies such as the Gulf immigrant labourers were 
not able to find welcoming hands. These tribal societies, they said, could not treat 
individuals according to their abilities but only to their family ties (Zahlan, 1982: 
119). It could be argued that humane management is impossible in such an inhumane 
process, where foreign workers are kept in camps isolated from the nationals. Most of 
them are males who are not allowed to bring in their families; In a few countries those 
who earn higher salaries are the only expatriates who are eligible for such a right. 
3.2 THE INVISIBLE MAJORITY 
While their cities, airports and ports were crowded with foreign labourers, the 
Gulf regimes ignored the problem altogether except for a few sponsored conferences 
on the effect of expatriates especially nannies, on indigenous societies. To officials 
these expatriates exist only as a problem over which they have no control. Most of the 
time they try to hide them from the eyes of visitors to the region. Most official figures 
on the number of workers entering the GCC countries are not all that accurate. 
The Gulf media clearly reflected this attitude. Most of the government -
confrolled television stations avoided filming foreign workers; shots were removed 
from different programmes i f they carried the faces of expatriate workers, especially 
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Asians. In the eyes of the television networks, these thousands of workers who 
constitute the largest proportion of the population, simply do not exist. 
The local press, however, tackles the matter in a very low key. Even though 
most of the Gulf newspapers are privately owned, they are all under the Ministry of 
Information's indirect control. Self-censorship is practised not only among the local 
press and media, but also by the foreign press that is represented in the region. 
Gulf newspapers are considered the only avenue through which nationals and 
expatriates can air issues and problems. With the lack of any kind of popular political 
representation, many people turn to the correspondence pages of the newspapers to 
voice their opinions, provided they are acceptable to the state. Unlike the case of 
letters to the editor in the Western industrialised nations, the Gulf leaders consider 
them the barometers of the local society. It has been reported that the Bahraini Prime 
Minister, Sheikh Khalifah al-Khalifah, starts his working day by reading the 
correspondence pages in the local press. 
The English-language newspapers became the only means through which 
foreign workers could voice their problems and complaints. Ill-treated nannies, 
servants and construction workers write to these papers asking for help. They also 
vmte to know i f there are any laws that can safeguard their rights. It is significant to 
note here that most reporters of these newspapers are from the Indian subcontinent 
and are themselves faced with the same problems. 
A few Arab journalists have been interested in the problems of foreign 
workers. Their writings, however, have concentrated on the idea that expatriates are 
dangerous to the local society and most of the time they end up blaming them for all 
its difficulties. Even those who try to understand the problem of the large proportion 
of imported labour and its influence on the development of the region; participate in 
what they preach against. Most of them employ servants and nannies to take care of 
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their children and do the domestic work. 
Over a period of six months in 1988-9 the present writer concentrated on 
monitoring two principal newspapers from each of four Arab Gulf countries selected, 
namely Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait. From each country an Arabic -
language and an English-language daily newspaper was decided on. From Saudi 
Arabia, two sister newspapers that were published internationally were selected, 
namely Al-Sharq Al-Awsataxid Arab News Bahrain at the time of the research had 
only one English and one Arabic daily Akhbar Al-Khaleej and The Gulf Daily News 
From Qatar, Arrayah and Daily Gulf Times, were selected. The two newspapers 
decided upon from Kuwait are published by the same publishing house: they are Al-
Seyassah and Arab Times 
Although most of the analysis will concentrate on these six months, at some 
points there may be a few stories from other periods of time that were selected for 
their importance to the argument as a whole. It is worth noting that most of the 
Arabic-speaking staff of the Gulf newspapers are Arabs from the capital-poor 
countries. Bahrain is an exception, however, since the largest percentage of its 
joumalists are nationals with only a few Arab expatriates. This situation creates a kind 
of uniqueness in the Bahraini press and media in general. Bahraini joumalists are not 
faced with deportation like their Arab colleagues and can tackle issues that others 
would shy away from. In saying this, one should note that local joumalists are still 
under threat; they could lose their press card or even be imprisoned. 
Many of the news items related to foreign workers are given little space and 
are usually hidden in the inside pages. Such was the case of one news story published 
by the Bahraini Arabic-language newspaper Akhbar Al-Khaleej. It reported the 
sacking of a large number of Indian workers by a Bahraini company which was facing 
financial difficulties. The news item was published in a small box at the bottom of 
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page 4. Akhbar Al-khaleejusually publishes twelve pages only. 
The Gulf Daily A^ew carried a letter from an expatriate worker who had been 
in the country for six years and had not received his holiday pay for that period of 
time. In his letter he noted that the company he used to work for had been sold to a 
new group and said that he was afraid of complaining to the authorities because he 
might be sent back home. Many of the letters raise the same concern on the part of 
immigrant labourers of being deported, which is a common practice in the Arab Gulf 
countries. The replacement of workers is a daily occurrence since there are always 
people waiting for recruitment in most of the capital-poor Third World countries. 
During the period of monitoring it was noticeable that daily advertisements 
about run-away workers were common. These advertisements usually carry a 
photograph of the laborer, his passport number and the date of his disappearance. 
Sponsors and employers urge the public - through these advertisements - to report 
these individuals to the police and not to employ them. 
The Arabic-language newspapers usually carry letters f rom readers 
complaining about immigrant labourers. On 16 October 1988, a woman wrote to the 
Bahraini newspaper urging young Bahraini men to take up blue-collar jobs. She 
commented that most Bahraini men reject such hard work and that was why a large 
number of Indians and other Asians had been recruited to take such jobs. 
Newspapers tend to emphasise crimes and disrespect to the indigenous culture 
on the part of foreign labourers. Akhbar Al-Khaleej, for example, on 17 October 1988 
published such a story on its front page. It was a news item about 14 Indians charged 
with gambling, which is forbidden by Islamic law. The newspaper noted that it was 
not the first time that such an act had been committed by foreign workers. The fact 
that such an unimportant news item was published on the front page is an indication 
of the newspaper's policy of focusing on the misbehaviour of immigrant workers. 
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None of the joumalists at the newspaper had ever raised the question of whether these 
expatriate labourers knew anything about the Gulf societies and their culture since 
they were so isolated from the indigenous population. Nor does anyone wonder why it 
is that when one of the Indian or Pakistani workers commits suicide, his story does 
not make the front page, but when he fails to understand the local culture it does. 
A few days later the same newspaper published a feature about the social 
security system in the island. In it the reporter stated that foreign workers were the 
cause of the increase in the number of unemployed among Bahrainis. The same issue 
carried a letter from a reader who urged the deportation of all foreign labourers 
because there were shortages of jobs among nationals. He wrote, 'foreign workers 
should leave the country immediately and go back home since the economy is bad 
now and there are not enough jobs for everybody.' 
Another long letter from an angry reader was published by Akhbar Al-Khaleej 
on 24 October 1988 dealing with maids who had run away from their employes while 
accompanying them on a visit to London. The reader complained that no one had 
been helping all these Bahraini families who were faced with such a 'tragedy,' and 
that something should be done to protect the employers of foreign maids. 
While this reader called for the protection of nationals against their maids, 
another blamed the Asian workers for the lack of morals among Bahrainis. The same 
accusations can be seen from time to time in almost all the Gulf Arabic-language 
newspapers. Both joumalists and readers write constantly about the bad influence of 
foreign workers on the indigenous population. 
Reading the daily newspapers in the Gulf, one could not help noticing that 
most of the nationals' anger was directed against specific section of the immigrant 
labourers. Although the Gulf countries employ individuals from almost all parts of the 
world, the Indians are the worst treated, mostly because they come in large numbers 
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and are ready to take any kind of job, no matter how low the salary. But the main 
reason could be that most of those who come from the Indian subcontinent usually 
occupy manual jobs which are downgraded by the natives. 
Arab Times in its issue of 27-28 October 1988 published a letter from a 
reader, praising the management of one of the local banks for banning its employees 
from using any language other than English or Arabic. The reader noted that this was 
a big blow for the Indians working at the bank who were accustomed to speaking their 
own languages. He also called upon all other banks and companies to follow suit. 
On the same day Akhbar Al-Khaleej puhlishcd a long article about the hotel 
sector in Bahrain, reporting that 87 per cent of the employees at the local hotels were 
foreigners and that Bahrainis consfituted only 13 per cent of the total number. 
Although this article raised the problem of the increased dependence on foreigners in 
such a vital sector; it did not raise the question of the reason behind it and simply 
blamed the expatriate workers for snatching jobs from the nationals. The front page of 
the same newspaper a few days later also carried a news item about an Indian driver 
who stole 65,000 Bahraini Dinars from his employe's account. 
The Saudi newspaper News of the same date carried a discussion about 
foreign maids and nannies. The journalist and the people interviewed agreed that 
Saudi families preferred maids from Sri Lanka and Indonesia rather than from 
Thailand and the Philippines. They said that the Filipinos were not liked because they 
were 'highly educated, arrogant, expensive and rebellious.' They also stated that 
servants should always be Moslems because they had a great deal of influence on the 
children of Saudi families. 
The last few years have seen the strengthening of the Moslem fundamentalist 
movement and this has had an effect on the people of the Gulf region. It influenced 
the increased number of maids being imported from countries such as Indonesia with 
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predominantly Moslem populations. Even those who are not Moslems have been 
forced by their employers to wear the 'Hijab' or head covering. 
A daily column in the Bahraini newspaper Akhbar Al-khaleej which 
concentrates on local issues condemned a Pakistani worker who sexually assaulted a 
young woman. The journalist, in his column 'ala al tariq' (on the road), claimed that 
this was not an isolated incident and that immigrant single males were a threat to the 
local society. He noted that, although foreign labourers were cheap, they created great 
problems for the Gulf societies in general, and he called on the Ministry of Labour to 
put an end to such immigration. 
In 1988 the Philippines Government banned Filipinas from going to work as 
nannies and maids in a number of Arab Gulf countries after incidents of ill-treatment 
by the nationals. Saudi Arabia was one of the states faced with such a ban. Arab News 
31 October published a news item announcing the lifting of the ban by the Philippines 
Government. It stated that the Saudis had been putting pressure on the Philippines 
Government to lift the ban, by refusing visas for Filipino nationals and by offering to 
build a communication tower in the southern part of the Philippines, i f the ban was 
lifted. The same issue of the newspaper carried a feature about the difficulties Saudi 
families went through in finding a suitable maid !! 
Arab Times in Kuwait reported a denial by a Kuwaiti official of the rumour 
that his government planned to sack all its expatriate workers and replace them with 
Kuwaiti nationals. The denial was published on the front page of the newspaper 
apparently to calm the large number of foreign workers who were disturbed by the 
rumour. Expatriates constitute the largest percentage of the workforce in the emirate, 
so it was not surprising to find the Kuwaiti official announcing such a denial; 
otherwise the life of his country would have come practically to a standstill. 
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By 1988 the economies of most of the Gulf states were feeling the effects of 
the 1985 drop in oil prices. Most of the new development plans were abandoned for 
lack of finance. The number of unemployed began to rise and the governments in 
these oil-rich countries calmed their nationals by promising to reduce the number of 
foreign workers in their countries. 
The Qatari newspaper Daily Gulf Times of 1 November 1988 reported that the 
Saudi Government was encouraging the private sector to replace foreign workers with 
nationals, while the Bahrain-based Gulf Daily A^ ew5 concentrated on the Philippines 
government's lifting of the ban on Filipina maids. Such contradictory reports are 
common in the Gulf media. A newspaper may report a government plan to reduce the 
number of immigrant workers on its front page, and inside the paper there could be a 
report about more importation of labour from the Asian subcontinent. 
Arab News of 2 October 1988 published a story telling of the reaction of 
Filipino nationals to the l if t ing of the ban on Filipina maids. One of the people 
interviewed was the head of the biggest recruiting agency in the whole of South East 
Asia. He obviously praised his government's decision and said that his offices were 
ready to return to regular business because the people of the Philippines did not 
approve of the ban. 
Akhbar Al-Khaleej's front page on the same day carried the news of a 
Pakistani construction worker who fell to his death on the site where he was working. 
The newspaper did not comment on the matter but preferred to treat it as a normal 
news item, despite the fact that many expatriate workers especially in the construction 
sector face their death every day in these countries because of lack of safety 
precautions on site. There are not enough accurate figures about such incidents, but 
news items such as this raise the question. It is important to note that not all such 
incidents are reported in the daily newspapers. 
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A letter by a reader complaining about the large number of foreign labourers 
who disappeared from their jobs was also published on the same day. The reader 
suggested that some kind of a law should be passed to punish these workers and that 
their deportation was not enough. The Kuwaiti newspaper Arab Times noted on its 
front page the Saudi Government's decision to replace expatriates with nationals. 
Two days later Arab A'^ ew '^published a letter from an Indian labourer working 
in the Kingdom in which he complained about the treatment of Indian workers in the 
Gulf by the Indian authorities. He stressed the point that it was they -the Indian 
workers in the Gulf- who helped their country's economy by the amount of money 
they sent home every month. He suggested that they ought to get better treatment 
back home in return for these remittances. It is well known that Indian workers in the 
Gulf face very harsh treatment at their country's airports when they go on home visits. 
Now and then letters are published by Gulf nationals in which they complain 
about the way foreign workers -especially Asians - are treated by the locals. One of 
these was a letter in the Bahraini Arabic-language newspaper in which the reader 
condemned Bahraini families who forced their maids to wash their cars every day in 
the streets. It is a common sight in the streets of the Gulf in the early hours of the day 
to see the Filipina or Indian maid cleaning her employer's car. Most of the families in 
the Gulf own more than one car, especially in those countries where women are 
allowed to drive, as is the case in Bahrain and Kuwait, for example. 
The Gulf Daily News 9 November reported the disappearance of a Filipina 
waitress after she had been dismissed from her job. Her employer, who was quoted by 
the newspaper as saying that he had reserved a seat for her on the first plane leaving 
the island for the Philippines. The Filipina waitress had had a disagreement with her 
sponsor, who decided to sack her and send her home. Although a handfixl of foreign 
workers disappear from their jobs every day, not all of them get the publicity that this 
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case had. A Few days later the same newspaper reported that the whereabouts of the 
waitress was still unknown and that a Sri Lankan maid had also been reported 
missing. 
The headline of the same paper on 13 November reported the police 
investigation of an accident at a construction site where one Indian labourer had been 
killed and another injured. The paper noted that both were working on a project to 
renovate the Sheraton Hotel. What it failed to mention was that the renovation was for 
the forthcoming Gulf Co-operation Council summit meeting to be held at the hotel. 
The construction company that had the contract for the project was forcing its workers 
- almost all of them from the Indian subcontinent - to work day and night to meet its 
deadline. 
Both Akhbar Al-Khaleej and its sister paper reported on 14 November that a 
Pakistani citizen had been sentenced to six months imprisonment for staying in the 
country without a visa. It also published a long letter by a reader who explained that 
foreign workers had been needed in the 1970s because of the large amount of 
construction work that was going on in the region, but that the 1980s with the drop in 
oil prices and its consequences for the construcrion sector, most of these Asian 
workers were no longer needed. He noted, however, that most of them remained in 
the region and had been able to survive by finding other jobs, which was a threat to 
the nationals. He then suggested that the Gulf governments should force them to pay 
taxes. In many of the oil-rich Gulf states, the tax system is not enforced. 
A Qatari journalist, in his daily column in Arrayah, went to great lengths to 
explain the troubles that the Qatari face when sponsoring a foreign worker. On the 
same day The Gulf Daily News reported that an Indian had been accused of fraud 
when he stole the money that his employer had given him to deposit at the local bank. 
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In an article titled 'Maids on the run,' Arab News investigated what it called 
the 'phenomenon' of maids on the run. It reported that between 10 and 15 housemaids 
in Saudi Arabia abandon their sponsors every year. One of the Saudis interviewed by 
the paper said that his wife insisted on having a maid although they had no need for 
one. He remarked that it was becoming a kind of fashion for Saudi families to hire 
maids even i f they did not need one. It is important to note that the majority of Saudi 
women do not participate in the workforce and that those who do are limited to 
specific jobs which society permits them to pursue. 
The Gulf Daily News of 20 November reported that the body of an Indian 
worker who had died on a construction site had not yet been flown home for burial. 
The story, which was published on page 4, remarked that the Indian embassy in the 
island had commented that he was a runaway worker and there was therefore no one 
to meet the expenses of sending his body home. It was later reported that a group of 
Indians had donated the amount needed after more than two weeks. 
A small news item on the front page of Akhbar Al-Khaleej narrated the story 
of an Asian male who jumped in front of a bus and killed himself The paper did not 
comment on the incident nor did it follow it up. Small items about such episodes are 
published now and then but rarely do they get investigated. 
Sensationalism is an international phenomenon among journalists, and the 
Gulf is no exception. Crime stories are at the top of the list since the newspapers in 
the region are not allowed to report gossip, prostitution or the private lives of 
celebrities. Even with crime, the newspapers never publish a story unless they receive 
prior permission from the police or the Ministry of Interiors. Crimes that are 
committed by foreigners, however, can be reported much more easily and at times 
without permission. 
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On page 2 of Akhbar Al-Khaleej of 23 November it was reported that an 
Indian man had been accused of breaking into the room of a Filipina. The Gulf press 
never reports the many known incidents of sexual assaults by native males on their 
maids. The same paper reported on its front page news about an Indian man who had 
been accused of installing a special device on his telephone to cut out the recording of 
his long-distance calls. 
The number of foreign children taking up manual work in the Gulf was 
indirectly raised by the Saudi newspaper Arab News in a feature about child beggars 
who had switched to washing cars. The reporter interviewed many of the children 
who were all non-Saudis. One of the boys- a Pakistani- said that he had came to the 
country to visit the holy shrines of Mecca and Medina and had never left the country 
since then. He lived on the streets and worked as a car washer. 
A peculiar letter appeared on the same day in the Kuwaiti newspaper Al-
Seyassah in which a Kuwaiti male described how foreign maids had taken up the role 
of the woman of the house. He wrote that these maids cooked, washed, cleaned and 
even helped with the children's homework, and since most of the time they were 
'prettier, better dressed, have nicer figures, etc' the husbands had begun to compare 
them with their wives. He commented that the wives became jealous of their maids 
and started abusing them. 
On 29 Nowemher Akhbar Al-Khaleej reported that a Pakistani male had been 
sentenced to a year's imprisonment for attempted murder. The paper noted that the 
sentence had been reduced because the accused was only 18 years old. Its English -
language sister newspaper reported on the same day that the Philippines Government 
had also lifted the ban on maids to Bahrain, after doing the same thing for Saudi 
Arabia. The editor commented on the subject, indicating that Bahrain was blacklisted 
in the beginning because many Filipina maids in the country had been exploited. The 
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correspondence section of that day carried a complaint by a housemaid who wanted to 
change her job, but had her request rejected by the recruiting agency. She wrote that 
the agency told her that she would not get a release letter from her sponsor unless she 
paid him 200 Bahraini Dinars. 
The Gulf Daily News devoted its whole Second page to a feature about the 
large number of expatriates who disappeared in the island. The article tried to discuss 
the reasons behind what it called 'the vanishing' expatriates, but failed to do so, 
concentrating instead on the figures and reactions by officials. Akhbar Al-Khaleej of 
the same day reported that four Filipinos had been imprisoned on the charge of 
stealing carpets from a mosque. 
On 4 December the same paper published a coverage of a lecture on the 
workforce, in which the lecturer estimated the percentage of foreign workers in the 
private sector as 79 per cent of the total. On the same day the Saudi paper Arab News 
reported the arrival of the Philippines Minister of Labour on an official visit to the 
Kingdom. The paper noted that the latest estimate of the number of Filipinos working 
in the country was between 300,000 and 350,000. 
Al-Seyassahin Kuwait published a letter of condemnation of a woman who 
had been beating her maid to the extent that she needed hospitalisation. The reader 
explained how this Kuwaiti woman had used sharp instruments and cigarettes against 
her maid who had had to take refiage at her country's embassy. 
The imprisonment of a Filipino who stole an amount of money from the 
company he worked for, was published as the main news item on page 2 of Akhbar 
Al-Khaleej on 6 December. The man was caught while posting it to the Philippines 
and was sentenced to three months imprisonment and deportation. Arab News 
reported that four foreign workers who had been jailed for different offences were 
freed after each of them memorised the Koran and converted to Islam. 
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The Gulf Daily A^ew r^eported that expatriates earning less than 4,200 Bahraini 
Dinars a month had been banned from hiring maids. The paper gave the reason for 
such a decision by the Bahraini Government as one way of reducing the number of 
imported maids, while at the same time discouraging expatriate wives from working. 
It has been noticed that most of the highly paid expatriates in the Gulf tend to 
imitate the nationals in terms of recruiting domestic servants. Reports from capital -
poor Arab countries such as Egypt show that many Egyptians who have worked in the 
Gulf take their maids with them when they return home. The same could be true of 
Europeans and others who were recruited to the Gulf for their expertise. This does 
not, of course, imply that most of the expatriates in the Gulf had maids, since the 
majority of them were manual workers. 
While the Saudi newspapers were reporting that the government was planning 
to reduce the number of immigrant workers in the country and encourage the private 
sector to replace them with nationals; the same papers were reporting further 
recruitments. Arab Newso^ 8 December reported that there were around 100,000 
Bangladeshi workers in Saudi Arabia, and that the two governments had signed an 
agreement for more 'cooperation' in this field. In the same issue, the newspaper 
commented that 200,000 positions occupied by non-Saudis could be taken up by 
locals. 
Another suicide incident by a foreign laborer was reported by Akhbar Al-
Khaleej on 9 December. On its front page the paper published the story of an Indian 
worker who tried to commit suicide by stabbing himself with a knife. His neighbours 
took him to hospital immediately, which saved his l ife. The Gulf Daily News 
commented on the government's 'Bahrainisation' plan. It noted that the plan had not 
been successftil because expafriate workers were ready to accept low salaries which 
made them cheaper for employers. 
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Most of the Arab Gulf states have launched plans to substitute nationals for 
immigrant workers. None of the practical steps suggested by these plans have 
materialised and all have remained as rhetoric to be used by officials when needed. 
A well-knowm Kuwaiti columnist wrote on 12 December in Al-Seyessahxhat a 
number of maids faced cruelty from their employers and when they complained they 
were sent back home, while the employer could always recruit a new maid without 
much trouble. At the end of his column he advised that such employers should not be 
allowed to import any more maids as one way of 'punishing' them. 
The Gulf Daily News of the same date claimed that Westem expatriates would 
always be needed despite the 'Arabisation' or 'Bahrainisation' programmes. The 
reason for this, according to the newspaper, was the lack of expertise among 
nationals. 
An Egyptian worker wrote to the Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Seyassahon 14 
December, complaining about laws prohibiting immigrants from bringing their 
families to live with them in Kuwait. He described his loneliness and compared 
himself to a camel. 
The finance seed on of Al-Seyassahof 15 December revealed that 21,000 work 
permits for expatriates had been issued by the Bahraini authorities between January 
and August 1988. 
On the same date The Gulf Daily News also disclosed the case of an Indian 
worker who fell to his death at a construction site and the incident was not reported to 
the police by his employer. The paper asserted that the worker wasn't insured by the 
company he worked for although this is required by the labour laws. Another news 
item reported that five expatriates had been accused of selling rice after the expire 
date had passed. 
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Arab A^ew5published a study that was carried out in the Kingdom on both 
Saudi and immigrant workers. According to the study, the Saudi workers had the 
advantage of self- confidence and readiness for leadership, while foreign workers 
were distinguished by their efficiency and easy adaptation. The same study noted that 
expatriates constituted 56 per cent of the total labour force. 
The increased dependence on foreign maids was criticised by a Qatari writer 
in one of Arrayah's daily columns. The writer explained how Qataris were becoming 
completely dependent on these maids to the extent that some families had one to carry 
their children's books to the university. He noted that this was a part of the changes in 
Qatari society, which was shifting towards more and more consumerist habits. 
Although the Gulf societies are not considered violent in comparison with 
others, violence among families is usually not reported apart from the ill-treatment of 
servants. This, too, is only reported as scattered incidents or through complaints by 
the maids themselves. The Gulf Daily News of 20 December published three letters 
of this kind written by maids under false names. In one of the letters the housemaid 
reported noticing that her cousin, who also worked as a servant, had a black eye after 
she had been slapped by her employer and that she had not been allowed to see a 
doctor. 
An incident of 22 Filipinos who were caught gambling at a private residence 
was reported by Akhbar Al-Khaleej or\ 22 December. Although gambling is 
forbidden by Islam, many Gulf nationals practise it but none has ever been caught or 
reported. The same newspaper printed a feature entitled 'Looking for a maid?' which 
revealed that, even during the period when the Philippines Government banned 
recruitment to the Gulf, many had managed to obtain them after falsifying the 
documents required. The article discussed incidents of ill-treatment of maids and said 
that many male employers demanded a beautiful maid. 
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A Bahraini journalist published a feature about an old part of the capital 
Manama, where all the Asian workers have resided since the nationals left the area. 
She said that she could not find a single Bahraini walking around in the streets of the 
district. She also reported that people were looking at her with suspicion because she 
was not wearing the 'Sari ' the long dress worn by the women of the Indian 
subconrinent. She wrote with sadness that this was only one of the areas where 
'strangers' had moved in to occupy the beautiful old traditional houses. At the end 
she blamed the Asians for these changes and never thought to question why the 
Bahrainis had left their beautiful old houses. 
Arrayah of 25 December printed a letter by a Qatari remarking that the people 
of the Gulf always complained about their servants and that they (the expatriate 
servants) stole from their employers. He wrote, however, that no one wondered i f this 
could be the result of their unjust treatment. 
When a Bahraini raised the issue of unemployment among nationals and 
blamed the expatriate workers for it, he received a strong answer or comment from an 
official at the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. The letter and the reply were 
published in The Gulf Daily News of 27 December. The official commented that the 
number of unemployed was not so high and that expatriates would still be needed 
because of their qualifications. He also reminded the nationals that Bahrainisation 
ought to be gradual and not rapid. 
Zahed Matar, a columnist on Al-Seyassah remarked that according to the new 
law an Asian worker would be allowed to bring his wife and family to live with him 
in Kuwait only after twenty years. He was referring to a new law that required 
expatriates to have a minimum wage of 410 Kuwaiti Dinars to be eligible to bring in 
members of their families. Since most of the Asian workers earn very low incomes 
and get no increases in their salaries they would probably reach the minimum wage of 
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KD 410 only after twenty years or so. 
The Gulf Daily A^ewj'reported that the Bahraini Chamber of Commerce had 
issued a plea to curb expatriate trade. It noted that the Chamber wanted to end the 
practice of Bahrainis who rent their trade licences to foreigners for a monthly 
payment and leave them to conduct business in any way they like. Many Gulf 
nationals have turned to this procedure as an easy way of making money. The licence 
is usually rented to a group of workers who have lost their jobs on a construction site 
and were looking for any kind of occupation, so they rent a licence and open a small 
shop or restaurant. 
Foreign maids were attacked by a Qatari columnist on 1 January 1989. The 
writer directed her anger against male servants whom she described as 'monsters' 
who attack innocent young girls. She wrote that many Qatari families hired male 
servants who would take any opportunity to assault sexually young female members 
of the family. 
The ful l story of an Indian laborer who committed suicide in Bahrain was 
disclosed by The Gulf Daily News.On 2 January 1989 it reported that an Indian 
worker who had hanged himself in his room three weeks earlier had been under 
severe stress. He had run away from his employer weeks before, but had been caught 
and forced to pay his sponsor an amount of money in return for his release letter. The 
paper did not elaborate on the subject. 
Akhbar Al-Khaleej of 4 January reported that a group of foreigners had been 
caught violating the laws by turning parts of their homes into restaurants and shops. 
Many expatriates who were recruited in the 1970s and had been able to stay and bring 
their families into the country; managed to open such small businesses. In the same 
issue was a feature about workers in the island and how they were treated by agents. 
According to the article, this procedure applied not only to foreigners but also to 
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nationals, who worked for a specific company and obtained part of their salary 
through an agent who took the rest of it. 
On 7 January, The Gulf Daily News revealed that the hotel sector in Bahrain 
would continue to depend on foreign labourers for the next ten years. Its Arabic -
language sister newspaper reported two days later that the number of expatriate 
workers in the island had reached 107,000, 96,800 of whom were males and 10,167 
females. 
At least one foreign laborer gets deported every day in Bahrain according to a 
study published by Akhbar Al-Khaleej. The same study stated that the practice of 'free 
visa' was still going on. It was during the last few years that a handfiil of nationals, 
mostly members of the ruling families, had managed to get hold of a large number of 
visas which they distributed among expatriates in return for a specific amount of 
money paid to them monthly. Most of those trading in free visas use their status or 
influence to obtain the visas. There are rumours of officials being involved in these 
practices. 
A group of Asian workers in Kuwait were faced with a situation in which they 
had not received any salary for months. The Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Seyassah reported 
that this was not due to the economic recession but to the simple fact that the 
Kuwaitis did not want to pay these Asians anything and preferred to delay the 
payment i f possible. It stated that 50 per cent of the Asians in the country faced a 
delay in the payment of their salaries and 30 per cent had not been paid at all. 
According to the report these workers l ived in overcrowded unhealthy 
accommodation. 
In countries such as the Gulf where thousands of workers are imported 
annually, salaries are not always the same for a specific job. The Gulf Daily News 
published a study in which it proved that Bahrainis, Europeans, Filipinos and Indians 
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got different salaries for the same job. It disclosed that Bahraini nationals were paid 
less than expatriates in the high-level jobs in the private sector. 
Arab Times of 4 March 1989 reported a strike by Indian workers at a camp 
outside Kuwait city. The workers told the newspaper that they had taken this action 
because they had not been paid their salaries for months. It is not common to see 
foreign labourers on strike in the Gulf because early experiences have taught them 
that they could be on the first plane back home i f they go on strike. 
Safety at work sites is one of the issues that foreign workers are faced with but 
can not complain about. A Bahraini newspaper reported the death of an immigrant 
laborer while working, because the machine he was using did not have a protection 
cover. In Qatar, Arrayah commented that many foreign maids tend to hurt the 
children of their employer either because of the way they are treated by the parents or 
because they are left with too much work. 
On 6 March, Arab Timesre^porteA that expatriate workers in the Gulf 
especially those from Third World countries, contributed between $6 to $8 billion to 
their country's income every year. 
Whilst most immigrant workers in the Gulf are always afraid of being 
deported; there are also cases of those who want to return home but have been forced 
by their sponsors to stay and work. Such was the case of a worker who wrote to The 
Gulf Daily News editor enquiring about the matter. He said that he wanted to go 
home and asked i f his employer could force him to stay. 
The same newspaper reported on 9 March that the bodies of three Indian 
workers had been flown back home. It revealed that the three had died when fire 
broke out at their house. Fire incidents such as this one are also very common, since 
most expatriate workers are forced to live in crowded accommodations. A handfial of 
them usually rent a small room and use it for everything ,i.e. sleeping, cooking, etc. 
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House rents are very high in most of the Gulf states because of the high standard of 
living and also because of the large number of nationals who live off their real estate 
as one easy way of making money. 
When the present writer visited many workers' camps in Bahrain for a feature 
ardcle on the standard of accommodation for expatriates, she found that up to 10 
people shared a room which they used for all their daily activities and needs. Water, 
electricity and sewage were not always available. At one of these camps the workers 
said that they had not had running water for months. At night most of them slept on 
the pavement which was cooler in the hot summer heat of the Gulf. They also 
reported incidents of fire since they used old stoves for cooking and coal for heating 
in the cold desert winters. 
Many of the abused maids get their revenge on the children of the family they 
work for. Arab News of 11 March reported that a Filipina maid had been sentenced to 
death after being convicted of killing the daughter of her sponsor. The newspaper 
noted that the maid had had an argument with the mother who had accused her of 
stealing some money. It continued by saying that the maid became angry with her 
employer and got her revenge through the daughter. It also disclosed a separate 
incident in which a mother discovered that her maid had been abusing her children by 
kicking and beating them. 
On the same day the Qatari newspaper Daily Gulf Times published on its 
front page the story of a Filipina woman who had been beheaded after being 
convicted of strangling a young Saudi woman. These are but a few of such events that 
get published; many others do not find their way into print but nationals always talk 
about them. Gulf nationals blame the maids and nannies they hire to take care of their 
children and never really think that they could be part of the cause of such tragic 
events. 
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Another suicidal episode was reported on 15 March by Akhbar Al-Khaleej. It 
is worth mentioning that most of the Gulf newspapers tend to ignore such events, and 
that only this newspaper publishes a few of them from time to time. It stated that 
another Asian worker had committed suicide by hanging himself from the fan in his 
room. As with the previous reports, it declined to comment on the matter. 
A column in Arrayah remarked that nationals should think more positively 
about these foreign workers. He said that they came with the dream of making a 
fortune but, they face disappointment and misery because of the problems confronting 
them. One of these problems is the delay in getting their salaries. A few days later the 
paper published a letter by a reader stating that Qataris should not blame the maids for 
all the problems they faced with their children. He v^ote, '..the truth is that they are 
here to help us in our homes and they have been doing that...the threat to our children 
doesn't come from the maids but from other things.' 
The last week of March 1989 saw the opening of the Gulf Women's 
Conference. It was covered by most of the newspapers in the region except the Saudi 
ones. The conference will be discussed in a different section of this thesis; what is 
relevant here is the papers which were presented at the conference dealing with the 
issue of the effect of foreign nannies on the Gulf children. The Gulf Daily News of 20 
March reported that a study conducted locally had found that children were held back 
by untrained maids. The newspaper's daily comment on the issue opened up a debate 
on the subject. 
In less than two days another suicide incident was revealed by the same 
Bahraini newspaper. Akhbar Al-Khaleej reported that a Bangladeshi cook had tried to 
commit suicide but failed and had been hospitalised since then. The English-language 
newspaper on the same day published a letter by a reader complaining about the large 
149 
number of cheap foreign labourers imported while Bahrainis were unable to find a 
job. 
Arab Times on 22 March devoted most of its front page to news items related 
to foreign workers. The first commented on the laws that had been passed to prevent 
expatriates from taking up two jobs at the same time or working for someone who 
was not their sponsor. The second one stated that immigrants were not allowed to 
invest in the country. The third exposed the dispute with a number of Indian workers 
who had not been paid for a long period by their Kuwaiti employer. 
A Qatari writer expressed his deep sadness at the changes in the Gulf 
societies. He said that, following the discovery of oil, the people of the region had 
became interested only in material things. They were no longer concerned about 
work and had become totally dependent on foreigners to do everything for them even 
at home. He ended by urging people to go back to their pre-oil situation and start 
recovering from the material shock that the petro-doUars era had brought with it. 
The story about the Indian workers who had not been paid by their Kuwaiti 
employer found its way into the rest of the Gulf press. The Gulf Daily Newsof 23 
March reported the incident. 
A Kuwaiti columnist noted that, instead of advertising about missing maids; 
the government should make it legal for any worker to change sponsors i f he or she 
was not satisfied with their employer. He wrote on the front page of Arab Timesthat 
people should be ashamed of themselves for doing such a thing as advertising for 
their employees who had run away. His column was also published by both Al 
Seyassah and Arab Times 
Akhbar Al-Khaleej raised a matter which was very sensitive to Gulf societies, 
namely the increased number of marriages between Bahrainis and their Filipina 
maids. There have been such cases, not only in Bahrain but also in most of the other 
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Gulf countries. Official statistics indicate that marriages with Filipinas comprise the 
largest number of intermarriages with non-national females. 
On 1 April 1989 The Gulf Daily //ew5 disclosed that an Indian worker had 
died at a construction site. The paper did not elaborate on the matter, other than 
saying that there had been many similar accidents on the island. Arab Times oi 
Kuwait reported a few days later a the second strike by the same Indian workers who 
were still waiting for their employer to pay them their wages. The news story revealed 
that an agreement had been reached the first time on condition that the Kuwaiti 
employer started paying their salaries gradually. Months had passed and the promises 
had not materialise and this forced the workers to take their second action, the 
newspaper noted. Later in the month it was to report that a second agreement had 
been reached between the labourers and their employer. 
A few days later the same paper's front page carried accusations by a number 
of Kuwaitis that Filipino workers in the Gulf were working as agents for the Mossad, 
the Israeli secret service. The article was extensive out and tried to persuade readers 
that these were not mere speculations but hard facts. In Bahrain The Gulf Daily News 
carried the same news item. It noted that all Filipinos working in the Middle East 
were spies for different countries. This newspaper also published the news item on its 
front page. 
Both the Kuwaiti newspapers studied reported on 5 April that the Kuwaiti 
Minister of Planning had announced that his country was going to impose taxes on 
'unproductive' expatriates. The Minister continued by saying that the recruitment of a 
'productive' work force would continue. 
Akhbar Al-Khaleej later interviewed a group of local women who were 
working as cleaners at most of the hotels on the island. The women complained about 
cheap foreign labourers who competed with them. Al Seyassah on the same day 
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reported that two Pakistanis had been beheaded in Saudi Arabia after being convicted 
of drug smuggling. 
The Daily Gulf Times of 10 April noted that the 1,000 Indian workers who 
had gone on strike in Kuwait had been sent home after months of arguing with their 
employer. The report stated that the Kuwaiti Government had intervened and paid 
their salaries and travelling expenses and that all the deals they had previously 
reached with the construction company they worked for had failed to develop. Arab 
Times also published the news about the striking workers and said that they had been 
paid their salaries for only two months. Discrimination among foreign workers can be 
observed from the different procedures that the authorities in these states adopt. One 
of these is the Bahrain airport authority which forbids Indians and Asians from 
entering the airport premises unless they are travelling. Most of them wait outside the 
airport building i f they are expecting someone. An Indian worker was interviewed by 
The Gulf Daily News about his own experiences. He said that he was not allowed to 
enter the airport building to receive his visiting wife because of his nationality, 
whereas his British friend was able to do so. He revealed that while he was waiting 
outside the airport building others from different nationalities were going in. The 
Bahrain airport authority gave as its excuse that Asians go in large numbers to receive 
a relative or friend and this could disturb the others. 
3.3 MORE DEPENDENCE, MORE IMMIGRATION: 
In general, for the local media the foreign workers do not constitute an issue or 
represent a problem. Even though the local newspapers and magazines have a 
considerable amount of freedom when it comes to this matter - compared with the 
television networks - they try to play down the numbers. Now and then small news 
items appear in the local papers announcing that yet another foreign worker has 
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committed suicide, died at a construction site or been deported or reported missing. 
These news stories are never followed up or investigated. Journalists and readers 
write about these immigrant labourers only as a threat to them and as the source of all 
the changes in their societies. 
Whilst the Arab Gulf states remain dependent on oil revenues, the influx of 
foreign labourers will continue and more and more dependence on non-Arab workers 
wi l l surface. For the capital-rich Gulf countries the lack of development plans, 
especially those that are aimed at developing human resources; means that the need 
for workers to clean, build, teach, etc. will persist. The capital-poor, on the other 
hand, will always encourage this migration of its manpower -what two Arab writers 
have called the 'lottery ticket' (Sa'd Al-Din and 'Abd al-fadil, 1983: 20). 
This lottery ticket has not only been purchased by labourers in most of the 
capital-poor Third World countries, but also by intellectuals and academics. Even 
Arab political dissidents -especially Egyptians - immigrated to the Gulf in the 1970s. 
Whilst the first Arab migration to the region influenced the indigenous population and 
stirred Arab nationalism feelings, the second one created more division among them. 
Those political dissidents who worked in the oil-rich Gulf states concentrated on 
making money and isolated themselves from any interaction with the nationals. This 
in fact helped both the Gulf regimes and their Arab counterparts. At home the 
Egyptian Government, to take one example, got rid of most of its political opponents 
and this weakened the whole opposition movement. In the Gulf too Arab nationalism 
started to fade out for the first time and the regimes were glad to see this. 
"The presence of Egyptian political dissidents 
in neighboring oil countries is a mixed blessing 
for (the) regime. In one sense, their absence from 
the Egyptian scene weakens the internal opposition. 
The regime would no doubt welcome such a 
development if these dissidents concentrated on 
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'making money' instead of 'making revolution.' 
Some of them have in fact turned away from 
politics and rechanneled their energies into 
business and professional activities outside Egypt. 
Quite a few, have been vocal in criticizing (the) 
regime and have found easy access to the mass 
media of the host countries" (Ibrahim, 1982: 94). 
Remittances from these labourers -Arabs and others - who worked in the Gulf 
have increased the dependence of most of the Third World capital-poor countries on 
the Western industrialised nations. It forced most of these states to abandon the 
development of their agricultural and industrial sectors and increased their 
importation of consumer goods. At the same time the emigration of most of the 
needed labour created shortages at home (Birks and Sinclair, 1980: 366). 
Today, almost all of these Third World capital-poor nations are dependent on 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. They are forced to adapt their 
development plans to suit these two organisations. Even political decisions that could 
determine the ftiture of these states are taken not at home but in Washington, London 
and elsewhere. 
The Gulf states, on the other hand, are faced with an even gloomier fiiture. 
The decline of the oil revenues and the lack of any substitute means that the 
dependence of these countries on the West and the East will persist. Countries like 
Saudi Arabia will be more dependent on foreign workers than all the others especially 
due to the continued isolation of women from participating in its development of 
these states. An official of the United Arab Emirates government once said : 
"...were the Egyptians to be removed, many of the 
school systems would have to close; were the 
Palestinians to be forced to leave, the media 
would cease to function; were the British, 
Jordanian, Pakistani and Baluchi soldiers and 
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policemen to be expelled, the defence and internal 
security network would collapse; were the 
Iranians, Baluchis and Pathans who make up the 
bulk of the labor force to be sent back to their 
homelands, progress of such vital projects 
underway as the building of roads, ports 
irrigation schemes, housing projects, schools and 
medical clinics would all come to an abrupt halt" 
(quoted in Al-Najjar, 1983: 16). 
It will take years before the people of the region themselves start to feel the 
need to take up more of the jobs essential to building their countries' ftiture. By that 
time, the identity of the Gulf Arab countries will have disappeared in the midst of this 
invasion of labourers who do not share the same culture, language, heritage or history. 
The Arabic identity of the oil-rich Gulf states is already fading out. In most of the 
Gulf capitals; the Arabic language is rarely heard or spoken. On the local television 
screens, and in the cinemas and video shops, the dominant languages are English and 
Urdu. Local shops and supermarkets sell newspapers and magazines from India, 
Europe, Pakistan and the Philippines, to mention but a few. Even the names and signs 
of shops and restaurants are not written in proper Arabic. 
In most of the Arab Gulf countries the indigenous population is a minority and 
wi l l continue to be so. The Gulf states have no plans for reducing the number of 
immigrant labourers, and their media will continue to reflect the government line. 
Local newspapers reproduce the same statements all the time -that the Gulf states 
need to develop and can not do so without the help of foreigners. After the 1990 
invasion of Kuwait, these newspapers began attacking all Arabs and reported the state 
policy of reducing the number of Arab workers in the region. The need for a few 
Arabs, though, will persist because of jobs that need the a master of the language. But 
the bulk of the imported labourers wil l be from Asia. In spite of the fact that the 
recent developments in the region emphasised the need for women's participation in 
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the labour-force, there are no indications of any changes in the status of Gulf women. 
Women still constitute a small percentage of the workforce and segregation between 
the sexes persist. The role of Gulf women and their treatment by these patriarchal 
societies is the main theme of the next chapter. It therefore links the issue of women 
to the thesis main argument namely the lack of civil society and citizens' rights in the 
Gulf region. 
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CHAPTER IV 
G U L F WOMEN: WESTERN OUTLOOKS AND 
T R I B A L VALUES 
"Tala' my dear ask any woman how many 
times she has been lashed in this life, 
and in each and every day. She is lashed 
from the day she is born, the moment 
they cry 'it's a girl' then through the 
the treatment she gets, and last through 
regarding her as a means for free 
services and pleasure!!" 
(from the novel by Abdulrahman Munif 
'Now....Here: Or Eastern Mediterranean 
Revisited'. 
4.1 INTRODUCTION: 
In his book 'Women and Socialism,' George Tarabishi wrote that there are one 
hundred million Arabs in Arab 'society,' but the figures indicate that there are only fifty 
million because women have been prohibited from taking any responsibilities in their 
societies (Tarabishi, 1961: 13). Many have thought that Arab women's emancipation 
would not only lead to changes in family structures, but also to the transformation of 
the whole of Arab society. (Berger, 1962) Sociological in-depth studies of Arab 
women, though, are a recent phenomenon. At the beginning of this century a few Arab 
intellectuals (mostly men who studied in European capitals) wrote about the situation 
of women. They advocated changes primarily in women's education. Most prominent 
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among them were Rifa Rafa Al-Tahtawi and Qasim Amin who published 'Tahriral-
mara" (The Liberation of woman) and ' al-mara' al-jadidah' {The New Woman) in 
1899 and 1901 respectively. Qasim Amin's books became the bible for Arab feminists 
for years to come. 
The first Arab feminists who burned their veils (the sign of women's 
oppression) were mosdy influenced by these writings. They were not able to take their 
issue any further, however. Most of these women concentrated on education and 
political rights for women. The first movements encountered several setbacks. This is 
not to say that there were no gains. In fact, there were tremendous improvements in 
women's schools and education in general but the roots of the problem were left veiled 
or unstudied. 
A few Arab feminist writers were to try later in the century to tackle the real 
issues and problems that face Arab women. Feminists such as Nawal Al-Sadawi (of 
Egypt) and Fatima Memissi (of Morocco) were to suggest in their eariy writings that 
Islam was to be blamed for the segregation of women. Later they were to reverse these 
positions regarding Islam and women and to argue that it was not only religion that 
kept Arab women segregated. Arab women's emancipation, however, has become the 
subject of many books and articles not only by Arab feminists but also by their 
Western counterparts over the past twenty years. Both parties criticised each other for 
their approaches. Since the arguments and critiques in these studies are irrelevant to the 
present thesis I shall not go into them but shall try to draw up a framevvork through 
which one might be able to understand the situation of Arab women as it is today. 
To try and define the position of women in Arab society one has to go back to 
the main unit of this society, namely the family. From there one could expand one's 
theory or ideas to cover the whole of society. Although most of the Arab countries 
have witnessed some transformations and changes, the family (which is the main pillar 
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of society) has managed to survive intact. Members of the family are still dependent 
on it financially even i f not in a direct way. Female members are even more crucial to 
the family structure mainly because of their child-bearing role and their domestic work. 
In retum, as individuals they have obligations such as maintaining the family reputation 
and wealth. Individuals always try to show their loyalty to the family, tribe and state 
(in this order) so as to avoid any clashes and/ or isolation from the group or in this case 
their society. It is extremely difficult for an individual to be independent in such 
patriarchal societies, especially i f this individual is a female (Dhaher, undated: 57). 
Male members of the family are responsible for female members even after the 
latter's marriage. Family pride, however, is based on honour which is related to female 
members only, not males. 
"..they represent a set of cultural 
constraints upon behaviour which serve 
as an extremely efficient form of control 
over social relations" (Minces, 1980: 17). 
Honour and shame are the basic cultural norms through which Arab women 
have been confined to the roles of mothers and wives only. These are the two main 
instruments that have maintained the segregation between males and females in most 
Arab societies. The Sharaf or honour of an Arab family depends mainly on its female 
members. That is why girls from the age of puberty are closely watched (mostly by 
older female members of the family) to make sure that the family honour is preserved. 
Virginity, which is the other side of the coin, is an important element of the family 
honour. 
"A girl's virginity is a family possession 
of considerable importance, even today. 
Young women of the bourgeoisie who have 
a relatively free life during their years at 
university usually have their hymen 
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replaced before marriage by accommodating 
surgeons whose fortunes are quickly made" 
(ibid.: 19). 
Many of these customs and cultural norms have been related to Islam by 
sociologists and scholars in their attempt to understand the inferior status of Arab 
women. The two - Islam as a religion, on the one hand, and cultural norms, on the 
other - have been mixed together to the extent that one finds it difficult to separate them. 
Juliette Minces, in her book 'The House of Obedience: Women in Arab Society,' 
argues against the idea that Islam is the main cause of maintaining women's inferiority 
in Arab society. She wrote that the Quran (the Islamic holy book) and the Shari'a 
(Islamic law) have been misused to provide the ideological grounds for the practices of 
patriarchal ideology and continue to do so in present-day Arab societies (ibid.: 17). 
The Quran as interpreted by the ruling elites could provide the ideology for the 
male dominance in Arab societies. Admittedly there are passages in the Quran that 
could be interpreted in a patriarchal way, for instance: 
"Men are the protectors and maintainers 
of women, because Allah has given the 
one more (strength) than the other and because 
they support them from their means. 
Therefore the righteous women are 
devoutly obedient" (The Quran, Sura 
4:34). 
However, Ahmed Dhaher in his book "Women in the Arab Gulf States" agrees 
with Juliette Minces. He notes that, although Islamic law treats both sexes equally, 
these societies (referring to the Gulf but it could be true for all Arab societies) are 
patriarchal. He argues that even in the Arab male literature women are treated as a 
lesser humankind (Dhaher, undated: 30). In his fascinating study of sexuality in 
Arabic novels, George Tarabishi noted that in most of the novels written by Arab 
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males the relations between civilisations, countries, etc. are associated with relations 
between the sexes. It is, according to Tarabishi, a relation of power and control, on the 
one hand, and submissiveness and ordeal, on the other (Tarabishi, undated: 16). 
There has been some evidence (not thoroughly studied, however) that in the 
most strict religious societies, such as that of Saudi Arabia, bedouin women have the 
same amount of freedom in choosing their partners as men. Such evidence was also 
found among tribes in parts of North Africa (Clement, 1982: 32). 
It could be argued that in these patriarchal societies i f Islam did not exist then other 
ideologies would have been created and used to legitimise the norms and structures that 
have controlled Arab society for years. Fatima Memissi has argued that: 
"..If the Muslim family, with its 
territorial sexuality, did not exist, it 
would have been created. It is thus not 
difficult to understand the utility of the 
various conservative arguments advising 
women to return to the hearths their 
grandmothers occupied" (Mernissi, 1985: 
160). 
One might study the role of patriarchal ideology in relation to women's status 
through the role that older women play in the family structure. Older women have 
different roles from younger ones. Although they continue to be dependent on their 
husbands or other male members of the family, older women (who have lost their 
sexuality) become important to the household and its inhabitants. They also gain 
respect and power not only among their own families but also in society as a whole. 
"At least she is universally respected; no 
longer a sexual being, she ceases to be 
that crushed and dominated object whose 
actions might detract from the honor of 
the family, arouse desire in other men or 
cast doubt upon her husband's virility and 
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manhood, which must constantly, be 
reasserted" (Minces, 1980: 20). 
The role of older women changes drastically and it is through them that the 
ideology of the patriarchal society is filtered to young giris. Older women also have the 
role of protecting the structure of the family and its honour. They become the moral 
guardians of the family and society in general. Their task as women changes with the 
changes in their role. They become responsible for choosing brides for the younger 
male members of the family. Contrary to their previous role, older women are 
consulted by their husbands, brothers or other male members of the family. 
In most Arab societies females have their own space which is isolated and 
segregated from that of the males. A woman's space is confined to the walls of the 
home while males have the rest of space for themselves. Even at home there are 
specific areas or rooms which are strictly for male members to receive their male 
guests. Educated women (especially those who have studied in the West) try to break 
this spatial segregation but are often faced with anger and threats from older female 
members of the family and a rejection by society as a whole. 
The concept of women as sexually provocative is a notion that is well described 
in the Quran and dominates most of the writings about Arab women. The media in 
Arab states reflect this in television soap operas, articles in the newspapers and 
magazines and also in novels and poetry. 
There is no evidence in the Quran to indicate that Islam degrades women or 
treats them as the weaker sex. On the contrary, Islam has raised more concern about 
women and the power they hold. Muslim men find women difficult to control and 
make submissive without the use of force (Qasoub, 1991: 11). 
"And they [women] have rights similar to 
those [of men] over them in kindness, and 
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men are a degree above them " (Quran, 228 
of Sura 2). 
4.2 Gulf Women Prior to the Discovery of Oil: 
Before the discovery of oil and the boom years that followed, women played 
an entirely different role in the Gulf Most of the emirates were poor and undeveloped 
both economically and technologically. People relied for their livelihoods on fishing, 
pearl diving and trade. For the purposes of this study we shall divide women into three 
categories or groups based on the class structure: 
(i) wives of fishermen, boat builders (the traditional boats in the Gulf are 
known as Dhows), and pearl divers. 
(ii) rural women (mostly in the Saudi desert) 
(iii) wives of pearl merchants and women of the ruling tribes or families. 
Women in the first category were the poorest and so had to help in wage 
earning in addition to their domestic work. They raised chickens, sold eggs and worked 
as servants at the houses of the big merchants who were mostly pearl traders. The 
wives of the pearl divers had a harsher life than the others since their husbands spent at 
least six months a year away from home. During this period the women carried all the 
responsibilities on their own shoulders. I f they were desperate for cash, they could ask 
the pearl merchant who employed their husbands for a loan which was added to their 
husband's debts. I f the husband died at sea - while diving for pearls - then the wife had 
to pay his debts; in most cases young sons would be sent to take their father's jobs to 
pay these debts. 
Al-Rumaihi noted that in a few cases the divers' wives had to dive themselves 
when they were desperate (quoted in Unesco, 1984: 19). These women, like their 
husbands, were the most exploited class in the Gulf before the discovery of oil. The 
hardship of their lives was reflected in poems and songs that are now considered part 
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of the Gulf cultural heritage. In one of the most famous songs to have survived, these 
women begged the pearl merchant to be merciful with their husbands because the sea 
was very harsh. 
Bedouin women and those who lived in the rural regions of the Gulf (mostly in 
Bahrain and parts of Saudi Arabia) shared the same degree of oppression and suffering 
as the wives of the pearl divers and fishermen. In the rural regions women tilled the 
land, irrigated the farms, raised animals and sold vegetables. In the Bahraini villages, 
women participated in handicrafts mostly baskets for dates. 
In the desert bedouin women herded animals and processed food from goats' 
and camels' milk. Their handicrafts mostly consisted of weaving tents and woollen 
bags to carry their belongings. Noura Al-Falah has noted that intermingling between 
males and females was not considered shameftil because of the tasks that the women 
carried out (Al-Falah, 1988: 59-60). 
The wives of the pearl merchants and the ruling clans lived a much more 
comfortable life. They had no obligations other than supervising their servants. They 
could afford anything they needed or wanted but they shared the same segregation and 
discriminadon as the women of the other classes. In fact, their isolation was much 
harsher since they were not allowed to step outside their homes. The other categories of 
women had to leave their houses because of the hardships of their lives and the fact that 
their husbands were most of the time away from home. Merchants' wives, though, had 
servants and even slaves to do their shopping for them. A few of the poorer women 
sold goods to the houses to serve the richer women who were confined to their homes. 
Education was not available for women except for younger women of the 
merchant families. A few of them were sent to the religious schools known as Alkutab 
or Mutaw'a, many of which were run by older religious females. Such schools were 
to be found in most of the Arab countries. Their main aim was to teach the Quran,the 
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Hadith (the Prophet's sayings) and other religious teachings to young girls. A large 
number of the schools for girls were at the homes of these older women while similar 
schools for boys were at the Mosques. 
Proper schools for females were established later on. The first girls' schools in 
the Gulf region (which were in Bahrain and Kuwait) started in the late 1920s and early 
1930s. In other parts of the Gulf such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar such schools are 
considered new phenomena and are only about twenty years old. The first girls' school 
in Riyadh (the Saudi capital) provoked riots mostly by male religious extremists. Most 
of the early schools only trained women to be good housewives and mothers. Illiteracy 
was much higher among women than it was within men. 
After the age of puberty women were considered ready for marriage. Most of 
the marriages were arranged by the families and were usually between cousins. 
Thereafter women, even those with some education, were confined to the home while 
their husbands travelled for trade and business. The women took full responsibility for 
the household and were forced to have children while they were still very young. 
Women from the merchant class have the constant fear of their husbands marrying 
another woman. Older women advise younger females to have a lot of children so as to 
keep their husbands satisfied and busy. 
Segregation between the sexes was not confined to outside the homes but even 
inside them. Women had their own section of the house commonly known as the 
harem. Men still refer to their wives, daughters, mothers and women in general as 
harem., which is derived from Haram in Mecca meaning sacred or taboo. In fact, it 
was not proper for men to refer to female members of their families in the company of 
other men. At the same time, it was not acceptable to ask about the condition of female 
relatives. 
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43 Gulf Women after the Discovery of Oil: 
The first few years fol lowing the discovery o f oil did not witness any drastic 
changes in the structure o f society, and particularly for its female members. A large 
number o f pearl divers and fishermen shifted to work for the oil companies which 
meant that their womenfolk continued in the same role that they had played prior to the 
oil discovery. 
The most visible changes for women were in the field of education. The Gulf 
emirates provided schools for girls and many families discovered the significance of 
education. There were more educational opportunities, for males than females, 
however. To most o f the Gu l f ' s inhabitants male education was essential, whilst 
female education was merely a luxury. Many Gulf families thought that some kind of 
education fo r their gir ls wou ld make them more desirable wives and mothers, 
especially because males f rom the Gulf were being sent to universities in various Arab 
capitals. Although education was free for both sexes, many women thought that it was 
not a social necessity but rather a preparation for marriage. 
Female members o f the merchant class were more privileged than the others. 
They had the free time and the family wealth to enable them to join schools sooner than 
women fi-om the working class. 
I n the 1950s and 60s the f i rs t G u l f women university graduates, mostly 
daughters of rich merchants, returned home f rom different Arab capitals. They were 
influenced by the women's liberation movement that was sweeping the whole world 
and wanted to spread its ideas around at home. Many of them took jobs as teachers and 
in government offices. The majority of them were graduates f rom the schools of arts 
and education, non had science or engineering degrees which remained male-
dominated fields. 
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It is interesting to note that many of these women were influenced by the 
underground political movements that mushroomed during this period in Gulf history. 
A Few were members o f the main pol i t ical parties such as the Ba'ath, the Arab 
nationalists 'Al-qumeen' and the communists. Women joined forces in the struggle 
against colonialism. A Few women f r o m various G u l f countries even joined the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Occupied Gulf which launched an 
armed struggle against the colonisers and the local regimes. 
In some countries -mainly Bahrain and Kuwait - women participated in the 
many demonstrations that took place at the time. During these political demonstrations 
women burned their traditional dress, known in the Gul f as 'abbaya,' or the black 
garment usually made of nylon or silk that covers the whole body (Beck and Keddie, 
1978: 176). The ve i l , that is widespread today in the Moslem countries, was not 
common in the Gulf at the time. 
The o i l boom years, though, transformed these societies very rapidly. The 
extreme wealth arising from the increase in oil revenues changed Gulf women, but, like 
other aspects of Gulf society, these changes were artificial and superficial. Gulf women 
became trade-mark conscious and dressed in the most fashionable clothes but at the 
same time they did not change the way they perceived their roles in society and its 
development. Gir ls ' education was established in a way that would not disturb the 
common norms and culture (Dhaher, undated: 33). The oil revenues may have helped 
in the process of development in the material productive forces, but they did not lead to 
a development of human productive forces in general, or that of females in particular 
(Unesco, 1984: 115). 
Kuwai t was the f i rs t o f the G u l f states to experience the changes, which 
corresponded to changes in the status o f Kuwai t i women. The large increase in oil 
prices and the small number of Kuwait i citizens meant that the distribution of wealth 
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changed the lives o f even the poorest fishermen in the country. Early in the 1970s 
many educated Kuwaiti women were working and driving cars, and they did not face 
much rejection from older women. One of these women said: 
"At that time, there was so much 
excitement about the new wealth that the 
older generation could not decide which 
of the changes to accept and which to 
reject. New values were accepted along 
with the new wealth " (Beck and Keddie, 
1978:176). 
While educated Kuwait i males joined the family business, educated females 
looked for jobs outside the family - an indication that education for women was one 
way o f breaking away f rom the family, tribe or clan ties. At their conference in 1971 
Kuwaiti women demanded the right to vote which forced the parliament of the time to 
assign three sessions for the discussion o f the issue. These same women retreated, 
however, and in the early 1980s around 1,000 Kuwa i t i women signed a petition 
endorsing the parliament's decision prohibiting the franchise for women (Al-Sadani, 
1983). By the 1990 many women were leaving school at an early age to accept the 
position o f a second or third wi fe . In most o f the G u l f societies the institution of 
marriage provided women wi th much more respect and security than joining the 
workforce (Qasoub, 1991: 54). 
The socio-economic changes in the Gulf countries have brought a few changes, 
especially in the field of education for women, but on the whole the traditional norms 
have persisted. In Qatar, for example, female university students who want to pursue a 
career in education are offered scholarships by the Ministry o f Education. They are 
allowed to travel to the West to j o in universities there, but they must have a 'Mahram' 
or a male companion with them. The 'Mahram' - father, husband or brother - must 
accompany these student women for the duration o f their university courses. The 
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Qatari embassies in the Western capitals confiscate their passports the moment they 
arrive to the country and return them when the women have finished their studies. 
Although the majority o f Gulf women are keen on education and obtaining high 
degrees, they do not have the same enthusiasm when it comes to work. Gulf males and 
females share the same perspective about work. To them work is only for those who 
are desperate to earn a living in states that reward their citizens with money and wealth 
in return for their unquestionable loyalty. Male members of the family think that it isan 
embarrassment for the family i f female relatives work. Many women wi l l say that they 
take jobs just to k i l l the boredom and to occupy their free time. A Few of these wealthy 
states, such as Kuwait, have offered social security benefits to divorced or widowed 
women or simply to women wi th no job . Noura Al-Falah, in her study o f social 
changes in Kuwait, noted that these measures made women less interested in joining 
the wage labour sector o f the economy (Al-Falah, 1988: 69-70). 
The absence o f G u l f women f r o m the labour market did not affect the 
development process o f these states. Foreign workers and expertise were called in to 
take the place o f Gulf women. The issues of the growing number of foreign workers in 
the Gulf states and incorporating women in the workforce went hand in hand. In fact, 
many of the plans that have been issued by different Gulf countries to curb the large 
number o f imported labourers stressed the need for the participation of Gulf women. 
These plans were never taken seriously by off ic ia ls , however. One Saudi official 
suggested that to solve the problem of the increased number o f foreign workers, the 
state should issue a law forcing men to have four wives and should support these men 
financially (Dhaher, undated: 60). 
A Few studies have noted that measurements o f GNP in many of the Gul f 
states do not include women's economic activities, no matter how small or big they are 
(Unesco, 1984: 24-25). Many women in the Gul f who joined the labour market 
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believed that they could not carry both jobs, domestic and wage-earning, and hired 
servants from the Asian subcontinent to do their domestic work for them, (see chapter 
3). 
Those who looked fo r jobs depended on their f a m i l y ' s connections or 
importance in the country. Women depended on their clan and family ties not only for 
wealth and security but also for f inding jobs and sometimes even for the grades of 
jobs. Some studies have argued that, in states like Kuwait and Bahrain, women have 
been hired for the sole purpose o f camouflaging the real situation and creating an 
artificial modernist impression of Gulf society. 
"Many Kuwaiti women felt that they were 
not allowed to be promoted to the decision 
making levels and that they were kept as 
decorations in the offices, as signs of the 
modernizations of the country, just like 
high-rise building andfancy cars which 
substituted camels, and horses " (Nath, 
1978: 183). 
Women's associations developed fast in the Gulf, mostly in the last twenty 
years. They represented women f rom the different class structures in society. Women 
f r o m the merchant and r u l i n g famil ies established their own charity oriented 
associations, while younger educated women (a few of whom were feminists) had 
different ones. A number o f these associations were used as platforms for different 
political ideologies. Nationalists and Leftists as well as Islamic underground political 
groups made use o f these recognised and legal associations (Al-Bazri, 1989). 
Most of the Gul f governments support such women's associations financially 
in return for keeping them under the umbrella o f the Ministries of Social Affairs. A l l 
attempts to unite women's associations throughout the region were hijacked by the 
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governments, however. Officials use the threat of cutting o f f the financial aid to these 
associations in cases of conflict between the two. 
With the help of the oil wealth Gulf women indulged in consumerist behaviour; 
it was their way of escaping the oppression at home. They travelled around the world 
and shopped for the latest products in cosmetics and fashions. Consumerist values 
were enhanced by the large number o f imported soap operas, television programmes 
and f i l m s that were broadcast by the state-controlled television networks. These 
programmes introduced new perspectives and ideologies - that women must be special 
and attractive and that families ought to live in nice modern houses (Abu-Lughod, 
1989,10). A Kuwaiti leader o f social change said: 
"Acceptance of Western patterns of living 
which were always considered superior 
and things to achieve) came immediately 
as we achieved Western standards of 
income" (Beck and Keddie, 1978: 178). 
The immense power of the media is all the greater in such secluded societies. 
Gulf women are more susceptible to television and the media in general than men. 
Television is the main pastime for women, especially in Saudi Arabia, reinforced by 
their confinement to the home; i t is their mirror on the outside world. Videos also play 
an important role for these women. 
The creation o f a state structure in most o f these emirates did not produce any 
changes in the status o f women. State formation has repercussions on male-female 
relations (Charrad, 1990: 20). States could either enhance the existing tribal and 
patriarchal norms or break them. The facts indicate that in these newly created Gulf 
states tribal kinship has been encouraged and enhanced by officials. Loyalty to the 
family was expanded to include the state and the dominant tribes, primarily the ruling 
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fami ly . The image o f the ruler or sheikh has been enhanced by the media and in 
schools as that of the father. Children's programmes on the local television broadcast 
songs and plays in which the children call the emir 'our father'. 
Tribal and traditional norms in the Gulf are reinforced by religion especially in 
Saudi Arabia and Qatar where the majority are followers of 'Wahabism' which is a 
strict and puritan Sunni sect. Religion in these countries legitimises the ruling elites or 
tribes. 
"The monarch's legitimation however, is 
still based on this ability to uphold 
Islamic principles, and the public 
separation of women is one which can 
still be enforced. Encouraging women's 
separation as a mandate ordained by divine 
law, therefore, becomes an instrument of 
legitimation" (Doumato, 1991: 35-6). 
In Saudi Arabia the segregation between the sexes is more visible than in the 
other Gul f societies. Women are invisible in the country. They are confined to their 
homes and to o f f ices , schools and banks that are for females only. The Saudi 
monarchy (which derives its legitimacy from religion) allowed the religious institution 
to establish itself as a state within a state. The 'society for the promotion of virtue and 
prevention o f vice' has its own police force. The religious police have the responsibility 
of making sure that women are completely covered when in public. Any exposed part 
o f a woman's body is marked with marker pens. Magazines and books are also strictly 
scrutinised by censors. Segregation between the sexes is enforced not only on human 
beings but also on animals. The Riyadh Zoo cancelled fami ly days because the 
religious police assumed that 'assignations' were taking place in the animal cages 
(Graham, 1991:93). 
172 
Citizenship too in most o f these states is related to the society's notion o f 
women. Sarah Graham-Brown has written in her review of literature on women: 
"They agree that citizenship itself is a 
gendered construction, built on assumptions 
about the desired nature of the family and 
women's role in it" (1991: 30). 
Any changes in the status o f G u l f women are seen as f i rs t step towards 
disturbing the structure o f society and the state system. That is why when a group of 50 
Saudi women met on 6 November 1990 and drove their cars through the streets of 
Riyadh, government off icials reacted wi th harsh measures against them and their 
families. It was the religious police who arrested these women before the arrival of the 
state police and the state was then forced to act. 
"In Saudi Arabia, the ideology underguiding 
the monarchy defines the legitimate ruler 
as one who will enforce standards of 
Islamic conduct upon the individual for 
the good of the community as a whole " 
(Doumato, 199: 35). 
The Saudi monarchy ( l ike any ru l i ng class in the Arab wor ld) uses the 
women's issue in times o f crisis to unite the people under the banner o f preserving 
religion and culture. The timing of the Riyadh demonstration, which coincided with the 
presence of large numbers o f foreign troops in the Kingdom, was used to divert 
attention from the really crucial issues and to mobilise the whole society (ibid.: 37). 
The rise o f Islamic fundamentalist movements in the Gulf (as in most o f the 
Arab world) might be interpreted as one reaction to the drastic changes that have taken 
place during the last twenty years. Young males and females today reject Western 
consumerist ideology by adopting what has been known as the Islamic dress and way 
o f behaving. Gul f women have been the main target for most of these fundamentalist 
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movements. In the eyes of these fundamentalists or Islamists the sociocultural changes 
affected the position of women more than anything else. 
The G u l f ru l ing elites faced wi th opposition f rom the unoff ic ia l religious 
movement or institution, have turned against women. The question here is not o f an 
alternative between an Islamic society and a modem one, but rather of a particular kind 
o f Moslem society. The media have echoed this curb on women and state repression 
directed against the female members o f society. This is the main subject of the next 
section of this chapter. 
4.4 Advanced Media and Veiled Women: 
Transformation in the G u l f had its consequences for the media. Advanced 
media technologies were purchased f r o m the developed countries. Computerised 
printing presses, satellite television networks and other technologies have been 
introduced in most o f the Gulf states. Each country has at least two major television 
networks in both English and Arabic. Most of the television programmes are imported 
either f r o m the West (mostly the United States and Bri tain) or f r o m other Arab 
countries, mainly Egypt and recently from Syria and Jordan. 
As is the case with cosmetics, cars and other consumer products, American 
soap operas are poured into the market. State-owned Gulf television stations shop 
around for the newest Western programmes, most o f which are very popular among 
the younger people who constitute a large percentage o f the G u l f population. In 
contrast, the same stations also broadcast a large number o f religious programmes 
which are imported largely from Egypt or produced locally. 
Gulf viewers adopt Western soap opera characters such as J.R and Bobby from 
'Dallas' or Crystal f r o m 'Dynasty . ' G u l f women are fascinated by the women 
characters they watch on their T V screens. They try to imitate them in the way they 
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dress, but can they adopt their life-styles? That is part of the duality confronting people 
in the Gulf. Different programmes pass on conflicting messages. Personal liberty -
especially that of women - is presented as the modern way of l iv ing. The religious 
programmes, on the other hand, preach that a woman's place is in the home and that 
Moslem women should not mix with men. 
I n her ar t ic le about technologies and public culture, L i l a Abu-Lughod 
interviewed several beduin gir ls f r o m the Egyptian desert about the television 
programmes they watched. Her findings can not be far f rom the reality in the Gulf. 
One o f the girls told her that she watches 'Dallas' 
"..of which she explained that she enjoyed 
it but found J.R. objectionable because of 
his illicit love affairs. Bobby, on the other 
hand was a good person whose conduct was 
close to Islamic behavior" (1989: 8). 
I n 1989 during the holy month o f Ramadan Bahraini television broadcast 
'Dynasty' immediately after the evening prayers. Most o f the women would break 
their fast, f inish their prayers and switch on their television sets to watch i t . Veiled 
women found it fascinating to watch the female characters in 'Dynasty' dressed in their 
extravagant dresses, drinking champagne and wine and involved in different love 
a f f a i r s . A t the end o f n igh t ' s episode these same women w o u l d v i s i t their 
neighbourhood mosque and listen to the Imam's lecture mostly about the conduct of 
Moslem women. Later on they would watch an Egyptian soap opera 'Helmiya Nights' 
(which was very popular all over the Arab world). The women characters in 'Helmiya 
Nights' represented a different life-style. Although they fol lowed a life-style much 
closer to that o f the Gul f women, they had an amount of personal freedom that many 
Gulf women can not even dream of. 
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Most o f the Gulf television stations present programmes for women, especially 
during the month of Ramadan, almost all of which concentrate on cooking recipes and 
flower arrangements in a kind o f home economics crash course. Women's grievances 
and problems are not presented or even considered in these specialised packages. Gulf 
women, though, (as is the case with foreign labour) have found their outlet in the local 
newspapers. Newspapers have a weekly women's page which is edited by women. It is 
through these pages and the correspondence section that Gulf women can expose their 
problems anonymously. In the f o l l o w i n g pages we shall t ry to review these 
newspapers in an attempt to crystalize the main argument in this study- namely the 
modem states with traditional norms and values. The modem Gulf media present this 
contradiction in the tribal and patriarchal norms that dominate their contents. 
Issues such as women joining the labour market, gender relations, the treatment 
o f women by their male relatives, are the most common themes in the local 
newspapers. On 10 October, 1988 a letter was published in the local Arabic-language 
Bahraini newspaper Akhbar Al-Khaleej, in which the reader expressed his support for 
working women. He wrote that he completely disagreed with the idea of segregating 
women. He also expressed the view that l i fe had changed and that it was about time 
that Bahraini society accepted this. 
The next morning the same newspaper published a letter from an anonymous 
woman, in which she pointed out that women refused to get married because most 
men did not treat them appropriately. On the same date, the Saudi newspaper Al-Sharq 
Al-Awsat published a reply to a woman's letter in which she complained about i l l -
treatment by her husband. The newspaper editor wrote that a woman should always 
obey her husband and satisfy him, these were the sayings of Prophet Mohammed and 
Moslem women should fol low them. 
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Akhbar Al-Khaleej o f 13 October 1988 published a letter f r o m a reader 
complaining about the treatment o f women in secluded societies like the G u l f The 
woman reader - who did not give her name - said that in most other Arab countries 
women had been able to break their chains and free themselves from tradition. 
As menfioned before, Bahraini and Kuwaiti women have been able to lead a 
slightly different life-style f rom that o f other Gulf women. This could be attributed to 
the early introduction of education for girls in the two countries. It manifested itself in 
the number of letters published in Bahraini and Kuwaiti newspapers. 
A Bahraini woman wrote a sarcastic letter to Akhbar Al-Khaleej on 14 October. 
In which she expressed her anger with society's understanding of sex appeal. In her 
letter - published in a small box at the bottom of an inside page - she wrote ' . . i f a 
woman works then she is raising sexual temptations.' She then concluded by ridiculing 
society's connotations o f sex appeal, 'nothing is left untouched, they might even say 
that i f a woman coughs then she might seduce men.' 
The Qatari nQwspaper Arrayah, on 16 October, however, devoted a whole page 
to the issue o f polygamy. A Qatari woman sent a letter advocating polygamy on the 
grounds that there were more women than men in the country. Many of the other 
letters agreed with her and very few raised objections to this idea. 
On 19 October, the English-language Bahraini Gulf Daily News, published a 
news story about relations between males and females. Quoting a Saudi cleric, the 
paper reported that G u l f women should not watch wrestling on television. Such 
programmes, according to the cleric, showed 'too much f lesh. ' The same Saudi 
religious man was also quoted as saying that when a woman talked to her fiance' over 
the telephone she should wear the veil and have a male member of the family present. 
Marriage as an i n s t i t u t i o n and i t s success were the subject o f the 
correspondence page of Akhbar Al-Khaleej of 20 October. One of the letters (written 
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by a woman) proclaimed that a really successfril marriage was one between two strong 
believers in the Islamic religion. She said that the increase in the number of divorce 
cases was caused by the lack o f such believers. On the same date, the Kuwai t i 
newspaper Al-Seyassah, published answers to questions raised by several women in 
letters to the editor. In one a woman asked i f it was proper for her to refuse marriage 
because she wanted to complete her education first. The editor answered her by writing 
that i t was against the Prophet's sayings to do so. A woman, he wrote, should not 
refuse marriage on any excuse. According to the paper, girls should marry and then 
they could finish their studies afterwards. Answering another query, the editor said that 
women should not go shopping without a 'Mahram' (or male companion). He then 
went on to say that i f they did so then they should not wear any make-up or perfume 
which would provoke men. 
Under the title 'Women's Role,' the Saudi English-language newspaper Arab 
News published a letter by an expafriate male. He started his letter by saying that the 
par t ic ipat ion o f Saudi women in the medical f i e l d was crucial to the country's 
development. The shortage o f human resources, he wrote, could not be solved unless 
women were emancipated. He went on, ' O f course the question of the status and role 
of women in the development of a given country wi l l have to be examined according to 
the social and cultural attributes o f its people; each nation has to adopt means and 
measures in this direcdon which are in consonance wi th its religious and social 
climate.' 
A week later the Qatari newspaper Arrayah returned to the subject o f 
polygamy, devoting two pages to the issue. Most letters were in reply to the earlier 
letter advocating polygamy as a solution to the problem of large number of unmarried 
women. The majori ty o f views were against this idea. Most o f the women were 
angered by such a call coming f rom a woman. In one of the letters, a woman reader 
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said that the problem was much more complicated than it had been presented. She 
wrote that many of the Qatari men had been favouring foreign women over Qataris. As 
a result, many Qatari women had no chance for marriage. Another woman wrote that 
the real issue here was not the problem of unmarried women but that of forcing girls to 
marry their cousins even i f they were already married. One o f the readers accused 
Qatari women of rejecting marriage on the excuse of pursuing their education. 
A reader wrote to Akhbar Al-Khaleej on 26 October complaining about veiled 
women driving cars. He said that he had seen a woman with her face covered and 
driving in the centre of the city. This, the reader noted, was very dangerous and should 
be prohibited by law. I f women wanted to be completely veiled, he wrote, then they 
should not be allowed to drive. 
A n article on women's participation in the workforce was published by the 
same newspaper on 27 October. A number of women were interviewed. Most of them 
protested that in the 1960s they were asked to join the workforce but in the 1980s there 
were calls for them to stay at home. One o f the women interviewed said, '..instead of 
blaming us fo r the increased number o f unemployed, men should advocate the 
withdrawal o f foreign workers. ' Another woman noted that many of the banks and 
companies had stopped employing women. She went on to say that i f a woman had a 
foreigner as her boss she was more likely to get promoted than was the case with Arab 
male bosses. 
The f o l l o w i n g issue o f the paper continued the investigation. Most o f the 
women interviewed concentrated their discussion on women's rights. They said that 
there was an urgent need for a family law to protect women. Most of the Gulf states 
lacked such a law. They had family religious courts in which three or four religious 
men resolved disputes according to their interpretations of the Quran and the Hadith. 
179 
On the same day the Saudi newspaper Al-Sharq Al-Awsat published a letter by 
a woman reacting to a previous letter f rom a man who accused women of 'snitching' 
jobs from fathers who were responsible for families. In her letter, the woman said that 
men tried to find any excuse to attack women and blamed them for the problems that 
men faced. 
The front page of Akhbar Al-Khaleej of 30 October announced the passing of 
a decree by the Bahraini Government regarding women on night shifts. It stated that 
women were allowed to work at night i f their jobs required i t ; otherwise it was 
prohibited for them to fo l low such occupations. The paper detailed the conditions 
required for women to work at night. The Qatari Arrayah discussed the controversy 
over working women. Many women wrote to the paper saying that they ought to be 
allowed to join the workforce. One reader quoted one of the Prophet's sayings in which 
he encouraged his followers to work. 
Every now and then news items are published about the number of women 
suffering f r o m psychological illnesses, but no discussion o f the causes has been 
introduced by any o f the newspapers or the television networks. The Saudi paper Arab 
News o f 30 October referred to a study conducted in the Eastern province o f the 
Kingdom, which found that the number of women suffering from hysteria exceeded 
that o f men in the region. I t also indicated that most o f the sick women were 
housewives. 
On 31 October, Akhbar Al-Khaleej carried a letter on the subject of equality 
between the sexes. The woman who wrote the letter said that Gulf men talked all the 
time about the need for equality. They said, she wrote, that women ought to be treated 
equally to men, but they themselves did not practise what they preached. She continued 
that at home men's behaviour to their wives was that o f a superior being towards a 
lesser one. 
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The same newspaper published a feature on 1 November about consumerist 
behaviours among Bahraini women. The paper asked the question: are women the only 
members o f society who overspend on luxury goods? When the question was directed 
at the public in general, most male readers complained about the consumerist habits of 
Bahraini women. Female readers, on the other hand, said that men too had been 
indulging in buying luxury goods. These women raised the question: who buys 
extravagant cars, yachts, perfumes and expensive prayer beads?. 
A Bahraini woman sent a letter to the same newspaper which was published on 
3 November in which she challenged the argument put forward by many people 
against women's participation in sports activities. She wrote that for the last few weeks 
many people had been writ ing that it was improper for women to take up any sports. 
The argument, she noted, that women lose their femininity and/ or virginity had no 
basis and in fact doctors advised women to play games. It is important to note that such 
arguments had drowned the G u l f newspapers at the time of the Olympic Games in 
Seoul. 
On 4 November the Saudi Al-Sharq Al-Awsat published a letter by a female 
reader, stating that Moslem women ought to know that lipsticks and other cosmetics 
contained 'pigs fat ' and that they should stop using such products. She continued that 
they (Moslem women) should 'wash those places [lips and faces] seven times, one of 
them with sand' to remove their effect. Moslems are forbidden by their religion to eat 
pork. 
Akhbar Al-Khaleej o f the same date carried an article about women's rights in 
Islam. The journalist, who devoted a whole page to the issue, reported that Islam 
granted women all rights and privileges. A reader wrote to the paper saying that many 
journalists and readers had been concentrafing on the issue of women. Who cares, he 
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commented, about these unimportant matters: w h y don't you w r i t e about the 
increasing prices o f eggs and milk? 
In Qatar Anaya, of 6 November published several letters all written by female 
Qataris. In one a woman criticised parents who forced their wi l l on their daughters. She 
vsTote: 'how could families still practise such backward activities?' and went on, 'Why 
don't they leave their daughters to decide for themselves what subjects they want to 
study and what kind o f l ife they want to lead?'. Another reader reflected on the large 
number o f unmarried women and that Qatari men preferred foreign non-Arab women, 
especially during the last few years. 
Divorced women are treated very badly, according to one o f the readers o f 
Akhbar Al-Khaleej. The reader noted in her letter published on 7 November, that 
divorced women were the subject of gossip, especially among men. Society thought of 
divorced women, she wrote, as immoral citizens. She said that they were continually 
scrutinised. 
The increased number o f divorce cases was the main subject o f the 
correspondence page Akhbar Al-Khaleej, on 8 November. One reader attributed the 
large number o f divorces to the 'dominance' of husbands over their wives. I f a wife, 
she vwote, wanted to share things with her husband, he rejected her. 
Arrayah in Qatar had the same issue as its main feature on 10 November. The 
journalist wrote that the number o f divorce cases among Qataris was on the increase. 
He then elaborated by writing that husbands have the right to beat their wives i f the 
latter had committed any mistake. He wrote that the Prophet Mohammed said that men 
should treat their wives fairly but i f they misbehaved then they should punish them. 
Punishment, he noted, should be by 'not sleeping with them and beating them but not 
very hard.' 
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Arab News o f 12 November interviewed the Secretary-General of the World 
M u s l i m League. The main questions raised concerned the role o f women in the 
development o f their societies. The Secretary-General, Dr. Abdullah Omar Naseef, 
said at the beginning o f the interview that women had been neglected during the last 
few decades. He went on to say that they ought to retain the position they held during 
the Prophet's time. Answering another question regarding mixing between the sexes, 
he said that Islam 'recommends that women should be at a distance from men because 
mixing with men w i l l cause problems...' Although Dr Naseef advocated the need for 
women to work, he noted that the main task for a woman was 'to take care o f the 
family, create a healthy environment, and to ensure that her husband is satisfied so that 
the whole family is l iving in a healthy and happy home.' 
The Bahrain! English-language newspaper Gulf Daily News, commented on a 
report compiled by the Bahrain Chamber o f Commerce about working women. The 
report advised women not to be choosy when it came to finding a suitable job. Women, 
the paper wrote, should accept anything available in the job market. It also noted that 48 
per cent of the population were women but their participation in the labour force was no 
more than 17 per cent. Neither the report nor the paper attempted to tackle the reasons 
behind this low share of women in the labour force. 
A t this time, reports o f a tape in which a conversation was conducted with a 
woman genie (a medium) were widely circulated in Gul f newspapers. The Qatari 
Arrayah, o f 15 November carried the script o f the conversation. In it a male voice 
asked the genie, whose name was 'Morjana' about the places she usually went to and 
the people she influenced. Morjana replied that she usually dominated women who 
wore make-up and listened to music - those, she said, who did not follow the preaching 
of Islam and who did not wear the veil. 
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A female columnist in the same newspaper wrote on 19 November that the 
government ought to abolish high-rise buildings which were constructed near to girls 
schools. She referred to a newly buih girls school with a high fence, but close to it a 
higher building was under construction. The male labourers on the building site, she 
argued, could watch the girls in their school. According to her this conduct was against 
the cultural norms and religious instruction. 
On the same date the Kuwaiti newspaper Arab Times, reported a threat by an 
official against men who 'tease women in public places or in fi-ont of girls schools.' In 
many of the closed Gulf societies, the most common places for teenagers to see each 
other is in front o f girls' schools. Young males drive their cars around these schools to 
get even a glimpse o f a female. The official, as quoted by the paper, said that those who 
were caught doing this would be punished by either 'imprisonment or whipping 
besides informing their employer or family. ' 
In Qatar the war over women's issues continued to surface on the pages o f the 
leading newspaper Arrayah. On the 20 November a male reader condemned parents 
who forced marriage on their daughters. He called for families to allow their daughters 
to study and work. The same reader said, 'people can not stop modernisation and 
change.' Not many women, though, shared his views. In a letter published on the same 
date, a woman expressed her rejection of complete freedom of movement and choice 
for Qatari women. She said that, although she wanted to study abroad, she wanted a 
male member of her family to accompany her. 
A man sent a letter condemning girls f rom the Gulf who left their country to 
study abroad. There, he wrote, 'they lose control and start going out with foreign men.' 
He continued by saying that when these girls graduated they brought back all these 
'foreign' ideals with them and spread them at home. 
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Al-Sharq Al-Awsat received a query on 22 November f rom a woman who 
asked i f it was necessary for her to wear the 'Hi jab ' (the head scarf) as well as saying 
her prayers. The editor said that the 'Hijab ' was a must for Moslem women; otherwise 
even their prayers were not accepted. 
Meanwhile, the battle between the sexes continued on the pages of the Bahraini 
newspaper Akhbar Al-Khaleej. A male reader sent a letter on 23 November accusing 
Bahraini women o f being greedy. He wrote that many of these women were the real 
cause o f high dowries, because women wanted more and more money. He went on to 
say that these women had no right to complain about Bahraini men marrying non-
Bahrainis. 
Two days later the Saudi English-language y4raZ) News, published a news item 
about the number of non-Saudi women who were working in the Kingdom. It reported 
that 60,000 non-Saudi women were in jobs that could be taken by Saudi women. The 
paper quoted a Saudi of f ic ia l as saying that the government was trying to integrate 
Saudi women into the wage-earning sector. In the same issue one o f the newspaper's 
reporters answered a query f rom a Saudi woman regarding her rights i f her husband 
decided to marry another woman. The reader asked i f her husband ought to consult her 
before doing so or even inform her. The journalist's answer was that a man did not 
have to tell his first wife about his intentions of marrying a second one. 
On the women's page of Akhbar Al-Khaleej, o f the same date, an in-depth 
analysis of the Bahraini society was published. The page's editor who is a female said 
that women's product ivi ty was very low because society did not take their work 
seriously. Since women were discriminated against, she wrote, they took their revenge 
on society by neglecting their work and indulging in other less important matters. 
This joumalist's colleague in Qatar had a different perspective o f women's role 
in society. Nora Rashid i n her column in Arrayh o f 26 November wrote that a 
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woman's voice was sacrilegious. She noted that, according to Islam, women were 
excluded from the call to prayer. She then went on to say that women ought not to sing, 
and that those who entertained at local female-only weddings should be banned. 
In Kuwait, Al-Seyassah published a letter from a female reader expressing her 
grievances as a woman. She said that everything was forbidden to her just because of 
her sex. The suffer ing, she wrote, that a woman faced in K u w a i t i society was 
unbearable. In the same issue, a male reader wrote that women should not complain i f 
men started chasing them. They, dressed in a provocative way and so men interpreted 
this as a way of attracting them. 
On 27 November v4rrflya/j published several letters fi-om readers regarding the 
treatment of women by society. In one a woman complained about men who identified 
women with cows. She said that '..they think that our main role in l ife is like a cow to 
bear children and feed them.' In another letter a woman complained about husband's 
treatment o f their wives. She noted that they thought o f their wives as part o f their 
property and that they could therefore do whatever they liked with them. One man sent 
a letter in which he criticised the 'old fashioned' way of marriage. He said that it was 
not enough for the bride and groom to be introduced through a photograph. It is an old 
habit in most Gul f societies for families to exchange photographs when introducing 
their sons or daughters who are eligible for marriage. 
A Qatari female who writes frequently in the local paper Arrayah, published a 
column on 29 November in which she commented on several issues. One of these was 
a book fair being held in Doha (the Qatari capital) at that time, at which the govemment 
censors had banned a number o f ti t les. She wrote that freedom o f speech and 
expression ought to be allowed. In another part o f her column she expressed her 
disagreement with female teachers who dressed up in the latest fashions and make-up 
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for work. The Ministry o f Education, she wrote, ought to interfere and prevent these 
teachers ft-om doing so. 
I t should be noted here that, although there are a few female writers and 
journalists who publish articles and columns in the local Saudi and Qatari newspapers; 
they work fi-om their homes. Unlike the case in Bahrain and Kuwait where women 
journalists share newspaper offices with their male colleagues, in Saudi Arabia and 
Qatar they are not allowed to do so. The restrictions are upheld by both the families and 
society in general. 
Akhbar Al-Khaleej of 30 November published a news item about a court case 
in which a wife accused her husband of ill-treating her. The husband, it was reported, 
attended the family court session on the day and said that his wife wanted to drop the 
case against him. He said that he had been going to bring his wife to do so, but there 
were no indications o f why the wife had not shown up. 
Two men wrote to Arrayah on 4 December, 1988, both o f them reporting 
incidents o f women who were seen in public uncovered (without a veil). They said that 
since these women were not veiled they provoked men to chase them around. Both 
letters ended with a message to women that i f they wanted to be respected and not to be 
harassed, then they should show consideration to society and cover themselves. 
A Kuwai t i reader also commented on women's dress in Al-Seyassah o f 7 
December. He wrote that Kuwait i women were switching to wearing jeans instead of 
what he called their 'Islamic dress.' Women, he wrote, should not go out in public in 
trousers and jeans. According to him, they must cover themselves in public but could, 
i f they wanted, dress in Western style while at home. 
Under the title 'Banking On Women,' the Qatari English-language newspaper 
Weekly Gulf Times, published a news item on 8 December announcing the opening of 
a women-only section of the Doha Bank. I t stressed that 'The women's section at this 
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bank has its own clearly marked entrance into the main branch building on Grand 
Hamad St, its own car park, and a l i f t exclusive to the section.' A Doha Bank official 
who was interviewed said that, once inside the bank, 'customers are hidden to the 
outside world because o f decorative wooden screens, gypsum work and curtains.' 
On 12 December, Akhbar Al-Khaleej, of Bahrain published a letter by a female 
reader, protesting at the treatment of female workers by society. She wrote that women 
work because they have to contribute to the family income. Then, she went on, they get 
blamed by society for the collapse of the family. ' A few of us -women- have no choice 
but to work to be able to survive,' she ended her letter by saying. 
The issue o f divorced women crops up very often in the local newspapers. For 
the G u l f societies this is a new phenomenon. In Al-Seyassah, o f 13 December, a 
woman wrote that Kuwaiti society condemned divorced women, but failed to do the 
same as regards men. In fact, she wrote, divorced men confinued their normal lives -
they married another wife and started a new family with no difficulties. She finished 
her letter by raising the question 'Why does divorce mean the end of life for a woman?' 
Discussions on birth control measures and whether they are allowed or not by 
the Islamic religion are sometimes discussed by the media. On 19 December Arab 
News touched on the subject by saying that any measures that could stop a woman 
from having babies were against Islam. The paper then said that it was only in specific 
cases that such procedures were allowed, and defined these circumstances as when the 
parents wanted to have an interval between two children. 
A letter to Akhbar Al-Khaleej, raised a completely new issue in terms o f 
female-male relations in the Gulf. A female reader drew attention to cases in which 
females received telephone calls and letters f rom men putting forward proposals of 
marriage. In all the cases reported, however, the men promised that the marriage would 
be in complete secrecy and would not last for longer than a day or two. The woman 
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asked, 'Why should I or any other girl agree to such an arrangement?' She then went 
on to say that women were not looking for 'physical satisfaction' alone, they wanted a 
partner with whom they could share their life. 
The off ic ia l attitude o f the Gulf states towards women could be demonstrated 
by an interview with the Saudi Education Minister reported in Arab News o f 24 
December. In the interview he said that there were many opportunities for Saudi 
women. He then noted that, with imported technology and women's participation in the 
workforce, the kingdom could overcome the problem o f dependence on foreign 
workers. The minister gave no examples of his government's plans for the integration 
of women into the wage-eaming sector, however. 
On 21 December, the Qatari newspapers carried several articles insulting a 
female university teacher. Apparently the teacher had condemned the treatment o f 
women by Islam in one of her lectures. A woman journalist called her 'Satan.' and said 
that she had learnt all these foreign ideas f rom the 'communist countries.' Other male 
writers also attacked her and insinuated that action might be taken against her by the 
authorities. 
I n one o f Al-Seyassah, sections called 'Diwaniat al-qura' (meaning the 
readers' gathering place) on 25 December a male reader noted that polygamy brought 
happiness to men. He wrote that, contrary to the widespread belief that men with more 
than one wife were miserable, they led a very happy life. His whole family, he said, 
including his two wives, were very comfortable and happy with the situation. He 
concluded by saying 'people should not condemn such marriages.' 
Arrayah of the same date published a letter by a female on the subject of mixing 
with male servants. She wrote that many women forgot about their religion and did not 
cover themselves in front o f male servants. Many of these servants took advantage of 
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the situation to have intimate relations with the female members of the family. She 
advised Qatari families not to hire male servants and to beware of them. 
In Bahrain and Kuwait , where women are allowed to drive cars, the media 
warn the public against dr iving behind them. A feature published by Akhbar Al-
Khaleej, on 26 December cautioned drivers by reporting, '..be careftil i f you are driving 
behind an Asian, a taxi driver or a woman driver. ' The reporter (a male) said that 
women were always nervous when they drove and could easily lose control. He quoted 
women who told him that they avoided specific areas where the traffic was very bad 
and that they preferred driving during day time only. He blamed this for the increased 
number of accidents in Bahrain. 
The Saudi Arab News published a new law to reduce the number of marriages 
wi th non-Saudi women. Saudi men, according to the paper, complained about the 
increased amount o f dowry that they had to pay for Saudi women. The of f ic ia l s 
interviewed said that restrictive measures had been taken by the state because such 
cases ultimately increased the burden on i t . Arab News also noted that the law was 
stricter in regard to Saudi women marrying non-Saudi men. 
In Arrayah the editor gave a piece of advice to newly married women, namely 
that they should obey their husbands. Maybe, he wrote, in this way we could save 
many marriages from facing difficulties which could lead to divorce. 
The same newspaper on 8 January 1989 published a letter by a reader, stating 
that women dressed in 'fight skirts could aggravate sexual urges in men.' Women, he 
wrote, ought to be more considerate and decent; i t was for this specific reason that 
Islam decreed that women must wear the veil and cover their bodies. 
Arab News on 14 January published a long letter by an educated Saudi woman, 
Dr Rab'a Al-Khateeb, challenging polygamy as projected by a prominent figure in an 
interview with the same newspaper. She wrote that the interviewee had contradicted 
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himself at several points in the interview. At one point, he asserted that he was against 
polygamy. He then contradicted himself by saying: ' I t is natural for a man to take a 
second wife. It is simply a matter of needs...marriage to a second wife is sunnah.' She 
disputed his ideas that prohibiting polygamy could lead to immorality in society. She 
also argued against his use o f the term 'spinster,' about which she wrote that this word 
was no longer used in the West; 'perhaps we, too, should cross this word out o f our 
vocabulary.' She also challenged him on the idea that women had no l ife i f someone 
did not knock on their door. Women, according to her, could pursue their careers and 
develop their interests even i f they did not have a husband. 
It is important at this point to note that educated Saudi women cannot express 
such radical views in the local Arabic-language newspapers. It is only in the English-
language newspapers or television networks that they have such freedom. 
Arab News o f 4 March 1989 interviewed the director o f the Islamic Press 
Agency who expressed liberal views concerning women. He said: 'We cannot leave 
half the society (which is women) unproductive.' Women, according to him, should be 
used as one o f the forces through which the country could develop. 
On 11 March an editorial in Arrayah tackled yet another issue related to mixing 
between the sexes. This time it was on how male tailors take women's measurements. 
He wrote that this practice was against Islamic principles. Men and women, he noted, 
must not stay in the same room alone. ' I t is even worse when the man (tailor) has to 
touch the woman's body while taking her measurements.' 
The next day's issue o f the same newspaper carried another harsh article 
against women. The journalist condemned women who tried to attract the attention of 
the opposite sex and those who had some kind of a relation with men as 'Satans.' He 
attributed his conclusion to the Quran and to the Prophet's sayings. 
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Women take their revenge on such articles every now and then through the 
letters they send to the editor. On 14 March a woman wrote to Arrayah saying that 
Qatari society treated its women with 'hatred.' Women, she wrote, were imprisoned by 
society which turned them into 'ha l f human and half handicapped, it creates dead 
monuments out o f them.' 
Are Moslem women allowed to dance or not? was the subject o f another 
column by one of the Arrayah female journalist. On 15 March, she wrote that parents 
should not let their young girls dance even at school functions. According to her, girls 
who dance while young grow up with no manners. She then directed the question to 
the readers: 'And you know what dancing does to girls?' 
During March 1989, the 5th Gulf Women's Conference was held in Bahrain. 
The conference was ignored by almost all the Gulf newspapers except, of course, those 
o f the country in which it was held. The state-controlled television networks did not 
even menfion it in their local news bulletins. The Bahraini newspapers, on the other 
hand, competed in publishing coverage and discussion about the issues that were raised 
at the conference. 
L ike the previous ones, the conference was sponsored by the Minis t ry of 
Labour and Social Affairs in Bahrain. Ministry officials had brief discussions with the 
organisers months before it was held to ensure that the subjects discussed would be in 
line with govemment policy. 
A male reader, however, wrote a cynical article about the conference. He 
commented that i t had avoided all the important issues and concentrated on the 
problems o f famil ies and children. He ended by saying that, even though the 
conference was obviously not going to change the status of Gulf women, he had hoped 
that it would alter the family insfitution. ' I am sure,' he wrote, 'that the conference's 
results w i l l be kept in the drawers of those in charge.' 
192 
A male cartoonist followed this with a sketch published in the newly launched 
Arabic-language newspaper Al-Ayam in Bahrain, summarising the whole issue of 
women's segregation. In the cartoon one man was helping another to climb a wall to 
get a glimpse of what was behind it. Although the cartoonist was referring to the small 
number o f male participants in the conference, his comment could be generalised to 
include the whole question of separation between the sexes. 
Akhbar Al-Khaleej's issue of 21 March was also devoted to coverage of the 
conference and reactions to the issues discussed by the participants. One man 
commented by saying that the conference's motto or slogan ' A better future for the 
family and the child' in fact 'enhanced the subordination of women.' 
The next day the same newspaper published a letter from another male reader 
drawing attention to a leaflet that had been distributed in different parts of the country. 
He said that his wife had discovered one of these leaflets attached to her car window. 
The leaflet, he wrote, advised women to wear the hijab or else they would suffer in 
hell. These leaflets were widely circulated during the Gulf Women's Conference and 
most o f the participants found them tucked in their windscreens. 
'Women in a Man's Law' was the title of Akhbar Al-Khaleej feature on 23 
March. The reporter interviewed lawyers and women regarding Bahraini laws, and 
especially those concerning women. Most o f the women interviewed said that these 
laws were writ ten by men fo r men. One o f the women commented that women, 
according to the country's laws, had no rights whatsoever. Almost all of them regretted 
that Bahrain had no family law. Lawyers also agreed that there was a need for such a 
law and that most o f the efforts to push for one were not acknowledged by officials. 
The same newspaper carried a news item about a husband who had been taken to court 
after assaulting his w i f e . The court heard that the w i f e was fur ious when she 
discovered that her husband had married their maid a year earlier. 
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On 24 March a woman wrote to the editor o f Akhbar Al-Khaleej, accusing 
Bahraini females o f being 'too Westernised.' She asserted that these women had drifted 
away f rom their religious beliefs. They had been imitating the women they saw on 
television who are not Moslem women and did not observe Islamic dress and 
behaviour. 
In Kuwait, Arab Times reported that many Kuwaiti women had expressed their 
readiness to be included in the compulsory military service which the govemment was 
trying to impose on men only. These women either wrote or telephoned to the editors 
of the newspaper to say that they wanted to be part o f their country's defence forces. 
Nationalism, they said, was not restricted to males and should not be considered as 
such. 
On 29 March Akhbar Al-Khaleej printed a letter on its correspondence page on 
the subject o f honour. The female writer rejected the idea that society's honour was 
derived f rom its females. She said that such ideas had been maintained for years for the 
sole purpose of keeping women in submission. It was about time, she declared, that we 
changed these 'backward' beliefs and joined the modem worid. She stressed that many 
of the women who gave way to the veil and the complete cover-up were leading double 
lives. They covered themselves up, she was convinced, while at the same time doing 
all kinds of things that were forbidden by their religion. 
In one o f its columns, the same paper commented that young women did not 
receive the same amount o f attention as that provided for young men. During the 
summer vacation, the editor wrote, many of these giris found themselves stranded and 
confined to their homes. He said that there were no sports facili t ies or clubs for 
women, while men had many to choose from. 
During the month o f Apr i l 1989 a court case decision reported by Akhbar Al-
Khaleej was to stir up a b ig row between off ic ia ls on one side and lawyers and 
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journalists on the other. The whole o f society was split over the issue and foreign 
correspondents found it very exciting for their hungry editors in Western capitals. It 
concerned a divorce case brought by one of the two wives at the centre of the issue. 
The wife complained that her husband slept with both his wives at the same time in the 
same bed. The Bahraini f ami ly court granted the wi fe the right o f divorce. The 
husband, however, was not satisfied with the decision and went to Saudi Arabia and 
got a 'Fatwa' f rom the Kingdom's ' M u f t i ' who is the highest Islamic clergyman. The 
'Fatwa' stated that men have the right, under Islamic law to have intercourse with their 
wives in any way they like. Based on the Saudi Fatwa, the Bahraini court decision was 
overruled and the divorced wife was dragged by the police back to her husband's home. 
The consequences o f reporting the case were drastic for the newspaper, the 
reporter and the source who was a female Bahraini lawyer. The Bahraini Minister of 
Information suspended the newspaper for two days (10 and 11 of April) and threatened 
the reporter wi th confiscating her press card. The Bahraini Minister o f Justice and 
Islamic Endovmients ordered the prosecution o f the lawyer in a special court for the 
profession. Both the reporter and her lawyer source were unable to produce any 
evidence, as the case files disappeared the day after the decision was reported. A denial 
o f the existence o f the case by the Ministry of Justice and Islamic Endowments was 
published in all the local newspapers for two days. In the ministry's denial i t was 
mentioned that the whole case had been faked by 'someone' and that no records of the 
incident had been found. The journalist and the lawyer were saved from imprisonment 
or other harsher measures because they were both members of the royal family. As for 
the editor of the newspaper, he was forced to publish an apology. 
Foreign reporters based in Manama (the Bahraini capital) were summoned to 
the Ministry of Information where they were lectured on objective reporting, etc. They 
were also threatened by the Minister himself who told one o f the correspondents (for 
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the German news agency DPA) that he could be deported immediately for such an 
offence. 
The Gulf newspapers reported only the suspension of Akhbar Al-Khaleej. with 
no reaction or even discussion of the reason for such an action by the Bahraini officials. 
Meanwhile, the other Gulf newspapers carried on their usual writings about 
women. Arab News, a few days later, noted in one of its columns that women ought to 
obey their husbands. The Saudi English-language newspaper stated that women must 
act and dress in the way their husbands liked. According to the Prophet Mohammed's 
sayings, the writer said, real Moslem women ought to please their husbands. 
Whi le the last two chapters have illustrated the way in which Gul f media 
handles the issues o f foreign labor and women, the next one w i l l attempt to study the 
media itself Gulf journalists who adopt the modem-patriarchal nature of the state are 
themselves subject to its despotism. Although these journalists have an amount of 
autonomy, at times o f crisis their freedom vanishes. Self-censorship, however, is a 
common practice among Gul f journalists. The next chapter w i l l examine the lack o f 
citizens rights in the Gulf in relation to those journalists and it specifically concentrates 
on the coverage o f the Gulf War. 
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CHAPTER V 
T H E G U L F MEDIA: VICTIM OF STATE CONTROL 
The Case of the Gulf War Coverage 
"The media, the arena in which I work, has been 
both a major victim of and a collaborator in the 
narrowing of information and ideas, although 
it is misrepresented as the very opposite " 
(Pilger, 1992: 2). 
5.1 Introduction: 
Although the media in the Gul f - as seen Chapters 3 and 4 o f this thesis -
sometimes avoid airing problems related to women and migrant workers. Gulf 
journalists themselves become the victims o f state control. The importation o f 
advanced media technology as a result o f the huge oil revenues brought no drastic 
changes in the media contents. The G u l f media, just as is true o f women and 
foreign workers, are unable to provide an independent ouflet for the voices o f 
intellectuals, especially in times of crisis. They are, however, confronted with the 
more difficult problem of exposing the duplicity of society and the state in general. 
From one side they have to project the modem media (state) and, on the other, they 
are confined to the traditional politics of the ruling tribes. 
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The Gulf sheikdoms (as discused on chapter 2) have their own pecuHarities. 
The tremendous oil wealth has transformed them into welfare states, but the 
traditional nature of the patriarchal structure has continued to dominate. These states 
have constantly exploited religion, tradition and kinship to support their legitimacy. 
In their attempt to adopt and project a more prosperous, developed and modem 
outlook for their states, the Gulf rulers have been faced with the dilemma of 
providing individual freedom for the mass of their populations. Michael Hudson 
noted that these rulers were: 
"..Aware of the more directly liberal, democratic, 
participatory values associated with modernity. 
Although they seek economic growth, they are 
reluctant to see the masses politicized and 
unwilling to permit significant mass participation 
or autonomous opposition groups " (Hudson, 1977: 
27). 
The principles of modernity, as universally defined to require equality and 
individual freedom to express views and opinions that might not suit those of the 
ruling elite, are not observed in the Gulf. Kevin Dwyer in his book 'Arab Voices' 
discusses the lack of personal freedom and democracy in the Arab world, with a 
main focus on three Arab countries. While talking to different groups and 
individuals in Egypt he found that the exploitation of Islam goes beyond the Gulf 
boundaries and actually has its effect on other Arab countries. He found that 
Egyptians looking for jobs in the oil-rich Gulf states were told that i f they 
condemned secular ideas and embraced Islam they might find it easier to get the 
employment they were desperate for. 
It is worth emphasising what a Moroccan member of the Council of 
Religious Scholars told him concerning the issue of human right and individual 
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freedom. After criticising the West for its neglect of human rights, the Moroccan 
scholar noted that Saudi Arabia had not signed the UN Convention on Human 
Rights because it accepted 'atheism.' He continued: 
"And also, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights was for complete equality between men and 
women. For us, women are equal to men in law, but 
they are not the same as men, and they can't be 
allowed to wander around freely in the street like 
some kind of animal" (Dwyer, 1991: 39). 
By relating the state structure in the Gulf to the issue of the media in the 
region one could understand the dilemma confronting the rulers. The Gulf states 
have promoted and, in fact, helped to develop their media. Advanced media 
technology as found in most of the developed countries is available in the Gulf and 
is used by local journalists and editors. However, this advanced technology was 
able to deliver the modernity principles discussed above and itself became a victim 
of state oppression and control. 
In one respect the Gulf media were to give an impression of modernity and 
independence. Newspapers, magazines and television networks have adopted the 
most advanced media technologies that are available in the market. Like many other 
consumer products, these technologies have been purchased from the Western 
industrialised countries. The authorities have also sent reporters and editors to be 
trained in Western capitals. Gulf journalists, nonetheless, know very well that while 
they can use the technologies they have to forget about changing the contents of 
their media. Even though almost all the daily newspapers in the Gulf are privately 
owned, they have to function under the close control of the Ministries of 
Information. As one Saudi editor puts it: '..the newspapers are so similar they 
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might as well be nationalised.' 
The amount of freedom available for the media to voice some kind of an 
independent critical opinion is limited in peacetime, but at times of crisis it 
disappears altogether. As is true in most developing countries, the Gulf media are 
completely dependent on information filtered through officials: 
"In developing societies, truth has always been 
considered divine in form as well as in content, to 
whatever god or prophet it is attributed. The 
knowledge of this truth is therefore considered a 
privilege, the privilege of one man or of a few men, 
who henceforth necessarily claim a monopoly of 
freedom-the freedom of those who know and have 
alone the right to tell the others what they must 
know and believe. A phenomenon accentuated by the 
sacred character of the written word, to be written 
in the most perishable fashion: in newspapers...in 
such a context, it is natural and logical that the 
press should assume a very particular role. Instead 
of being a "mass medium" in the sense commonly 
held, it becomes the instrument of transmission of 
the official truth, the media by which this truth is 
authoritatively communicated to the masses " 
(Tueni, 1971: 2-3). 
Television stations in the Gulf are faced with tighter control since they are 
all govemment-owned. The harsher measures imposed on television are partly due 
to its effect on a population which is largely illiterate. News presenters have no 
freedom whatsoever and must repeat the news which the officials filter through to 
them. Local news consists mainly of the activities of the Emir, his Crown Prince 
and state ministers. International news is carefully scrutinised so as not to offend 
any 'friendly' country. 
The Gulf media are also saturated with religious material. The Daily 
newspapers have at least a weekly section devoted to Islam. Television stations 
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start and end their daily programmes with a recital from the Quran. A huge amount 
of money is invested in religious programmes especially during the holy month of 
Ramadan. The relation between religion, state and media is so complex because, in 
their attempt at legitimacy, these states define the ruler as God's representative on 
earth (Dwyer, 1991). 
During times of crisis, however, the Gulf media convert into a mouthpiece 
for the state. The last two decades have produced different examples supporting 
this argument. To name but a few of these crises: the 1979 seizure of the Grand 
Mosque in Mecca; the 1981 coup attempt in Bahrain; the 1985 bombs in seaside 
cafes and the assassination attempt on the Emir of Kuwait; the 1989 explosions in 
Mecca during the pilgrimage season. In almost all these incidents there was a 
complete blackout on the part of the media for the first few hours or even days until 
official statements had been released. The Gulf media were allowed only to voice 
the government line of accusation and condemnation. 
A statement made by the Kuwaiti Prime Minister after the suspension of 
his country's parliament in 1976 illustrates how officials conceive of the role of the 
media. He said: 
"with unlimited freedom the press became 
irresponsible Giving it freedom without controls 
has made some papers obedient instruments in the 
service of objectives alien to our country, which 
work to corrupt society, propagate self-interested 
rumors and sow trivialities and sedition among our 
ranks" (Rugh, 1979:106). 
Journalists in the Gulf are the most feared and watched by government 
officials and/or security personnel. In most of the Gulf countries, journalists are not 
allowed to have their own union or even a club in which to meet. Kuwait was the 
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only Gulf state that allowed the establishment of a journalists union, partly due to 
pressure from parliament when it was not suspended by the Emir. In Bahrain, 
Saudi Arabia and Qatar such attempts by journalists were completely rejected by 
the authorities. It might be worth noting that other professions - lawyers, engineers, 
sociologists...etc - are allowed to set up such unions. The Bahraini Minister of 
Information in a meeting with a group of journalists bluntly revealed that they 
(meaning the government) could not allow such a union for journalists. Tariq A l -
Moayed told the gathering that it was easier to handle individual journalists than a 
group of them. 
A recent crisis, however, can be used as an illustration of how the Gulf 
media relinquish their autonomy to the state. As noted in chapter 2, the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait on 2 August, 1990 was ignored by most of the Gulf media. In 
countries like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, the local media waited 
until the official reaction was made public. From 2 August onwards the media in 
the Gulf caved in to the state. They were forced into a situation where they had to 
cover their own local news (the Gulf War fought on Gulf deserts and Gulf waters) 
through the American and British media. 
Since the Gu l f off ic ials succumbed to the American and British 
governments and armies, their media had to follow suit. Gulf reporters and editors, 
who were much better equipped to cover a war being waged on their own territory; 
were asked to depend on American and British journalists. The Gulf media 
repeated what the Western news agencies and/or television networks were 
reporting. In a few cases even comments that could be classified as racial towards 
Arabs in general were echoed by the Gulf media. Mustapha Masmoudi in an article 
about the Arab media and state in times of crisis commented on the Gulf media by 
writing: 
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"But the Gulf countries most affected realized that in 
spite of their technological capacity for 
audiovisual and print communication, their media 
had not committed the necessary effort in terms of 
content and political information " (Masmoudi, 
1992: 42). 
Gulf reporters were not allowed to participate in the pool reporting that was 
organised by the American and British forces. Even those who were confined to 
their own countries had no access to cover the military operations that were taking 
place there. Bahraini journalists, for example, could not talk to the Tornado pilots 
who were based in the island. Their Saudi counterparts were not allowed to talk to 
Saudi pilots who, according to the allied commanders, participated in Desert Storm. 
Saudi pilots just like the other Arab soldiers, were interviewed in English by 
American or British pool reporters with access to them. 
Although Gulf joumalists had all the tools for reporting the war, they were 
voiceless and completely marginalised. Gulf officials preferred the Western media, 
despite the ideological costs, to an independent media in the Gulf. One of the costs 
of this total dependence on the Western media was the example of unveiled 
Western females who had the freedom to travel around Saudi Arabia either as 
soldiers or reporters. The Gulf media had to depend for their account of the war on 
American and British joumalists who were themselves only too eager to fall in as 
instruments of their states' propaganda machines. 
In an attempt to clarify this point the present writer wi l l use her own 
experience prior to the Gulf War as one example of how joumalists in the region 
were pushed into the position of observers. 
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The last decade has witnessed an increase in the number of professional 
Gulf journalists who were not only acclaimed locally, but also by international 
media organisations. They were able to report both in English and Arabic and with 
their knowledge of the region's history, culture and norms were better equipped to 
cover its news events. At some points they were even sent to report on events that 
could not be described as Gulf, but rather as Arab or Middle Eastern events. 
The present writer, as one of many journalists in the region, was hired as a 
reporter and then photo-editor by the Associated Press's Gulf bureau based in 
Manama, the Bahraini capital. On several occasions I had to travel around the Gulf 
to cover news events ranging from war to meetings between the European 
Community and the Gulf Co-operation Council. On many of these occasions the 
decision to send me instead of a more experienced AP reporter was based on the 
fact that as a Bahraini citizen, I suffered from no travel restrictions around the 
region, and I knew the language, the geography and the culture. 
During the Iraq-Iran War, I was sent to the war-front in both the northern 
and the southern borders of Iraq and Iran. On one occasion the Iraqis took a group 
of journalists (including the writer) to the Kurdish region in the northern part of the 
country. The Kurds, fighting for their autonomy, had reported that a battle had 
taken place between their guerrillas and the Iraqi army. The Iraqis for their part 
wanted to prove to the journalists that such an incident did not take place. The 
writer managed to prove the Iraqis wrong after chatting to local Kurds in the 
northern town of Mangish. 
Covering yet another war, my knowledge of Arabic proved be usefiil. 
During the 1986 civil war in Southern Yemen, I was sent by AP to Djibouti to 
interview refiigees fleeing the infemo. South Yemen - as the only socialist country 
in the region - had strong ties with what used to be the Soviet Union and the 
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Eastem bloc states. Its relations with the West were poor, which was reflected by 
the few Westerners who were working in Aden, the capital. Almost all the refiagees 
were non-Westemers who could speak no English. With no language problem and 
with my knowledge of the history of South Yemen, I managed to cover the story 
much more easily than my Western colleagues. 
These are but a few examples of how Gulf journalists were equipped to 
cover the Gulf War. Yet they were pushed into the position of observers or mere 
ghosts who were present but in reality had no effect on the way the war was 
presented to their audiences. The rest of this chapter will therefore try to analyse 
how the Gulf War was covered by the local media through its American and British 
counterparts. To do this I need to examine American and British coverage of the 
war, which was, after all, used by the Gulf media. 
5.2 Regulations and Pool Reporting: 
As the allied soldiers were moved swiftly from their bases to the Gulf 
Western reporters flooded into the region. Correspondents whom in the past had 
had to wait months to obtain visas, were confronted with few difficulties this time. 
It was not long, though, before they were faced with the regulations enforced by the 
Pentagon, the British Ministry of Defence and the Saudi authorities. 
Correspondents were assigned to pools which excluded all non-American 
or non-British reporters, including Gulf joumalists. This procedure angered many 
Westem joumalists who complained about it. French correspondents, for example, 
found such treatment appalling and at one point during the conflict threatened to 
leave Saudi Arabia and terminate their reporting. They were among the few who 
objected to such discrimination against non-Americans and non-British. On 12 
February, 1991 a group of 300 joumalists (all non-British or non-American) 
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representing 23 different countries sent a letter to King Fahd and the allied 
commanders in the Gulf complaining about road blocks established to prevent 
them from venturing into the desert (Taylor, 1992: 158). Gulf joumalists, however, 
were not among those who dared to complain. In fact, throughout Desert Shield 
and then Desert Storm, these reporters and editors were far away from the action. 
While western reporters were allowed to stay in Riyadh and attend the military 
briefings, their Gulf counterparts were confined to their offices. 
Westem joumalists who defied the mles were threatened with having their 
credentials confiscated and even being thrown out of Saudi Arabia. A French 
television team representing TFl was confronted with such a case. The TFl team 
filmed a group of French soldiers who said that they did not know why they were 
there, but they might be fighting for oil. These French correspondents were banned 
from coverage and this led to their protest (reported in The Times, 19 February 
1991). Such a story did not find its way to the Gulf media which depended entirely 
on American and British coverage of the conflict. 
It might be useful to mention that the American media, especial the 
television networks, had the greatest effect in the Gulf region, in particular Cable 
News Network (CNN). Most of the Gulf local television stations provided CNN 
with specific amounts of their broadcasting rime. It was also reported that the 
Pentagon negotiated a deal with the Bahraini Minister of Information to provide 
CNN with a separate channel for continuous broadcasting. This was acknowledged 
by the Bahraini officials as a service to the American soldiers in the Gulf 
The first few days of the crisis witnessed a complete devotion to coverage 
of the war. The Westem media -especially the television networks - bombarded the 
readers and viewers with informarion, most of it of no huge substance. As Sir 
William Deedes wrote in the Daily Telegraph of 19 January, 1991: 
206 
"..the ceaseless sound, the plethora of voices, round 
the clock, sheds extraordinarily little light on what 
is actually going on " (quoted in Taylor, 1992: 66). 
Not all American and British correspondents were allowed to join the pools. 
Journalists were asked by the military to undergo physical fitness tests. Each 
reporter had to do 29 push-ups in two minutes and run one and a half miles in 15 
minutes. The few who passed these tests were assigned to accompany a specific 
regiment. Pool reporting, as an army technique, was created by the Americans 
mainly after the Vietnam War and the invasion of Grenada {Time, 10 September 
1990). 
Journalists who did not qualify to join these pools were forced to stay in 
Riyadh and Dhahran waiting for their colleagues' dispatches. 
"Most journalists were left in the hotels...forced by 
Pentagon rules that limit coverage to small troops 
of combat pools designated to visit the war and 
send censored dispatches back to their jealous and 
miserable colleagues " (The Guardian, 28 February 
1991). 
Many frustrated reporters who decided to take a chance and venture alone 
into the desert, found themselves threatened by the army with being 'kicked out' of 
Saudi Arabia. Others were faced with angry pool reporters who tried to attack them 
with the help of allied soldiers. Robert Fisk, the Middle East correspondent of The 
Independent told The Washington Post of the ordeal he faced when he visited the 
Saudi-Kuwaiti border town of Kha^i. Fisk said that he was faced with an NBC 
pool reporter who started 'shouting abuse at me, telling me to go back to Dhahran 
and saying I would spoil it for the pool.' He expressed anger about these reporters 
who, according to Fisk, 'have lost their critical faculties and become part of the 
military machine. This is very sad and humiliating for all of us' (The International 
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Herald Tribune, 12 Febmary 1991). 
Reports, such as those by Fisk or other self-respecting joumalists, did not 
find their way to the Gulf media which were confined by the state and military 
straitjacket. The Gulf media not only lost their ability to cover a war in their own 
region, but also had to depend on joumalists who had identified with the military. 
These American and British pool reporters at some point found it acceptable to 
practice self- censorship. Philip Knightley, in an article entitled 'A Warrior Race 
Tums a Blind Eye to Battle,' noted that the guidelines enforced by the military 
enhanced the amount of 'voluntary' censorship by joumalists {The Independent On 
Sunday, 13 January 1991). (For more on Knightely's account of war coverage see 
Knighfley, 1989; also Glasgow University Media Group, 1976, 1982). 
The policy of the carrot and the stick was practised by the allied 
commanders in relation to joumalists. A Los Angeles Times reporter, for example, 
was kicked out of the pool after publishing an article in which he wrote that 50 US 
military vehicles were missing. His article passed the censor in his pool with no 
objections, but he was penalised for it later. From the early days of the deployment 
of allied forces in the Saudi desert. Pentagon press officers wamed joumalists that 
i f they asked 'hard' questions that were seen as 'anti-military' they would suffer. 
The Pentagon officers explained that their requests for interviews with 
commanders would be rejected {The New York Times, 17 February 1991). 
American and British pool reporters had close contacts with the soldiers. 
They shared the same facilities and at some points depended on them completely 
for their ovm safety on the battlefield. Many of them had identified themselves with 
the soldiers more than with their journalist colleagues. They even dressed in their 
uniforms and held back information which they thought might harm the allied 
froops. A very few resented this joumalist-soldier image and preferred to keep their 
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distance from the army. They were the ones who criticised their colleagues and 
advised them to join the army i f they were so fascinated with it. Robert Fisk, in one 
of his dispatches from Riyadh noted: 
"The reporters in uniform and the soldiers with 
journalism in their veins suggest a symbiotic, 
perhaps osmotic relationship. Half the reporters in 
Saudi Arabia it seems, want to be soldiers. Half the 
soldiers would like to be in the news business. No 
wonder fantasy has so strong a claim " (The 
Independent On Sunday, 9 December 1991). 
It is worth referring at this point to an incident where it was reported that a 
colonel commanding a US air base in the Gulf had given reporters small American 
flags as presents. The commander told these pool members that these flags had 
been carried in the cockpits of the first US jets to bomb Baghdad. He continued by 
saying, 'you are warriors too' {The Independent, 6 February 1991). 
The Gulf media were saturated with images of American and British 
journalists dressed in military fatigues. To Gulf journalists these reporters 
represented the power not of the media but of the US and UK armies. The liaison 
between soldiers and journalists was so complete that many changed professions 
during the conflict. For instances there was the case of General Michael Dugan, the 
US air force Chief of Staff dismissed in September 1990 for revealing that the US 
were ready to bomb downtown Baghdad in order to kill Saddam, who was offered 
a consultancy job by CBS at a salary of $1,500 per day {The Independent, 25 
January 1991). 
A New York Times journalist commented on this close relation between 
pool reporters and the army: 
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"Each pool member is an unpaid employee of the 
Department of Defence, on whose behalf he or she 
prepares the news of the war for the outer world" 
(quoted in Taylor, 1992: 53). 
The outer world that Malcolm Browne was referring to included the Gulf 
region which in the end was forced to use material that was highly censored or 
influenced by the American and British armies. Every piece of copy and every 
television news msh was carefully scmtinised by the officers assigned to carry out 
such jobs for every reporter in the field. The Guardian of 28 Febmary, 1991 quoted 
the famous Italian journalist, Oriana Fallaci, as commenting on the amount of 
censorship enforced: 
"..I was horrified by this....It was more than 
censorship it's like a cancer. Everybody in my 
family die of cancer. You say cancer, I shiver. You 
say censorship, I shiver. And that was my deepest 
experience in censorship and incapability, was 
North Vietnam. lam living the same experience 
again." 
American and British pool reporters did not, however, complain like 
Fallaci. In fact, many defended the military censorship and guidelines. American 
television network CNN - regarded by many as the most powerful media outlet 
during the war - reminded its viewers continuously of the restrictions imposed on 
the reporting. CNN presented the illusion of keeping its distance and that restriction 
was beyond its control. Yet the network correspondents who joined the pool 
reporting identified, like all the rest, with the military. 
Charles Bremner remarked on the complete surrender of the American 
media to the army. He wrote that American joumalists: 
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".have followed a line of subdued loyalty 
reminiscent of reporting from Korea or during the 
Second World War" (The Times 23 January 1991). 
The Gulf War proved that the American army officers were able to set the 
agenda for the media to the extent that the two became one. It was very easy for the 
US army to control the media coverage of the war. By organising pools they 
managed to exclude many journalists who had to wait for their colleagues' copy. 
They bombarded the media with information that had no great significance for 
actual operations. At some points a number of correspondents in Saudi Arabia 
found themselves in the position of having to ask their editors to read them the wire 
copies which they then used as i f they were their ovm (Taylor, 1992: 14). This war 
could have endorsed the Iraqi President's saying long before he ordered his army to 
occupy Kuwait that 'compared to tanks, journalists are cheap - and you get more 
for your money' {The Guardian, 23 February 1991). 
Censorship, nonetheless, was not confined to dispatches from the front line, 
but was also imposed at home on programmes and songs that could harm war 
operations. In London and Washington programmes such as the documentary on 
the 'October Surprise' theory were completely banned or delayed until the fighting 
had stopped. The BBC (which was the most listened to station not only in the Gulf 
but in the whole Arab World) issued a list of songs which was 'inappropriate' to 
play during the war, including: 'Killing me Softly', 'Everybody Wants to Rule the 
Worid' and 'We Can Work It Out'. 
In the Gulf any article or interview that attacked the American or British 
administrations was banned completely. Any mention of the Gulf as part of what 
used to be the British Empire was unacceptable, as was any linkage between the 
invasion of Kuwait and that of Palestine by the Israelis, Lebanon by the Syrians 
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and even the Saudi occupation of parts of Yemen, Qatar and even a Kuwaiti island, 
the island of Qarouh, which was occupied by the Saudi military in 1989 but 
abandoned a few days before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. 
The Gulf media were forced to disregard the history, geography and 
civilisation of the region. Joumalists in the Gulf did not dare to link the invasion to 
the border problems in the ex-British colonies. They also had to publish and 
broadcast the lies that were circulated by the army and filtered through the 
American and British media. 
American and British joumalists were themselves subject to criticism for 
publishing propaganda information without verifying it. The media were used as 
part of the army propaganda campaign directed towards home audiences and the 
Iraqi authorities and military. General Norman Schwarzkopf admitted that they 
concealed most of the tmth from the joumalists. In an interview with David Frost 
after the war, he said: 
"Nobody knew everything that we were doing 
except for a very few people in Washington and it 
was even a limited group of people here in this 
headquarters that knew everything we were 
doing" (cited in Taylor, 1992: XI). 
A few - mostly British - joumalists have declared that governments always 
lie to the media, but in times of war or crisis it becomes more evident. Hugo 
Young of The Guardian wrote: 
"Although the whole truth is no more available than 
it ever was, the illusion of truth is more strongly 
present than it has ever been. This is the 
achievement of wall-to wall television. Here is 
this powerful medium, uniquely the medium of the 
actual and believable, devoting so much time to the 
war that unwary viewers may be easily lulled into 
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the belief that their picture is complete " (The 
Guardian, 5 February 1991). 
Nik Gowing, the diplomatic editor of British Channel Four television, also 
confessed that information during the first few months of the crisis was a lot of 
' b l u f f and was not 'accurate' (The Times,17 January 1991). A few examples 
could be classified as military misinformation. One such incident was the oil spill 
episode when the Western and Gulf media concentrated on pictures of dying birds 
and polluted sea water. The media blamed the Iraqis for creating such an ecological 
catastrophe and called Saddam Hussein an enemy of nature. A few days later it was 
discovered that these pictures were of an earlier oil slick, but neither the Western 
nor the Gulf media emphasised this fact. Philip Knightley commented on the 
incident by remarking: 
"what raid was this? How could Iraqi planes 
successfully raid a Saudi refinery at a time when 
the allies were claiming total mastery of the air? 
And, most intriguing of all, who had decided to 
release pictures of the dying bird and link it to the 
spill from Kuwait, thus creating a powerjul 
propaganda image of special appeal to 
environmentalists - who, until then, were among 
the leading opponents of the war? " (New Statesman 
and Society, 8 February 1991). 
The Battle of Al-Khafji was another example of misinformation that went 
unquestioned by most journalists. During the allied briefing in Riyadh, reporters 
learned that the Saudi and Qatari armies had overcome an attempt by the Iraqis to 
occupy the border town of Al-Khafj i . The information was also supported and 
confirmed by reporters in the pool. A Few of the journalists who were confined to 
Riyadh ventiired out into the desert only to discover that the battle over Al-Khafji 
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was still going on two days later. Robert Fisk, for example, found that it was the 
American soldiers who had engaged in the fighting with the Iraqis. At the end of 
the fighting, Saudi and Qatari tanks were moved in to be filmed by the pool 
reporters as the heroes who had defended their borders. 
There was another incident where Kuwaiti resistance representatives (for 
their own benefit) told foreign reporters that the Iraqi soldiers had removed babies 
from incubators in a Kuwaiti hospital that lead to the babies' deaths. It was found 
out later that the story was completely fabricated but what is interesting is how the 
Gulf media ignored these reports. 
Such misinformation was never corrected by the Gulf media, since it served 
the interests of officials who wanted to show their public that the huge military 
budget had not been wasted. It was also intended to calm down the few voices 
among the Gulf populace who were concerned about the presence of a large 
number of allied troops and were questioning the role of the Gulf Peninsula Shield 
project. 
Both the Gulf and the Western media went down with total amnesia during 
the seven-month period of the conflict. Saddam Hussein, who had been hailed by 
the Gulf media up to 2 August as a great Arab leader, was now called a 
bloodthirsty dictator by those same media. He was the West's best ally in the 
region, but from 2 August he became 'the new Hitler.' The Iraqi regime's human 
rights violations, which had never been reported by the Gulf media, became the 
main theme throughout the war. Western media treatment of Saddam is depicted in 
Kellner(1992). 
The Western media also criticised a few Arab countries which took a 
different stand fi-om that of the allies, such as Jordan, Tunisia and Algeria. They 
were accused of being pro the Iraqi dictator, although these same countries had 
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been acclaimed a few months earlier for being the only Arab countries that were 
taking serious steps towards democracy (Masmoudi, 1992: 42). 
Media terminology during the coverage of the war is itself a subject for 
separate study. It is interesting, however, to review a few of the words that were 
used by the Western media to describe the Iraqis, on the one side, and the allied 
forces, on the other. While the allies have Army, Navy and Air Force, the Iraqis 
have a war machine. The allied have reporting guidelines, but the Iraqis have 
censorship and propaganda. The allies soldiers are professionals, the Iraqis are 
brainwashed {The Guardian, 23 January 1991). 
The American, British and Gulf media played with words and supplied 
definitions that well suited the military personalities. Norman Solomon, for 
example, wrote in The New York Times that he noticed that the American media 
were describing 'a dictatorship like Saudi Arabia as moderate.' He also commented 
on Time magazine's definition of collateral damage, a term that was widely used 
by the military and the journalist corps. Solomon wrote that it defined it as: 'a term 
meaning dead or wounded civilians who should have picked safer neighbors' (The 
New York Times, 25 May 1991). 
President Bush on several occasions said that this was a war to stop the 
'rape' of Kuwait. The American, British and Gulf media echoed this and kept 
using the word with all its connotations. In fact, it touched on the delicate side of the 
Gulf psyche by connecting the war with 'honour' and 'Shame' as referred to in the 
previous chapter on Gulf women. 
Religious terminologies and insinuations were also used by both President 
Bush and his Gulf allies. The war was called a 'holy' war, a 'Jihad' for the 
Moslems. Bush on the first night of the fighting was filmed going to Church. 
General Schwarzkopf told his troops 'May God by with you.' King Fahd got the 
215 
Chief Mufti in Saudi Arabia to produce a 'Fatwa' in which he justified the presence 
of foreign 'Christian' forces to defend the holiest Islamic shrines. 
Terminologies that were used by the American and British media were 
adopted by the Gulf media which were in desperate need to erase from the public 
memory all the previous glorification of the Iraqi regime and its military. The 
ideological cost of such coverage was tremendous, since previous experiences were 
forgotten as the propagandist media rewrote history. During the eight years of the 
Iraq-Iran war, the Gulf media had also been forced to support the Iraqis against the 
Iranians. The Gulf countries pumped huge amount of money to the Iraqis to launch 
a bloody war against revolutionary Shi'ite Iran. At that point the Gulf media were 
completely dependent on the Iraqi propaganda machine and American media 
coverage of the war. The Iranian side of the story was never heard by the Gulf 
populations, although some of them supported the Iranians especially in countries 
with a large percentage of Shi'ites. 
A further cost of the coverage was the media advertisement for arms. The 
contradictions were tremendous. While the war was fought to create peace in the 
region; arms sales were taking place with the help of the media. 
5 J TheGuIfMedia Advertising For U.S. Arms: 
The Gulf War was used to advertise American and British arms. Reporters 
in the field, editors and commentators in London and Washington were obsessed 
with arms technology. 
There were continuous reports about the accuracy of the Stealth planes or 
the Patriot anti-missile missiles. The Independent ^vib\\s]\Q<\ an article in which it 
noted that the British government 'believe a key lesson of the war is the importance 
of investing in high-technology.' It quoted a ministerial source as saying 'you look 
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at these projects and think they will never work, and then look what happens, when 
they do. Everyone wants one' {The Independent, 2 March 1991). 
Mark Latey, the BBC's correspondent in Dhahran, reported the Scud 
missile attack on this Saudi city which was intercepted by a Patriot. He said, 
'Patriot worked very well, they will get a Christmas card this year from me, the 
makers of Patriot...it is incredible the only thing in the world that could do this' 
(BBC News Bulletin, 18 January 1991). 
It was not unexpected to read a few days later that the Patriot manufacturers, 
who were facing difficulties selling their missile before the war, were flooded with 
orders, especially ft"om the smaller Gulf states. Also the first private commercial 
contract to rebuild Kuwait went to the Patriot missile manufacturers, Raytheon. The 
contract was for rebuilding an airfield for the amount of $5.7 million {The 
Independent On Sunday, 17 February 1991). 
The Guardian of 2 March 1991 published an article in which it explained 
why the British forces were using the Challenger I tanks. It noted that 
".the vital role of Challenger I tanks in the Gulf 
War is set to clinch a government decision to 
purchase a new generation of battle tanks and to 
choose the British candidate, the Vickers-built 
Challenger II, in preference to American and 
German rivals." 
Robert Fisk found Arabic-language sales brochures for the British 
Challenger tank on the desks of Saudi press officers at the Dhahran International 
Hotel, the headquarters of the Joint Information Bureau (The Independent On 
Sunday, 9 December 1990). 
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Newspapers, even the very few that were against the war, carried headlines 
such as 'RAF Tornados impress USAF and attract plane buyers,' 'Patriot rises 
above doubts of its effectiveness,' 'Pinpoint strikes vindicate 40 years of planning,' 
'A War of the 21st Century'. Newsweek msigazine in one of its issues before 
hostilities broke out explained that the situation in the Gulf raised the need for 
continuous arms development. It noted: 
"The nightmare vision of Saddam or some other 
Third world madman waving an ICBM tipped with a 
nuclear missile - not unthinkable in five to 10 
years - could mean salvation for Star Wars " 
(Newsweek, 10 September 1990). 
A New York Times reporter expressed his fascination with the advanced 
arms technology by wrifing about, 'technology that guides cruise missiles so 
precisely that one fired from a battleship in the Red Sea clipped a communications 
tower in Baghdad neatly in two' (quoted in Taylor, 1992; 47). 
Douglas Kellner explained this cosy journalist-military relationship by 
reminding his readers that the media in the West were owned by conglomerates, 
most of whom had relations with arms manufacturers. He wrote: 
"This pronounced bias points to the effects of 
ownership of the media by corporations like GE 
which are heavily invested in the military 
industries, and which have been strongly supporting 
the conservatives and pro-business Republican 
administrations for the past decade " (Kellner, 
1992: 53). 
Ben Bagikian commented that these corporations had created what he called 
a 'new private ministry of information and culture' (quoted in Kellner, 1992: 49). 
The advanced media technology, after all, was developed under military control in 
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both the United States and Europe. In the United States research and development 
in the military and communications had been close ever since the Second World 
War (Schiller, 1971: 162). Armand Mattelart noted that television in Europe was 
developed under pressure from the military (Mattelart, 1984). 
While journalists were expressing their fascination with the advanced arms 
technology and praising it for hitting its precise target, evidence after the war proved 
the opposite. The destruction of many civilian installations in Baghdad while the 
allied officers were saying that they were hitting only military targets, clearly 
contradicted Western media reports. It has been reported that, of the 88,500 tons of 
bombs dropped on Iraq and Kuwait, 70 per cent missed their targets (Taylor, 1992: 
220). Also, when the media reported that all Scud launchers were destroyed reports 
later found that that was false. General Schwarzkopf admitted in an interview that 
the allied estimates of the number of Scud launchers were wrong. 
"One of the figures I read recently is they had 15 
battalions of 15 launchers each, and that 
multiplies to 225- and that was a lot more than we 
thought because the maximum estimate that we had 
prior to the beginning was 48 and in fact, at one 
point right before we launched hostilities, we had 
pretty good intelligence that they had a maximum 
of only 18" (quoted in Taylor, 1992: 72). 
American and British correspondents' reports of the Scud attacks on Israel 
were played down by the Gulf media. The Saudi and Kuwaiti press (in exile) 
ignored these reports completely, for fears of provoking Arab nationalism among 
the Gulf public (Taylor, 1992: 70-1). Editors in other Gulf countries raised the 
question: 'Why did not Saddam start his war against the enemy Israel instead of 
invading Kuwait?' The Gulf media escalated their attack on Saddam as a dictator 
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with ambitions for the whole region. 
When the first Scud missile landed in Israel, Western reporters were the 
first to reach for their gas masks. The CNN correspondent in Tel Aviv reported the 
news with his gas mask on. Viewers watched CNN reporters fixing each other's 
masks and interviewing one another. It was found later that the reports of Scuds 
carrying chemical warheads were a complete illusion. 
This could be related to the exaggeration by the Western and Gulf media of 
Iraqi military strength. This particular presentation of the Iraqi regime, the might of 
its army and the strength of its Republican Guards, was used to justify the allies' 
continuous 'Carpet bombing' of Iraqi cities. When it became clearer that the allies 
were winning the war with no casualties, the media (American, British and Gulf) 
shifted to reporting the low morale of the Iraqi army and the large number of 
surrendering soldiers who were badly fed and armed. Reports by President Bush 
and other allied speakers that Iraq was only months away from producing an 
atomic bomb were quite unfounded. Two scientists disputed this theory in an 
article published by a specialised magazine. D. Albright and Mark Hibbs stated that 
Iraq was five to ten years away from creating such a bomb (quoted in Taylor, 
1992: 280). Such a report, however, went unnoticed by the mainstream media that 
continued transmitting the same information even after the cessation of the 
hostilities. 
There were a few exceptions to the general policy of submitting to the 
Western media, and a few examples were suppressed by the Gulf media. For 
example, the Gulf - especially Saudi - media played down the story of the Saudi 
pilot who had shot down two Iraqi F-1 Mirage fighters, whereas this story made 
the headlines in London and Washington. Also attributed to the Gulf officials' fear 
of anger among their masses was the suppression of the incident when an Arab 
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Moslem killed another Arab Moslem Iraqi. CNN's coverage of the story was not 
broadcast live in Saudi Arabia and was censored in all the other Gulf media 
(Taylor, 1992: 79). 
5.4 From War of Technology to War of the Dead: 
While journalists and officers were engrossing themselves in high military 
techniques in the beautifully decorated rooms of the Hyatt Hotel in Riyadh, 
thousands of Iraqi civilians were dying. The bombardment of the Al-Amiriyah air-
raid shelter brought the facts of war home. It was the first time that completely 
burned dead bodies were shown on television screens and the ft-ont pages of British 
and American newspapers. Although many of the pictures and film footages were 
censored by the media in Washington, London and the Gulf for reasons of taste, 
what filtered through was enough to shock the audiences so that an explanation had 
to be put forward. 
Military briefings in Riyadh, London and Washington tried to defend the 
attack as legitimate since Al-Amiriyah had been used by the Iraqi army as a 
communications centre. The media in these capitals tried to shift the blame on to 
the Iraqis themselves. The Gulf media commented on the incident by saying that 
Saddam had betrayed his people and used them as a cover for his military 
operational theatre. They insinuated that i f the Iraqi regime treated its own people 
like this how was it going to treat people in the Gulf i f Saddam has given the 
chance to move down and occupy other Gulf states?. 
Even though American and British correspondents in Baghdad were clearly 
touched by the scenes of the charcoal bodies of women and children; their 
colleagues back home were not at all sympathetic. Journalists such as Richard 
Beeston of The Times wrote in an attempt to blame the Iraqis themselves for the 
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massacre: 
"In some cases the Iraqis have only themselves to 
blame for the loss of civilian life. Their policy of 
relocating stafffrom government offices to 
schools and other civilian buildings and of moving 
military hardware out of their barracks to better 
camouflaged wooded areas in the countryside near 
farms and villages frequently exposes non-
combatants to attack" (The Times, 11 February 
1991). 
The Al-Amiriyah incident was carefully treated since pictures of Iraqi 
(Arab) civilians massacred by the Americans and British could have angered many 
people in the Gulf Gulf officials were careful throughout the war -via their media -
to prove that Arab nationalism was only a myth, and this could explain the 
concentration by the Gulf media on anti-war demonstrations in other Arab capitals. 
These were interpreted as being pro-Saddam and anti-Gulf rather than opposition to 
Western interference in an Arab region. 
Articles blaming the Iraqis for the incident and making excuses for the 
American pilots who did the bombing, were translated into Arabic and published in 
most of the prominent Gulf newspapers, for instance the one published by 
Newsweek magazine (which circulated in the Gulf)- The article entitled 'What 
Really Happened,' reported that the magazine had learned that allied intelligence had 
discovered that the Al-Amiriyah was one of a dozen bunkers intended to shelter 
Saddam's 'inner circle, the leaders and families of the Revolutionary Command 
Council and the ruling Baath Party.' It went on to say that the shelter had been used 
by Saddam himself and that the PLO leader, Yasser Arafat, had a residence close 
by which he used when visiting Baghdad. Newsweek quoted a Gulf War planner as 
saying, 'You have to convince those around Saddam that, unless they stop him. 
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they personally are at risk' {Newsweek, 25 February 1991). 
One might think that after such an incident the American and British media 
would have stopped advertising war without death and Smart bomb attacks, but the 
reality was that the reporting continued. John Simpson, the BBC foreign editor 
reporting from Baghdad, said on 18 January 1991 '..fears of carpet bombing and 
indiscriminate attacks on residential areas were unfounded...the bombs and missiles 
seem to have landed with pinpoint accuracy.' 
Robert Fisk - one of the few British journalists who rejected the war-
without-death phenomenon - had earlier written that the Desert Storm Joint 
Information Bureau was. 
"marketing war without death. This is not war as 
hell, but war without responsibility, in which the 
tide of information stops at the moment of impact. 
Easy-to-review, easy-to-support drama and light 
entertainment suitable for all the family...Baghdad 
supplies the reality which Dhahran denies (The 
Independent On Sunday, 9 December 1990). 
Fisk's report, however, went unnoticed by the Gulf media desperate to sell a 
war story to the masses in which innocent civilians were untouched and only 
Saddam and his powerful army would be hurt. 
The incident of the Falujah bridge where 'Smart' bombs landed in a 
residential area beside the bridge and many civilians were killed or injured could 
have complicated matters for the Gulf media. After Al-Amiryah, however, the 
media were careful not to produce more pictures of dead Iraqi civilians. 
Dead bodies disappeared from television screens and newspapers after 
these two incidents and when the land battle started a complete blackout was 
enforced by the military. The media did not complain about such a situation, and in 
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fact blocked any criticism of it from being voiced to the public. Such was the 
situation when a BBC radio commentator asked Philip Knightley, the author of 
books on war coverage, about the reason for the blackout. When Knightley 
answered by saying that it was to prevent the world from knowing the 'ferocious' 
nature of the allied attack, the BBC dropped the programme (The New Statesman 
and Society, 15 March 1991). 
The Gulf media were crippled throughout and did not comment on this; 
they kept on publishing and broadcasting official excuses and opinions. In fact, they 
completely ignored the massacre on the Kuwait-Basra highway where thousands of 
retreating Iraqi soldiers and civilians of different nationalities were wiped out by 
'carpet bombing.' At this point Kuwait was 'liberated' and the media concentrated 
on reports fi"om that state and comments at home about it. 
American and British journalists for the first day or so after the liberation of 
Kuwait were busy interviewing Kuwaitis and driving around the capital. At the 
same time, allied soldiers were chasing the retreating Iraqi soldiers and shooting 
them down. When the pool reporters were taken to the highway many concentrated 
on the looting by the fleeing Iraqi conscripts. Kate Adie, the BBC correspondent 
assigned to travel with one of the British regiments, reported that these soldiers 
were running away with consumer products, cars and everything they found along 
their way. 
A few journalists nevertheless painted a more accurate picture of what 
happened on 'highway hell. ' The Iraqi 'Guernica' was horrifically painted by 
Robert Fisk of The Independent who drove up the road from Kuwait city to the 
Iraqi border tovm of Safwan. It is worth repeating what Fisk wrote; 
"..the dead are strewn across the road only five 
miles out of Kuwait city and you see them still as 
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you approach the Iraqi frontier...at one point on the 
highway. I saw wild dogs tearing to pieces the 
remains of Iraqi soldiers corpses lay across the 
highway beside tanks and army trucks. One Iraqi 
had collapsed over the carriageway, curled up like a 
foetus, his arms beside his face, a neat moustache 
beneath a heavy head, the back of which had been 
blown away...two carbonised soldiers still sat in 
the cab, their skulls staring forward up the road 
towards the country they never reached" (The 
Independent, 2 March 1991). 
At this point it is important to stress yet again that such a depiction of the 
war was never read or seen in the Gulf. Gulf officials did not want to raise 
sympathies for the Iraqi soldiers although almost all those who were massacred on 
the highway were conscripts. 
When the media in any given society are suppressed and marginalised space 
is left open for rumours to circulate about incidents that are ignored by local 
journalists fearful of the repercussions. A few incidents were reported by journals 
published by the opposition to the Gulf regimes and were widely circulated among 
the people of the Gulf. For instance, there was the case of the younger religious 
leaders who opposed the presence of foreign armies and were against the war itself. 
Many intellectuals in the Gulf also voiced their fears of the results of launching a 
war against Iraq and not giving the opportunity for a peaceful settlement to the 
conflict. (See for example, issues of Al-Jazeera Al-Arabia, published in London by 
a group of Saudis who oppose the Al-Saud dynasty). 
The liberation of Kuwait lowered the curtain, implying the end of the war at 
least for the Gulf media. After that date local journalists were sent to report only on 
the joyful Kuwaitis and the drastic damage that was inflicted on their country by the 
Iraqi army. The Gulf media concentrated on incidents of rape and torture to justify 
the war. The fate of the Iraqi population left with a huge amount of destruction 
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inflected on their country was not a subject of interest to the local media. Incidents 
of torture and killing by Kuwaitis against other Arabs and Kuwaiti members of the 
opposition were also missing from the Gulf media. In fact, life went back to 
normal only a month after the 'liberation' of Kuwait. But was it really normal for 
the local media? 
For the Gulf journalists the small amount of freedom they used to enjoy 
before the invasion of Kuwait disappeared. Official pressures and censorship 
continued, and the Gulf media went down on bended knee. Like other parts of the 
Gulf population (women and foreign labour) the Gulf media were faced with a 
complete lack of freedom and intensified state oppression. This will be the subject 
of the concluding chapter. 
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CONCLUSION 
"While democracy sweeps the globe, from Latin 
America through much of Africa and Asia and now 
the former Soviet bloc, the Middle East, or at least 
its Arab core, has fallen off the curve of history " 
(Middle East Report Jan-Feb, 1992). 
As the previous chapter revealed, the Gulf War was a turning point in the 
history of the Gulf i f not the whole Arab region. When President George Bush 
went on national television to announce the end of the war, the Gulf leaders knew 
that it marked the beginning of war on the home fi-ont. Although Gulf officials 
were able to control domestic events by bribery at times and oppression at others, 
the situation was no longer feasible. 
The Gulf states had been undergoing economic difficulties before the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait. Financing the war against Iraq increased the difficulties. Saudi 
Arabia, for example, was forced for the first time in years to ask for loans from 
local banks amounting to 24 billion Riyals ($7 billion) {Al-Jazeera Al-Arabia, May 
1992 ). Other Gulf states followed the Saudi example and shopped around for 
loans. At the same time, however, arms purchasing by the Gulf states increased. 
The Gulf governments are the biggest arms purchasers in the world. Arms dealers 
everywhere cater for Gulf markets. Even specialised magazines such as Janes 
Defence Weekly are moving towards publishing an Arabic-language edition. Saudi 
Arabia alone has purchased $15 billion worth of arms since the Gulf war {The 
Independent, 11 June 1992). Bahrain, like all arms importers, had hosted an arms 
exhibition on May 1992 and it is scheduled to organize the Second Middle East 
Defence and Security Exhibition between 16 and 19 of October 1993 (New 
Statesman and Society, 20 November 1992). 
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The Gulf war exposed the vulnerability of the Gulf states patriarchal 
structure and the absence of a civil society. When female American and British 
soldiers arrived in the Gulf, religious men were appalled. The Gulf ruling families, 
who have always preached the preservation of culture and religion, were faced with 
unanswerable questions by their nationals. Two forces emerged during the actual 
war and continued to raise issues of representation and civil rights even when the 
guns went silent. 
Small groups of religious fundamentalists mushroomed, especially in Saudi 
Arabia. Hundreds of tapes by imams of local mosques were circulafing in the 
Kingdom. In general, these imams condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, but 
they opposed the presence of non-Muslim forces. They specifically condemned the 
existence of female soldiers and noted that this would lead to chaos in society. The 
Saudi Government - other governments in the Gulf have done the same - reacted 
by banning these imams from preaching in the mosques. Others were arrested and 
interrogated while the security police went around and collected all the tapes that 
were circulating in the country. Robert Fisk noted: 
"Saudi religious police raided cassette shops to 
confiscate the tapes, most of which take the form 
of sermons, complete with cries of approval from 
worshippers. Sunni religious sources in Cairo say 
at least 20 fiindamentalists behind the campaign 
have been arrested" (The Independent 11 June 1992). 
These young Islamic fundamentalists found fertile ground for their ideas. 
The Arab people in general have become disillusioned with the many ideologies 
that flourished during the 1960s and 1970s. Arab nationalism, Nasserism, Ba'thism 
and communism have all failed in the past to pull the Arab world out of its 
stagnation after liberation from French, Italian and British colonialism. The last ten 
years or so witnessed a vacuum in the political sphere and the Arabs were striving 
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to find their own identity. Many thought that going back to the roots of Islam and 
Islamic culture would solve their problem and restore their dignity that had been 
lost through a series of defeats. Ghassan Tueni noted: 
"Having resisted communism and socialism without 
assuming democracy... Arab politics has produced 
one innovation - so far more negative than positive 
-a movement of opposition rather than a system of 
government: religious fundamentalism " (Ibid.). 
Saudi fundamentalists took the law into their own hands and used force to 
propagate their ideas. At some points they searched houses and arrested whole 
families accusing them of organising mixed gatherings and parties. They 
announced that any kind of intermingling between the sexes, even among members 
of the same family, was contrary to Islam. Foreigners were also harassed by them, 
even those who were members of foreign diplomatic circles. The wife of the 
Tunisian ambassador to Saudi Arabia was whipped by the religious police in one 
of Riyadh's shopping centres, accused of not covering up properly. The Saudi 
Government apologised to the Tunisian ambassador and his government, but the 
religious police continued doing the same to other women. 
The second force which found in the Gulf war a chance to call for the 
introduction of some kind of political representation was the young educated 
intellectuals. Their approach was d i f ferent f rom that of the religious 
fundamentalists. They avoided any direct clash with the government and preferred 
to write petitions and present them to the king or emir. Saudi doctors, university 
professors, businessmen, lawyers and other liberal intellectuals met King Fahd and 
presented him with a list of issues that they thought needed to be tackled by the 
state. Their list included the right for Saudi women to drive cars and to work. Saudi 
women had their own way of addressing their civil rights. They took to the streets 
of Riyadh in a convoy of cars where they were harassed and arrested by the 
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religious police. 
The Gulf ruling families had their own agenda and made use of the 
presence of foreign (especially American) forces in their states. Immediately after 
the end of the hostilities they announced cuts in subsidies and introduced taxes. At 
the same time the security police were arresting thousands of religious leaders and 
others. Even those who opposed the Al-Saud role from a distance were kidnapped 
and brought back home. In October 1991 the Saudi government kidnapped a Saudi 
opposition figure, Mohammed Al-Fasi, from his residence in the Jordanian capital 
Amman. A l l attempts by his brother-in-law (who is a member of the Al-Saud 
family) to free him or to learn the conditions under which he is imprisoned have so 
far failed. 
An eminent Bahraini religious leader and academic was arrested at the 
airport on his return from 'liberated' Kuwait where he had attended a conference. 
He was taken to court where the Bahraini Government accused him of instigating 
the overthrow of the Gulf ruling families in a paper he presented at the conference 
on the ftiture of the Gulf region after the war. Sheikh Abdul-Latif Al-Mahmoud 
was acquitted by the court, but the Bahraini Minister of the Interior ordered his 
dismissal from Bahrain University and he was prohibited from preaching in his 
local mosque. 
In Qatar a petition was signed by members of prominent merchant families 
in the country and other liberal intellectuals. In December 1991 this petition was 
sent to the Emir. It called for political reforms and stated that citizens' rights and 
obligations in the Gulf emirate should be protected and respected by the 
govemment. All those who signed the petition were harassed by the security police 
and their passports were confiscated by the govemment. By May 1992 they were 
faced with no option but to turn to one of the foreign news agencies operating in the 
country. They handed their petition to the Reuters representative in Doha (the Qatar 
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capital). 
The Gulf ruling families not only punished their own citizens; they also 
extended their retribution to other Arab nationals, mainly those who had opposed 
the war against Iraq. In September 1992, Abdallah Bishara, the Secretary-General 
of the Gulf Co-operation Council, announced that Arab intellectuals who opposed 
the war must be banned from all Arab media owned by the Gulf. His statement 
aroused alarm among Arab writers, artists and others who know very well that 
most of the Arab media are owned by Gulf proprietors {The Independent 19 
September 1992 ). Abdallah Bishara's statement in fact reveals a lot about the state 
of the media since the war. Censorship has prevailed and the Gulf media went 
silent. Although many Gulf journalists thought that they might regain some of their 
freedom after the war, they now know very well that it has been buried in the sands 
of Desert Storm. 
While tensions grew, the Gulf ruling elites were obliged to use the same old 
solution to appease their angry citizens. They had to introduce cuts in prices and 
abandoned their tax plans. King Fahd, for example, on 24 March 1992 announced 
huge cuts which included 37 per cent on petrol prices, 30 per cent on gas, 50 per 
cent on water, 5.28 per cent on electricity, and local telephone calls in the kingdom 
were made free. This wil l cost the Saudi Government 5 billion Riyals annually. 
Saudi debts wil l reach 30 billion Riyals with a budget deficit of 31 billion {Al-
Jazeera Al-Arabia, April 1992 ). Many of the Gulf rulers promised their people the 
introduction of a consultative councils. King Fahd of Saudi Arabia announced at the 
beginning of 1992 a governing charter which was seen by many Saudis as merely a 
facade. In an interview with the Kuwaiti nQ^s^dcpQX Al-Seyassah , King Fahd noted 
that Western style democracy contradicts with what he called 'the speciality of the 
Saudi society which is based on the Islamic religion.' He continued by saying that 
democratic elections do not exist in Islam {Al-Seyassah, 28 March 1992 ). Saudi 
231 
Arabia, like many other Gulf states, does not have a written constitution, while the 
constitution of such countries as Kuwait and Bahrain is not put into practice or 
respected by the state. 
In other Gulf capitals tensions escalated between the ruling families and 
their citizens. Among their nationals there are signs of conflict between those who 
call for liberalisation and the end of the traditional norms and cultures and others 
who would like to see the creation of a real Islamic state. These religious 
fundamentalists are not united, however, and there are splits among their ranks. 
The views of an Islamic state differ also between Sunnis and Shi'ites. The Shi'ites 
represent an important element since they constitute 70 per cent of the population in 
a country like Bahrain and 20 per cent in Saudi Arabia, while their percentage in 
other Gulf states varies. 
In short, the fiiture of the Gulf region looks gloomier than it was two years 
ago when the Gulf war started. Many elements have aggravated the situation 
instead of calming it down. The continual presence of Western, especially 
American, forces in the region remindes many Gulf nationals of the old colonial 
period. Religious fundamentalists have utilised it to gather support, raising the fear 
of the threat to traditional norms from the presence of non-Muslim forces. 
On the other hand, oil reserves are increasing to the extent that the smallest 
oil field in any Gulf emirate equals that produced by all the oil wells in the United 
States {Al-Jazeera Al-Arabia, May, 1992). This in effect means that the foreign 
forces wi l l not pack up and leave as promised by the Western leaders at the 
beginning of the conflict. The Gulf ruling families depend on these forces for their 
own protection against any internal conflict. They will also continue to purchase 
weapons from the West even i f they need to borrow in order to finance these arms 
deals. 
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Those Gulf liberal intellectuals who felt that the West might help them in 
their struggle for democratisation have found that they have to fight their battle on 
their own. It is not only a war against the ruling monarchies, but also a challenging 
battle against the religious fundamentalist forces that are gaining strength by the 
minute. Meanwhile, tensions will intensify and only the future will reveal who will 
win the struggle; those who are looking towards the ftiture or those who would like 
to retreat into history. 
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